





At the Centre of Political Storms

Leonid Kutakov

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS



Leonid Kutakov is a Soviet diplomat and scientist. He was born in 1919 and graduated from Moscow University. A participant in the Great Patriotic War, he worked as a diplomat from 1946. From 1965 to 1973 he worked in the UN, first in the Soviet mission and then as a deputy to the UN Secretary-General. He has written many books exploring the field of international relations, and his works have been published in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and other countries. In this book the reader will find out about the behind-the-scenes diplomatic battles in the Security Council and the UN General Assembly. The book presents a gallery of portraits of major political and public figures from various countries.

At the Centre of Political Storms

Leonid
Kutakov

The Memoirs
of a Soviet
Diplomat



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
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Л. Кутаков

В ЦЕНТРЕ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ БУРЬ

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AT THE CENTRE OF POLITICAL STORMS

New York Ahead

On June 21, 1965 our Boeing 707 of the Belgian company Sabena was approaching New York.

A voice came over the loudspeaker:

"Ladies and gentlemen. In a few minutes we shall be landing at Kennedy International Airport. The time in New York is 6 p.m. and the air temperature is 96 Fahrenheit, 35 Centigrade. Please prepare the documents you will need for customs and passport control. Fill in your immigration forms and your customs declarations carefully. This is Flight 231."

We got into a car and drove to the Soviet representation at the UN on 67th Street in Manhattan. The hot and humid air enveloped us, and somehow I could not believe that that same morning I had been walking along the cool streets of Moscow. It was a little sad, but the abundance of new impressions soon distracted me from my memories.

The multi-lane highways on the approaches to Queens, the western sector of New York, made me recall the illustrations to H.G. Wells' fantastical novels: streams of cars were carrying people in various directions both above and below us. Queensboro Bridge links Queens with the centre of the city, and from it there is a view of the eastern part of Manhattan. Against the background of the Empire State Building and the Chrysler Building another edifice, which is not

especially tall by American standards, stands on the wide East River.

"Do you see that box?" asked the official meeting me, pointing. "That's the UN building—a 40-storey skyscraper. It's where the UN Secretariat is and the office of U Thant and three-and-a-half thousand officials. The rather low building to the left with the dome-shaped roof is where the General Assembly meets. The halls where the Security Council and committees meet are between the skyscraper and the Assembly building, and there are restaurants there, too."

I was to be in the United States for two to three years. I could not have thought at the time that they would turn into eight long years. When I had been working in the Soviet mission at the UN for three years U Thant, on the recommendation of the Soviet government, appointed me Under-Secretary-General on Political and Security Council Affairs. One of the most important departments of the UN Secretariat, the Department on Political and Security Council Affairs, is located on the 35th floor of the UN skyscraper. The most important, topical events in international life inevitably go through the political department. I shall talk about them in later chapters, and since I used to live and work in China and Japan I naturally paid most attention to Far Eastern problems.

At the Cradle of the UN

In August 1965 Adlai Stevenson, the permanent representative of the USA on the UN died unexpectedly. He was an outstanding figure in American political life. As leader of the Democratic Party, one of the leading bourgeois parties of the USA, he ran for Presidency in 1952 and 1956. Taking Stevenson's reputation in the coun-

try into account, President Johnson ordered a state funeral. Members of the administration and Congress, the diplomatic corps and missions attached to the UN were all invited to the ceremony. I was chosen to represent the Soviet delegation to the UN.

The funeral ceremony took place in a Protestant cathedral. It was devoid of any of the emotionality and solemnness characteristic of Catholic and Orthodox ceremonies, and those attending openly scanned their neighbours, looking for people they knew and for celebrities. It was here that I saw Robert Kennedy, American Attorney General, and Edward Kennedy, a young Congressman from Massachusetts, for the first time—the younger brothers of President John Kennedy, who was assassinated in 1963. Rather short and well built with light red hair, they were alike.

Many people turned around to look at these representatives of the legendary Kennedy clan. People still remembered the tragic fate of their elder brother, and no one even thought that less than three years later one of these young men, who looked more like students than statesmen, would prove to be the victim of a new crime. Robert Kennedy was assassinated in June 1968.

The sad occasion of Stevenson's funeral gave me the opportunity to visit Dumbarton Oaks,¹ the cradle of the UN, for the first time.

¹ Dumbarton Oaks—one of the old estates in the centre of Washington. It was here in 1944 that an international conference involving the USSR, the USA and Great Britain took place and that preliminary talks were held to draw up a charter for an international organisation to preserve international peace. In the final stage the US and British delegations held talks with the Chinese representative. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference drew up the proposals which lay at the basis of the UN Charter.

The idea of creating an international organisation to maintain and strengthen peace and international security became widespread during the Second World War.

The creation of the UN was preceded by: the Declaration by United Nations (1942), the Declaration of Moscow (made by the foreign ministers of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China), the Declaration of Three Powers (Declaration of Teheran (1943), the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the resolutions of the Crimea Conference (1945), and the San Francisco Conference (1945).

Even at this stage a different approach to the question of the Organisation's goals and tasks came to light. The Soviet government insisted that the questions of international security, maintaining peace and averting war must lie at the centre of its activity. After the war the most acute and imperative problem was that of preserving and strengthening peace and international security. It was for this reason that the USSR insisted the UN concentrate its efforts in precisely this direction. The Western powers, however, tried to water down the UN's activity with a multitude of different questions not directly related to urgent political problems. The USSR later agreed to some of these questions coming into the Organisation's functions, provided the political side of its activity retained priority.

The biggest difficulties in drawing up the UN Charter were caused by the question of the voting procedure in the Security Council, the Organisation's main organ. The USSR, the USA and Great Britain were all agreed that the functions of preserving peace came under the jurisdiction of the Council, that exclusive responsibility for maintaining peace rested with the Soviet Union,

the United States, Great Britain, France and China, and that these countries should be permanent members of the Council and hold the relevant position in it.

The Soviet delegation tried to make sure the Organisation really did serve the cause of peace and that it could not be used by some power or group of powers as a weapon against other members. In order to do this it was necessary to establish a decision-making procedure in its main organ—the Security Council—which would not allow the Organisation to be used against the interests of peace or to the detriment of the legal interests of any state.

Edward R. Stettinius, the leader of the American delegation, suggested that the principle of unanimity amongst the Council's permanent members be implemented where decisions concerning the use of coercive measures were to be adopted. The USA was the initiator of the right of veto which sprang from this demand for unanimity amongst the five great powers.

The participants in the Conference disagreed on the procedure for adopting decisions when one of the permanent members of the Council was itself involved in a dispute. The USSR took the view that the principle of unanimity amongst the permanent members of the Council must be preserved whenever it was adopting any political decisions and that an infringement of this principle would lead to the failure of the Organisation, as had already happened with the League of Nations.

The USA, however, insisted that the vote of a permanent member involved in a dispute should not be counted. This procedure gave no guarantees against abuse. Basing themselves on their own goals, the Western powers, which had a majority, could have forced decisions on the use of

economic and military sanctions, the severance of diplomatic relations, etc. The USSR refused to recognise this procedure, and the question remained unsolved at Dumbarton Oaks. The question of the voting procedure was once again examined in detail at the Yalta Conference between the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in February 1945. On the whole, the formula suggested by Franklin Roosevelt was approved. This formula envisaged unanimity amongst the five permanent members of the Council in the solving of all political questions except those of procedure, confirmation of the agenda, etc. If the question was one of using means of coercion (economic, diplomatic or military sanctions), the agreement of all the permanent members was required.

A great deal of attention at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was devoted to the role and powers of the General Assembly.¹ After prolonged discussions it was decided that the Assembly would have the right independently to examine questions of preserving peace and security, but that only the Security Council would have the right to take decisions which would be binding on all members of the UN and to adopt coercive measures to restore peace or prevent its violation.

It is interesting to note that the USA insisted on the system of "weighted voting", resembling the system which exists in joint-stock companies, where the number of votes a shareholder has is determined by the amount of capital he

¹ The General Assembly is empowered to discuss questions relating to the preservation of international peace and security and to recommend measures for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes. Decisions of the General Assembly are adopted by a two-thirds majority of the votes.

has invested. The USA proposed that each country have a number of votes proportional to its contribution to the Organisation's expenses. This suggestion did not get through, and every country in the UN has one vote.

The San Francisco Conference took place from April to June 1945. Fifty countries were represented at it by 282 delegates. In all, almost five thousand people took part in the Conference's proceedings, which went on under the sign of the unity of the allied powers: the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. On the whole, the UN Charter was confirmed in the form in which it was drawn up during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta talks between the leaders of the three great powers.

In the spring of 1967 I received an invitation from Professor Robert Scalapino, chairman of the National Committee on USA-China Relations¹, to visit the small university campus of Berkeley. On the way there we visited San Francisco which literally fascinates its guests. When one has been there it is easy to understand why voices were heard amongst the many participants of the 1945 Conference in favour of choosing San Francisco as the site for the UN headquarters. "I left my heart in San Francisco," Americans sing in New York, Oklahoma City, Boston and Chicago. The city really is full of charm.

Russian explorers arrived in peace in California even before the Americans, and their memory lives in the names of streets and districts in San Francisco: Russian Hill, Russian River, Russian Fort, Russia Street.

¹ As well as scientists, the Committee was made up of representatives of business circles from the East and West of the USA, including such prominent figures as David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Donald Kendall, president of Pepsi Cola et al.

From the aeroplane San Francisco appeared as the rippling of its hills and blocks, which were intersected slantwise by Market Street, the city's main thoroughfare. A green belt of parkland stretched from east to west towards the ocean, and further to the North there were the giant orange towers of the Golden Gate Bridge. Apart from its famous bridge and hills, San Francisco is also famous in its own way for its unique Fish Market, which is piled high with the fruits of the sea and boasts a mass of cafes and restaurants where magnificent meals are prepared from freshly caught lobsters and shrimps.

The beauty of San Francisco captivates its guests, but the city itself lives with a multitude of problems. Various people live in both San Francisco and the state of California. Like in New York, there is a mixture of races and nationalities in San Francisco. Of the city's 700,000 inhabitants, 96,000 are Negroes, 60,000 are Chinese, there are just as many emigres from Russia and no less Italians. Then there come large groups of Irish, Poles, Jews, Mexicans, Japanese and Filipinos.

Many people in San Francisco take an interest in politics, especially young people. When I first visited San Francisco College in 1966 (where around 40,000 people were studying), the following had been written on the arch at the entrance to the campus: "Stop the war in Vietnam!", "No entry to representatives of the American Army or Navy". A meeting was raging on a large lawn. One speaker after another went up to the microphone and angrily denounced the criminal war in Vietnam, declaring that none of them would go into the Army.

Leaflets written by all kinds of organisations ranging from the Black Panthers to the Union of Christian Youth lay on tables beside the im-

provised rostrum, where they were handed to all those who wanted them. San Francisco is a kind of cradle of all sorts of leftist movements.

Former Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan, the then governor of California who was notorious for his reactionary views, sharply cut back the grant to the University of California, because major businessmen and monopolists did not like the free spirit of the students and some of the professors, or their anti-war demonstrations. The grant cut was aimed at getting rid of professors and students of liberal-democratic persuasion, especially from among the poor students who were not able to pay for their studies.

San Francisco, a major financial, shipping and cultural centre on the Pacific coast, was not chosen as the headquarters of the UN. For the majority of European, African and Latin American countries, and also for some Asian countries, the distance to New York was considerably shorter and, therefore, cheaper, than to San Francisco. The United Nations began work in Lake Success, a suburb of New York. The millionaire David Rockefeller presented the new organisation with a vacant plot on the banks of the East River near Turtle Bay. At the time the plot was worth several million dollars, and the American press glorified Rockefeller for his generosity and devotion to the cause of peace. The overheads on the present, however, did not remain free of charge. The area around the UN building also belonged to the Rockefellers and soon began to be bought up for individual UN institutions, the missions of a number of countries to the UN, restaurants and hotels. The district grew and the profits from the sale of land and the exploitation of the new buildings began to pour into the pockets of the very same Rockefellers.

The complex of UN buildings now occupies

several blocks between 41st and 47th Street on the banks of the East River, and this place is called the United Nations area.

With its enormous glass windows which look onto a large, green park and the embankment of the East River, and with its numerous halls for the sessions of the General Assembly and its committees, the Security Council, the Social and Economic Council and the Trusteeship Council, the UN building is a beautiful example of modern architecture.

Inside there are halls and large lounges decorated with splendid works of art which have been presented to the UN by the governments of various countries. These include an unusually beautiful and original carpet which was given by Iran, an ancient bronze Zeus from Greece and a polished sphere with long antennae (a model of the Earth's first artificial satellite) presented by the Soviet government. A piece of lunar rock brought back by American astronauts gleams under a glass dome like a precious stone. The hall where the General Assembly meets is on the first floor and next to it there is a large vestibule decorated with works of art from Indonesia. This vestibule is the site of numerous meetings and discussions between diplomats from various countries and has come to be called "the Indonesian lounge". Not far from the entrance to the hall where the Security Council meets there stands a large porcelain vase decorated with the intricate patterns of Ukrainian ornamental design which was a present from the Ukrainian SSR. A remarkable sculpture called "Let's Beat Swords Into Ploughshares" by the Soviet sculptor Evgeni Vuchetich has been placed on the green lawn of the park beside the UN building, where it serves as a vivid symbol of the USSR's peaceable foreign policy.

The Organisation's work and the day-to-day activity of its institutions reflect all international events and the full diversity of the planet's international life. Winds and storms caused by conflicts and wars, coups d'etat and revolutions constantly rage over the skyscraper on the East River and new political whirlwinds burst into the office of the Secretary-General and are stirred up in the halls where the various bodies of the UN meet.

Gunfire and the sound of bombs exploding are never to be heard in the UN building, the orderly and measured procedure which reigns in the meetings having little association with conflicts and cataclysms. Every word of the delegates, however, sometimes hides the fate of tens of thousands of people. Listen to some speakers and it is clear that their fine words and elegant expressions conceal the shameless intrigues of the imperialists, who, with marvellous eulogies, are weaving a net against the socialist countries and the liberation movements and covering up conspiracies and overturns in the countries which have taken the path of independence and social reform.

The speakers have different styles and different manners. Some speak brilliantly and colourfully without referring to a previously prepared text, while others read indistinctly and monotonously. There are different languages and different reasoning. Despite the diversity of styles and forms, however, the two main lines, the two tendencies of the UN's activity are clearly visible: on the one hand, the forces of peace, democracy and social progress, and on the other, the forces of war, reaction and oppression.

San Francisco went down in the history of the United Nations as the city where the UN Charter was adopted. The tasks of the Organisation

were defined in Chapter I of the Charter as follows:

"The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends."

The United Nations is called on to be a forum for all its member states to express their opinions on the widest circle of political, economic, social, legal and other questions; a mechanism for establishing contacts and holding talks to draw up coordinated decisions; and an instrument of support and reinforcement for universal peace, as well as for averting and, if necessary, suppressing aggression.

When it is examining and taking a decision on any question in any field of international rela-

tions the UN invariably operates as an inter-state organisation, an organisation of sovereign, independent states. The activity of an organisation consisting of states belonging to different social systems could not have anything other than an inter-state base.

The UN does not and cannot stand above states, and it is precisely for this reason that no UN body, with the exception of the Security Council, can adopt decisions on any questions which are binding on member states. In accordance with the UN Charter, the decisions of the General Assembly and other organs constitute recommendations to the member states of the Organisation. Granting the General Assembly or its organs the right to take binding decisions would be tantamount to granting one group of states the right to dictate its will to the other members of the UN and a limitation of national sovereignty. In this respect special rights are granted only to the Security Council, which is charged with the responsibility of preserving international peace. All members of the Organisation are obliged to subordinate themselves to the decisions of the Security Council. The binding nature of all the decisions of the Council, which is made up of just part of the UN membership (15 states), is made necessary by the need to ensure that effective measures are taken to avert or halt possible aggression, for which the principle of unanimity amongst the five permanent members of the Council—the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, France and China—must be observed. In other words, the establishment of this principle gives each of the five permanent members the right of veto and reflects the objective fact that these five states are still the most powerful in the military respect—as they were when the UN was founded—and therefore bear most responsibility for

ensuring peace, although they belong to different social systems. If the international situation demands that force be used to avert or suppress aggression the Security Council can only act if all five great powers agree, otherwise the United Nations could be turned into a political weapon for those powers which, by using their majority in the Security Council, could, instead of consolidating peace, go out on the war-path. The specific results of the UN's activity have always depended on the arrangement of forces in the world arena.

When I arrived in New York in June 1965 the twentieth anniversary of the Organisation was being celebrated. There were jubilee ceremonies in San Francisco and then in New York at the 20th session of the General Assembly in September. Many delegates talked about the results of the UN's twenty years of activity and about the major changes which had taken place both in the international arena and in the work of the United Nations.

Spiral Development

At the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s the arrangement of forces in the UN on the whole reflected the position in the world. The socialist community was only beginning to take shape, while entire continents—Asia, Africa and Latin America—were essentially under the military, political and economic control of the imperialist powers. Most West European states and some countries on other continents were members of military blocs headed by the United States. In these conditions the USA could easily control the situation in UN bodies.

Only rarely did the Soviet Union and those few states which took a progressive stance in the UN

succeed in getting constructive decisions adopted. We can include in these the resolutions on the extradition and punishment of war criminals; on the universal reduction of arms and armed forces; on the prohibition of atomic weapons; and on the condemnation of war propaganda and the prevention and punishment of genocide.

At the same time, the imperialist powers many times foisted on the United Nations decisions which were completely at variance with the interests of peace and of the peoples. In 1950 American imperialism unleashed a war against the Korean people under the flag of the UN. Sessions of the UN General Assembly were used to make shameless attempts to blacken and discredit the foreign policy of the socialist countries and their internal development. For a long time the entry of the socialist countries into the UN was impeded, and the Chinese representation was reserved for Chiang Kai-shek.

The imperialist powers also made considerable efforts to adapt the very basis of the UN's activity to their own aggressive foreign policy plans. In 1950 the "Uniting for Peace" resolution was adopted by a simple majority, which, contrary to the UN Charter, empowered the General Assembly to take decisions on the use of armed forces.

From the second half of the 1950s the correlation of forces began to change more and more in favour of socialism, progress and national liberation. These changes could not but tell on the activity of the UN.

The United Nations was supplemented with more than 20 new members, including four socialist countries (Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania) and eleven Asian ones (including Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Ceylon and Nepal). The strengthening

of the socialist group and the entry into the UN of a number of young Asian states born in the fires of the national liberation struggle, and serious political and social changes in some Asian and African countries which were already members of the UN, all made for the appearance of new trends. The USA and its allies could no longer always control the course of events in UN bodies. As early as 1956 peace-loving states were able to get the General Assembly to condemn the aggression of Britain, France and Israel against Egypt. On the whole, however, the imperialist powers to a considerable extent exerted a decisive influence on the activity of the UN, even in the second half of the 1950s. They continued to wage a cold war against the socialist countries at meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other bodies, trying to have every possible provocative question, such as the "Hungarian question", the "Korean question" and others, examined.

The entry into the UN of dozens of young independent states noticeably influenced its activity, and by the middle of the 1960s its membership had more than doubled. By 1965 a new arrangement of forces had arisen in the UN, which now numbered 114 members, and a real possibility appeared of forming an anti-imperialist majority comprising the socialist countries and the independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which followed a policy of non-alignment.

As a result of this, states against which the imperialist powers committed acts of aggression or which they threatened with their armed forces began to turn more and more often to the United Nations for help and support. The examination of these appeals took on a definite anti-imperialist character, the Security Council and the General Assembly discussing such acute ques-

tions as the imperialist aggression against the Congo (1960), the aggressive acts of the USA against Cuba (1962), the threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus (1964), and the American intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965).

The discussion of questions such as these in the United Nations represents definite moral and political support for the peoples fighting to strengthen their independence, and in a number of cases becomes a factor restraining or, at the very least, hindering the activities of the imperialists.

Thus, the Soviet Union's proposal that the Security Council examine the question of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic prevented the American military from destroying that country's democratic forces and attracted the attention of the world to the aggressive policy of American imperialism in Latin America. It is true, however, that in this case the imperialist powers were able to impede the adoption of effective decisions to suppress the aggression. In other cases the imperialists succeeded in controlling UN operations which were taken to protect states which were the object of aggression. The UN troops sent to the Congo in 1960 at the request of Patrice Lumumba, the first Congolese Prime Minister, to stop the Belgian intervention were used by the imperialists to once more enslave the Congolese people. After the events in the Congo, however, the imperialist powers were not able to use a single UN decision connected with direct actions in any region of the world in their own interests.

In the face of an overwhelming majority of UN member states the Security Council adopted concerted decisions furthering the regulation of acute international situations. This was what

happened when, for example, the questions were examined of foreign interference in the affairs of Cyprus and of regulation of the conflict between India and Pakistan. Soviet diplomacy repeatedly used the Security Council to expose the acts of aggression of the imperialist powers and their interference in the affairs of nations.

Peace-loving countries have also been able to get the United Nations to adopt a number of decisions in support of the peoples' struggle to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. At the initiative of the Soviet Union, the 14th session of the General Assembly (1959) adopted a resolution which recognised universal and complete disarmament as the most important question facing the world at the time. In 1961 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons. The use of nuclear weapons was declared a crime against humanity and civilisation, and the entire African continent was proclaimed a nuclear-free zone.

The activity of the UN in the field of international law also became more productive. The 18th session of the General Assembly (1963) adopted the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.

The change in the composition of the UN led to a decision being taken to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council elected for two years from 6 to 10, this increase mainly being accounted for by Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Since 1965, when this decision came into force, the Security Council has become more representative, reflecting the true balance of forces in the world arena. The number of members of the

Social and Economic Council was also increased from 18 to 27. These amendments to the UN Charter reflected the change in the correlation of forces in the world political arena.

The changed international conditions created a basis for stepping up the UN's activity and provided the prospect of turning it into a genuine instrument of peace and assistance to the peoples in their struggle for freedom and social progress. Today the United Nations is an inalienable part of the system of international relations and brings together states which belong to different socio-economic systems.

The headquarters of the UN are today the site of regular meetings between the representatives of the vast majority of states to exchange opinions, discuss international problems, put forward various proposals and agree foreign policy conceptions. The United Nations has become a stage for the ideological struggle and an effective channel for propaganda and the formation of public opinion.

The UN plays an important role in furthering the economic and social progress of developing countries, and has become a coordinating centre for specialised institutions, the number of which is growing steadily.

One of the main bodies of the UN is the Secretariat, which is called on to make sure the whole UN apparatus functions successfully.

The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, who is appointed for a five-year term by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The status of the Secretary-General, his functions and powers are determined by the UN Charter, and he is the chief administrative officer of the Organisation. His main task is to guide the work of all the Secretariat's personnel in the

organisation of the activity of the UN's main bodies—the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council.

None of the clauses in the Charter gives any basis for viewing the Secretary-General as having the right to take political decisions in the name of the Organisation, but the very first Secretaries General—Trygve Lie of Norway (1945-1952) and Dag Hjalmar Hammarskjöld of Sweden (1952-1961)—wanted to be considered not just administrative officials, but political leaders of the Organisation. This became particularly clear in connection with the UN's activities in the Middle East in 1956-1957 and its operations in the Congo in 1960-1961 while Hammarskjöld was Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld claimed at the 12th session of the General Assembly that the Secretary-General could act not only in those cases defined by the UN Charter, but also, if he considered it necessary, to fill a possible vacuum in the systems provided for by the Charter and traditional diplomacy to ensure peace and security.

Hammarskjöld's stance and his claims met with warm support in Western countries, because his line met the age-old aspirations of the imperialist powers to substitute the solving of important political problems in the Security Council, where they had to take account of the position of the USSR, which had the right of veto, with the individual actions of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General could be a convenient screen to get round the decisions of the General Assembly, where the majority, which had previously been dutiful to the Western powers, was growing smaller and smaller. I should point out that Hammarskjöld's aims are still widely propagandised by some officials of the UN Sec-

retariat, who tried to thrust them onto U Thant and Kurt Waldheim.

A Soviet memorandum presented to the UN on March 16, 1967 pointed out the dangerous nature of the attempts to endow the Secretary-General with powers which were reserved exclusively for the Security Council. "Not even the most authoritative and objective figure [in the post of Secretary-General—*L.K.*]", it said, "can solve problems that should be solved by the states and governments concerned, in keeping with the Charter."¹

Hammar skjöld died in an air disaster over the Congo in March 1961.

The UN operation in the Belgian Congo was undertaken at the request of the government of Patrice Lumumba to defend the young republic from Belgian colonialists and the separatists they supported, who were trying to break off the rich province of Katanga from the newly-formed state. Patrice Lumumba was assassinated as a result of an imperialist plot.

Hammar skjöld turned the UN operation in the Congo into something like a punitive expedition, pushing aside the Security Council's guidance of the operation. A number of circumstances surrounding the air disaster in which the Secretary-General died remained unclear. In a discussion with me, Ralph Bunche of the USA, deputy UN Secretary-General and one of the leaders of the Congo operation, asserted that the catastrophe was organised by mercenaries. Belgian and British monopolies did not like the way Hammar skjöld worked, and believed he acted in the interests of the USA.

After Hammar skjöld's death a memorial to

¹ *New Times. A Weekly Journal of World Affairs* (Moscow), No. 16, April 19, 1967, p. 5.

him was erected in front of the UN Secretariat's building. A modernist sculptor placed in the centre of a fountain a large piece of stone in the form of a stretched and bowed pear-shaped figure with an opening at the top. People explain that this is supposed to symbolise Hammarskjöld's punctured heart.

U Thant, the Burmese representative, was elected the new Secretary-General. He was born in 1909, finished the Higher National School, graduated from the University of Rangoon and joined the national liberation movement. From 1931 he worked as the director of a school and engaged in journalism. In 1945 he was appointed director of the propaganda section of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. When Burma obtained independence in 1947 he became the Prime Minister's chief adviser and held a number of responsible posts in the government. In 1957 Burma was accepted as a member of the UN and U Thant became its first representative. As he later explained, the Prime Minister called him in and said:

"You have to go to New York for a year to see what benefit we can get from the UN."

"I never thought," U Thant later explained, "that my trip to New York would link my own future to that of the UN for many years."

U Thant was Burma's permanent representative at the UN, headed the Burmese delegation at sessions of the General Assembly, and took part in the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961.

In November 1961 he was elected acting Secretary-General, and his appointment was confirmed a year later.

U Thant's activity became widely known around the world, and he showed himself to

be an active supporter of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. He also came out consistently in favour of implementing the principles of peaceful coexistence and of solving international conflicts and disputes through negotiations.

By following this political line he assisted the peaceful settlement of the 1962 Cuba crisis and helped solve the problems of returning West Irian to Indonesia and of regulating the "financial crisis" of the UN which was fabricated by the Western powers in 1964, as well as a number of other important international problems.

The UN operation in the Congo, which Hammarskjöld turned into a punitive expedition, showed the whole world the disparity between the UN's executive apparatus and the new conditions which had taken shape within the Organisation as a result both of its having been joined by dozens of new states and of the enormous changes for the better in international relations.

U Thant took this into account. Speaking in 1964 he said that the Secretary-General was above all a servant of the Organisation and that he could only act within the framework of the powers granted him in each specific case by the Security Council or the General Assembly. He was, he said, to maintain close contact with and continually to consult the members of the Organisation and the governments directly interested in the solution of a given problem.

On the whole U Thant followed this formula, although he subsequently committed certain digressions under pressure from the Western powers and under the influence of his advisers from Western countries.

While he was Secretary-General U Thant acquired great international authority. Most of his declarations were politically definite and clear. They have been published in all countries of the world, and both friends and enemies of the UN have heeded his words.

THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT CONTINUES

How It Began

June 4, 1967 was a Sunday. In America at ten o'clock that evening CBS was, as usual, broadcasting the latest news.

In New York the news is read by three people who read the items out in turn. As a rule, the items are illustrated by film reports: there are interviews with celebrities, correspondents' reports from the capitals of the world, and the life of New York in every possible aspect (strikes, burglaries, fires, murders and so on). The programme sometimes has a small section on fashion and reports on new books and visits to art exhibitions, etc. First place, however, belongs to politics. On June 4 there was nothing worrying in the review of international events. The programme's international section opened with a report from Cairo, where gaily dressed people were walking along the streets of the nocturnal city. Advertisements for cabarets, night clubs and cinemas were shining brightly and beautifully-dressed women were hurrying to theatres and restaurants on the arms of their officers. The mood of serenity reached us, too, and it seemed as if the tension in the Middle East had receded and that calm reigned in Cairo, just one hundred kilometres from the Israeli aerodromes.

I was at the Soviet delegation's holiday cottage. Everyone was extremely tired from the

endless meetings of the Security Council, which had begun on May 24, on the situation in the Middle East. That morning there had been a report on the radio that the Vice-President of the UAR was to fly to Washington for talks with President Johnson on the peaceful settlement of the situation. At the same time Cairo's readiness was announced to receive Hubert Humphrey, the American Vice-President. These reports had been received with a sigh of relief in UN circles.

At 5 o'clock in the morning on June 5 there was a sudden knock on my door.

"Come to the telephone, you're wanted on the telephone," the warden of the cottage said in a loud whisper.

It was the duty diplomat ringing from New York:

"Israel has carried out an attack on the UAR. The chairman of the Security Council has called an emergency meeting for 8 o'clock in the morning at the request of the UAR."

I left for New York with N. T. Fedorenko, the USSR's permanent representative at the UN. Newsreaders were reporting in a patter on the radio that at dawn Israeli aircraft had come in from the sea and made an unexpected air strike against Egyptian aerodromes and bombed Cairo, Port Said and Suez. Israel's tank armies had unleashed an attack on the Sinai peninsula and made strikes on the area of Gaza, and on Jordan and Syria. Military observers were also giving their opinion on the radio as to the possible outcome of this, the third Arab-Israeli war.

Tel Aviv's declarations, which were full of deceitful fabrications, were also reported: "The war is a self-defence measure we have been forced to take... The Arab countries have been

planning to destroy the Jewish state for a long time..."

Zionist propaganda created the myth that in June 1967 Israel was facing the danger of extermination and that the UAR, Syria and Jordan were planning to attack it and liquidate it as a state. Therefore, the attack of June 5 was supposedly a preventive measure taken in the interests of self-defence. These arguments were refuted by the large amount of evidence of members of the Israeli government during the Six Day War and of leaders of the American administration.

The situation in the Middle East was undoubtedly tense. The USSR and other countries made considerable efforts to avoid war, while preparations were going on in Cairo for a high-level delegation to visit Washington to discuss the problem of finding a peaceful settlement to the problem with President Johnson. Israel knew of these facts, but still decided go out on the war-path.

This was also openly admitted by Israeli military leaders. In a speech on Israeli radio in June 1972 General Peled, Chief of the Bureau of Logistics during the 1967 war, declared that, at the time, there had been no danger of the "Hebrew state" being exterminated by Egypt and went on to assert that there was no proof that the Egyptians really intended to attack Israel.¹

Zionist leaders had drawn up expansionist plans as early as at the end of the 19th century to capture Arab territories. At a congress in

¹ Official Records of the General Assembly. Twenty-Seventh Session. Plenary Meetings. Volume II. Verbatim Records of Meetings 19 September-19 December 1972. 2092nd Plenary Meeting, United Nations, New York, 1976, p. 1.

Basel in 1897 the Zionist movement proclaimed its aim as being to create a Jewish state in Palestine. They were not troubled by the fact that, at the time, Palestine was mainly populated by Arabs, the Jewish population accounting for around 6 per cent of the total. Zionist leaders, however, dreamed of a "Greater Israel", and the Zionist delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference put forward a plan to create such a Jewish state, the borders of which would encompass the territory of Palestine and neighbouring states. This expansionist line dominated in the Zionist movement in the years of the Second World War, too, on the eve of the creation of Israel. Brigadier General Hurley, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East, reported to Washington that the Zionist organisation in Palestine had an enlarged programme envisaging the creation of a sovereign Jewish state and Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control.¹

The Zionist leaders of Israel have never considered the borders established by the UN General Assembly in 1947 as final. The problem of sorting out the many conflicts between Israel and its neighbours has not left the agenda of the General Assembly or the Security Council during the last two decades.

The state of Israel, which was created as the result of a decision of the UN in 1947, has for many years appeared in the international arena as a weapon in the hands of the largest imperialist powers, the leading circles of which are trying any way they can to halt the movement

¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1943*, Vol. IV, *The Near East and Africa*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1964, p. 777.

of the peoples towards national independence, democracy and socialism. In this connection we should not forget that, in alliance with Britain and France, Israel attacked Egypt in 1956.

In 1952 patriotic officers of the Egyptian army overthrew the regime of King Farouk and proclaimed a republic. The Egyptian government set about taking measures aimed at liquidating the consequences of the long rule of the British colonialists and at developing the national economy and improving the living standards of the people. With the help of Western powers the government planned to build the Aswan High Dam, which was to give a significant increase in the area of land under crops and create an energy base for the development of industry.

In February 1956 the USA and Britain agreed to lend Egypt \$ 200 million on condition that Egypt decline to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. When the Egyptian government rejected these humiliating conditions the Western powers refused to honour their promise to grant Egypt the loan. In reply to this the Egyptian government decided on June 26, 1956 to nationalise the Suez Company, which belonged to British and French bankers. Once the company was nationalised the government decided to use the revenue from the Suez Canal to build the vitally important Aswan High Dam.

The dam was later built with Soviet assistance. In 1977 I was invited, together with other members of the UNESCO Executive Council, to visit Egypt in connection with measures to save monuments of ancient architecture in Abu Simbel. We had the chance to see the Aswan High Dam, one of the most grandiose constructions of our time. I was left with an unforgettable impression by the gigantic turbines built in

Leningrad factories and the enormous Lake Nasser (660 square kilometres) which had formed behind the dam. This lake is an enormous reservoir used to irrigate sun-scorched fields.

The Western powers began a furious campaign against Egypt's lawful nationalisation of the Canal, an act which shattered the imperialists' positions in the Middle East and told on their political and economic interests.

The nationalisation of the Canal could be followed by the nationalisation of oil concessions in the Middle East, which yielded 20 per cent of the oil extracted in the capitalist world. The USA and its most important allies all depended to a considerable extent on imports of Arab oil for their energy. In 1956, for example, Britain satisfied up to 80 per cent of its requirements by importing Arab oil, while France and Italy imported up to 90 per cent.

The American oil monopolies, which were extremely influential in the formulation of American foreign policy, had a serious interest in not permitting the anti-imperialist national liberation struggle of the Arab peoples to develop. This was the beginning of the imperialist powers' obstinate struggle against democratic regimes in the Arab countries.

Britain, France and the USA resorted to exerting economic pressure on Egypt, while the governments of Britain and France made simultaneous military preparations.

On September 15, 1956 the Soviet government made a declaration about the need to find a peaceful settlement to the Suez question, emphasising that the military preparations of Britain and France were evidence of the intention of these powers to capture the Suez Canal, which would constitute an act of aggression against Egypt. The declaration pointed out that the

USSR could not ignore the Suez question, because any breach of the peace in the Middle East would affect the security interests of the Soviet state, whose territory was in the immediate proximity of the region.

The problem of the Suez Canal took on an international significance, and it was at the centre of the national liberation movement's battles with Western policy, which was trying to retain control over the countries of the Middle East.

The ruling circles of Britain, France and the USA took a course towards toppling the Egyptian government with the aim of re-establishing their positions.

From the very beginning of the Suez crisis Britain and France planned to use military force against Egypt. Anthony Eden, the head of the British government, later admitted this in his memoirs. "The government", he wrote, "determined that our essential interests in this area must be safeguarded, if necessary by military action."¹

The American administration also knew of Britain and France's military preparations. Having enlisted the tacit support of the USA, the two countries entered into secret negotiations with Israel to draw up a joint plan for an armed attack on Egypt. The extremist Israeli leadership readily agreed to take part in the attack.

Israel attacked on the night of October 29-30, 1956. Twenty-four hours later the British and French governments delivered Egypt an ultimatum demanding that it stop its military activities on land, sea and in the air within 12 hours, withdraw its armed forces 10 miles from the Suez Canal and agree to the occupation of key posi-

¹ *The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle*, Cassell, London, 1960, p. 426.

tions in Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. Britain and France threatened intervention should Egypt refuse.

The Egyptian government categorically rejected this ultimatum and on October 31 British and French planes made a massed attack on the territory of Egypt. Many Egyptian towns and villages were destroyed as a result of this bombing.

The American administration dissociated itself from its NATO allies in words, submitting a draft resolution to the Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Egyptian territory. The Soviet government also submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on the question of the Israeli aggression, but both the American and the Soviet resolutions were rejected as a result of the veto imposed by Britain and France.

The question of the armed intervention against Egypt was sent for consideration by an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, which, by an overwhelming majority of the votes, adopted a decision on November 2 demanding that Britain, France and Israel discontinue military activities against Egypt and withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory.

The aggressors refused to implement this resolution of the UN General Assembly. What is more, on November 5 Britain and France made a joint landing in the region of Port Said to occupy the Suez Canal zone.

At this critical moment the Soviet government took a decisive step, demanding on November 5, 1956 that Britain, France and Israel terminate their military intervention against Egypt forthwith. The Soviet government bitterly condemned the actions of the aggressors against the Egyptian republic and warned of the dangerous conse-

quences to which a continuation of the aggression could lead.

The firm position taken by the Soviet Union and its resolve to take an active part (including by using armed forces) in restraining the aggressors and establishing peace in the Middle East had a sobering influence on the ruling circles of Britain and France, and played a decisive role in the unconditional termination by those countries of military actions.

Just 22 hours after the Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris delivered the Soviet government's message military actions in Egypt were terminated. The British-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt ended in total failure.

I learned of the end of the war against Egypt in Peking, where I was working at the time, on the morning of November 7. That evening the government of the PRC held a large reception for foreign specialists in the Peking Hotel on the occasion of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

When we entered the enormous banquet hall Party and state officials of the PRC, delighted with the courage and decisiveness shown by the Soviet government in taking measures to defend the progressive Egyptian regime, as well as Chinese working with us, all warmly offered their congratulations, despite the restraint they normally practise in showing their feelings. Many diplomats from the socialist countries came up to our table and congratulated us on the anniversary of the October Revolution and on the successes of Soviet foreign policy, the more emotional of them hugging and kissing us.

The fire that threatened to place humanity on the brink of a new world war was put out.

In 1966 and 1967 Israel organised new provocations with regard to its Arab neighbours.

Its aggressive policy was repeatedly a subject of discussion for the Security Council, but manoeuvres by Israel's Western patrons prevented the Council from taking any measures to halt the aggression.

On April 7, 1967 Israeli forces launched an attack on the Syrian Arab Republic. The UAR, which had a mutual aid agreement with Syria, took a number of defensive military measures designed to show Israel that Syria was not alone. Apart from that, the UAR requested that UN troops on its territory be withdrawn.¹ Such troops were to have been stationed in Israel, too, but the latter ignored the General Assembly's decision and stubbornly refused to discuss U Thant's proposal concerning the deployment of UN forces on both sides of the Israeli-Egyptian border. The presence of UN forces on the Arab side of the armistice line had become an obstacle hampering the UAR government's defensive measures.

That was how things developed up to May 1967.

The situation in the Middle East became more and more tense. On May 22, 1967 the government of the UAR announced it was establishing control over shipping in the Strait of Tiran, and in so doing prohibited any vessels delivering strategic materials to Israel from passing through the Strait.

The Israeli government made a number of threatening declarations in connection with the measures taken by the UAR.

The expansionist policy of Israel's ruling circles led to many Arab countries finding themselves pulled into the Middle East conflict. As before, Zionist plans to create a "Greater Israel" had aroused passions.

¹ *Yearbook of the United Nations 1967*, United Nations, New York, 1969, pp. 162-63.

On May 23 U Thant flew to Cairo, where President Nasser and the Egyptian foreign minister assured him that the UAR would not give an initiative to any offensive actions.

An agreement was reached between U Thant and the Egyptian President that the former would try to persuade Israel not to send its ships through the Strait of Tiran, while the Egyptian government, for its part, would not oppose the passage of other countries' ships through the Strait to Israel without inspection, these ships instead being required merely to declare that they were not transporting strategic materials to Israel.

Without waiting for U Thant's return, a meeting of the Security Council was called at the request of Canada and Denmark. Arthur Goldberg, the American representative at the UN, was more than usually active at this meeting.

Goldberg was an experienced lawyer and a practised hand at settling conflicts between the American labour unions and the monopolies. Under President Kennedy he was Labor Secretary, and then a member of the United States Supreme Court, a respected and extremely influential post. Even with his experience and speaking skills, however, he could not hide the pro-Israel line of the American administration.

In one of his speeches Ambassador Baroody of Saudi Arabia, a well-known figure in the UN, undiplomatically remarked: "I would like to know just who our friend Goldberg is speaking for—the United States or Israel?"

The chairman of the Security Council¹—Cana-

¹ According to the procedure rules of the Security Council its chairman changes every month, the order following a list of countries according to the English alphabet,

dian representative George Ignatieff—was also suspiciously active that May. A former Russian count, he was a member of the Ignatieff family which was famous in tsarist Russia and held high posts in the diplomatic and civil services. His uncle was Prime Minister and his father was Education Minister under Nicholas II (in 1916).

After the Revolution the Ignatieff family found itself in Canada, where the old count counselled his children: "We have lost Russia. We must adapt and serve our new homeland as we served Russia." George learned this well and made himself an enviable career for an emigre as an assistant to the Minister of Trade, as ambassador in a number of countries and, finally, as Canada's representative at the UN.

Outwardly Ignatieff was always friendly. He tried to speak to us in Russian, stretching his words a little, like the inhabitants of St. Petersburg. When we talked about business or political problems he preferred English, since it was easier for him.¹

As chairman of the Security Council in May 1967 Ignatieff tried to exert an active influence on the results of discussions of the Middle East problem.

On May 24 he and Ambassador Hans Tabor, the Danish representative, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council which expressed

¹ The parents of Arthur Goldberg, the American representative, were also emigres from Russia. They arrived in the USA before the October Revolution. People used to joke in UN circles: "The Russians are taking control of the Security Council. Besides the Soviet representative there are another two." True, a year later the threat of a "Russian takeover" had receded; Goldberg left the UN in 1968, and Ignatieff was recalled when a new government came to power in Canada.

support for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General to lessen tension and contained an appeal to UN members to refrain from taking any steps which might worsen the situation. Neither Ignatieff's speeches nor the draft resolution contained a single word of condemnation of Israel's aggressive policy, indicating that the Canadian representative's line hardly differed from that of Goldberg.

Ignatieff tried to convince everyone that their draft was objective and that only a resolution such as this could "save peace" in the Middle East. The draft, however, did not win support, for it was too one-sided.

On May 27 the UAR delegation requested that the Security Council discuss the question of Israel's aggressive policy, which was threatening peace and security both in the Middle East and in the world as a whole. There followed a series of meetings, but the obstructionist tactics of the USA and Britain, which were supported by their NATO allies in the Council, prevented any positive decisions being taken.

Then came the morning of June 5, 1967.

Despite the early hour the conference hall of the Security Council was full to overflowing. Diplomats from the Arab and African countries and the socialist and capitalist worlds, numerous journalists and photographic and television correspondents were all anxiously discussing the new military outbreak in the Middle East and its possible consequences.

The representatives of Syria and Jordan reported that their countries had also been attacked by Israel and that their forces had joined battle.

Excited press-attaches and journalists came running incessantly into the hall with reports from the teletype from the world's major news

agencies. Iraq, Algeria and Kuwait declared their support for the UAR. Iraq sent its troops to Egypt and Iraqi planes bombed Israeli territory in retaliation.

On the first day of the war we did not have any reliable information about the state of affairs on the front lines, and neither did the diplomats from the Arab countries.

I went up to Ambassador El Kony, the representative of the UAR. He looked anxious, and his grey temples and deep wrinkles emphasised his fatigue. The endless meetings of the Security Council, discussions and consultations had all worn him out. Drawing me to the side El Kony told me that, according to his information, the Egyptian army had advanced from the Gaza region and was on its way to linking up with Jordanian units. "The aggressor must be punished," he said impressively.

The members of the Council took their seats in the worried atmosphere. The chairman—Ambassador Tabor of Denmark—was also nervous. He was a tall, prominent blond with typically Scandinavian facial features, and his large, bright eyes looked anxiously around the conference hall. He realised that this was a major military conflict threatening the whole world and that a lot depended on his diplomatic art. Not only the settlement of the conflict, but also his own diplomatic career. His words and statements would be quoted by all the newspapers and radio stations of the world, and hundreds of millions of people would see him on their television screens.

Flash guns went off. It was important to show the most dramatic and sensational moments of the meeting. What expression was on the face of El Kony, the Egyptian? What did Soviet representative N. T. Fedorenko, who was always

smartly dressed and invariably had a pipe in his hand, look like this morning? Was there any confusion on the faces of the Arab diplomats?

Goldberg was gesticulating as he talked with his advisers. The Soviet delegation, which was headed by Fedorenko, sat at the other end of the long horseshoe-shaped table. The Soviet representative was calmly correcting his draft speech.

In the amphitheatre of the Security Council hall there were seats for the representatives of countries which were not members of the Council. The Israeli delegation sat in the front row to the right of the chairman and not far from the Americans. We could see the young officials were nervous, excitedly exchanging remarks and bringing in urgent telegrams and reports.

The press section was behind a low barrier, and a little higher up there was a public gallery. UN security officials were keeping a close watch on the public, for there had been attempts (more than once!) at provocation. Several times the security service had confiscated weapons from representatives of the Jewish Defense League, an extremist Zionist organisation.

The chairman called the meeting to order and spoke into his microphone:

"I declare the 1347th meeting of the Security Council open."

The agenda was confirmed: the complaint of the UAR representative about the planned and unprovoked attack of Israeli armed forces on the territory of the UAR.

The representatives of the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Israel were invited to the Council's table to discuss the problem without the right to vote.

Having listened to the speeches made by the representatives of the UAR and Israel the Council suspended the meeting for consultations.

There was no time for battles of words. The matter of the urgent action the Council needed to take was discussed in the chairman's office, where Ambassador Seydoux, the French representative, spoke in favour of the Council demanding not only a cessation of hostilities, but also that troops be withdrawn to the positions they held before hostilities began. He was supported by the Indian representative, while Lord Caradon, his British counterpart, declared his readiness to vote in favour of a decision to cease fire and even to disengage and withdraw the troops.¹

The Soviet Union, which has always come out consistently against aggression and for solidarity with peoples struggling for their freedom and independence, came out decisively in defence of the Arab states.

Fedorenko reported that the Soviet government had released a special declaration on June 5, 1967 which resolutely condemned the Israeli aggression against the UAR and other Arab countries, an aggression which flouted the UN Charter and the basic norms of international law.

The Soviet government, he announced, insisted that the UN carry out its main duty and condemn Israel's aggressive actions, as well as take urgent measures to establish peace in the Middle East.

While declaring their readiness to accept the adoption of a resolution calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops, the Americans and the British were in no hurry to bring this about. They were waiting for events to develop further.

¹ Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1970, pp. 49, 50, 52.

Reports soon began to come in of major failures on the part of the Egyptian armed forces. The suddenness of the attack by well-trained Israeli troops equipped with American materiel, the criminal unconcern of Egyptian generals, and the disinclination of the reactionary part of the high command of the Egyptian army to defend the gains of the revolution all ensured rapid success for the Israelis.

Officers took to flight and soldiers were ready to give up, too.

Egypt had enough arms to hold back and rebuff the enemy, but those defeatist elements obviously predominated in the army command which preferred to be routed than to see the social reforms begun by President Nasser continued. Many Egyptian officers—members of bourgeois and feudal families—capitulated even before the war started. This truckling was reflected in an unwillingness to improve the fighting efficiency of the army and in a refusal to teach soldiers to master modern military equipment. There were a lot of idlers amongst the superior officers for whom shoulder-straps were merely a mandate to obtain numerous privileges. Egypt had enough manpower and material resources to prevent defeat, but they were not mobilised. The chauvinist propaganda and self-confident speeches and articles which filled the newspapers and were constantly broadcast on the radio could not replace serious preparations to resist the enemy. Class contradictions in society also made themselves felt.

The American mass media reported widely on the successes of the Israeli troops. The television showed hundreds of new tanks they had captured, and Jay Vyshinsky, a correspondent in Tel Aviv, gave the commentary: "Looking at these columns of tanks whose guns haven't

even been uncovered, it seems to me that they were built to take part in a parade."

Having received evidence that Israel had achieved definite military successes, American and British diplomacy changed its position. On June 6 Goldberg and Caradon announced their refusal to include in the Security Council resolution a demand to withdraw troops.

"That is a future matter," Goldberg said cynically.

By proposing various amendments to the draft resolution and drawing out consultations, Goldberg, Caradon and Ignatieff even prevented a cease-fire resolution being adopted. This was useful for the Israeli military which were trying to build on its success.

On the morning of June 6 I went up to Goldberg before the meeting began.

"The Soviet delegation," I said, "hopes that the American representative, who earlier expressed his anxiety at the threat of a conflict in the Middle East, will be consistent and support the suggestion to urgently adopt a cease-fire resolution."

Goldberg turned abruptly to me and said:

"I am not sure I will be able to support such a resolution."

The situation at the front line was becoming more and more critical. The Soviet delegation tried to have decisions on a cease-fire adopted, emphasising that the continuation of hostilities in the Middle East could lead to the conflict spreading to other countries and regions. As a result of intensive consultations the Soviet diplomats were able to convince even the closest of the USA's allies—Britain, Canada and Denmark—of the need to adopt such a resolution.

Hot debates went on all day, and it was only at about ten in the evening that the Security

Council passed a resolution requiring that measures urgently be taken to bring about a rapid cessation of all hostilities in the Middle East. The resolution stressed that the measures indicated should be merely the first step. This was an important clause signifying the impermissibility of reconciliation with the aggressor's seizures.

In violation of the resolution calling for a cease-fire, Israeli armoured units advanced towards Suez, coming out on the River Jordan and thus creating a threat that Israeli troops would reach the west bank of the Suez Canal.

The Soviet government requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Late in the evening of June 7 the Council adopted Resolution No. 234, which categorically demanded a cease-fire within a few hours.

The Soviet Union took all measures to support Egypt in both the political and the military respect, a position which had both supporters and opponents.

Mohamed Heikal, a prominent Egyptian journalist and editor of the newspaper *Al Ahram*, told me that in those most tense and tragic days for Egypt Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador, visited President Nasser and handed him a personal letter from Mao Tse-tung recommending that Nasser reject the cease-fire resolution and not conclude an armistice with Israel. Even if the Israelis were to capture Cairo, the letter said, the Egyptian army and partisans could withdraw to the village districts and desert regions and unleash a partisan war from there. In offering this advice Mao Tse-tung was drawing on his experience of conducting a partisan war in China.

Nasser rejected the Chinese recommendations and began to try resolutely to implement the

Security Council's resolution on a cessation of hostilities.

After its success on the Sinai peninsula the Israeli army began an attack along the length of the Syrian-Israeli demarcation line. The plan was to capture Damascus and overthrow the progressive regime there. UN observers reported the bombardment of the area around Damascus and the shelling of the demilitarised zone.

On the morning of June 9 the Security Council demanded the cessation of all military operations on the Israeli-Syrian front.

The USA and Israel began a diplomatic game in the Council so that it was not clear precisely who was violating the Council's resolution. Goldberg declared the need for an "impartial" examination of "reciprocal accusations" and questioned reports about the further advancement of Israeli troops, drawing on the "need to check" all information.¹ The USA was clearly banking on winning time to give Israel the opportunity not only to capture as much territory as possible, but also to try and topple progressive regimes in the Arab countries. It seemed to them that their goal was near—President Nasser had announced his intention to retire. The Israelis now directed their main push towards Syria.

On June 9 the meeting ended late at night. Early in the morning of June 10 an official of the Syrian mission telephoned me. In a voice that was trembling with emotion he told me that he had received a report from Damascus: the situation had got considerably worse. Israeli troops had captured Al-Kuneitra and were moving towards Damascus.

¹ See: *United Nations. Security Council. Official Records. 22nd Year. 1357th Meeting: 11/12 June 1967, New York, S/PV. 1357, p. 11.*

We hurried to the UN headquarters. I asked the Syrian representative:

"How are things at the front?"

The Syrian diplomat was pale.

"Israeli tanks are sixty kilometres from Damascus," he said.

"Have troops been brought up to defend the capital?" I asked.

"No," he replied. "The people's militia is being mustered. The other units are at the front."

With the agreement of the Soviet ambassador I telephoned the chairman of the Security Council to tell him that the USSR firmly supported Syria's request for an urgent meeting of the Council. Tabor very unwillingly agreed.

The tired representatives were sullen. The Soviet delegation asked U Thant to report what news had been received from the Chief of Staff of the UN observation force.

He read out a telegramme.

The UN observers confirmed that fighting was still going on on Syrian territory and that Damascus airport and the city's suburbs had been bombed by Israeli aircraft.

The Israeli representative hypocritically declared that, according to information provided by his country's Foreign Ministry, there had been no attack on Damascus or its airport, and that Israeli planes were flying over Syrian territory to cover ground troops, etc.

The head of the UN observation force once again confirmed that there had been air raids on the suburbs of Damascus.

Decisive action was necessary outside the framework of the UN to support the victims of aggression, because the implementation of the UN's resolutions was being undermined by imperialist forces.

On June 9 the Central Committees of commu-

nist and workers' parties and the governments of seven socialist countries—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—adopted a joint declaration on the situation which had taken shape in the Middle East. The declaration pointed out that the socialist countries considered it necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions from the fact that Israel had not implemented the Security Council resolution and had not ceased hostilities. "In this difficult hour for the countries of the Arab East," it said, "the socialist countries declare that they utterly and completely support their just struggle and that they will help them defeat aggression and defend their national independence and territorial integrity." If Israel did not cease its aggression, the socialist countries which signed the declaration would "do everything possible to help the peoples of the Arab countries repulse the aggressor".¹

The discussion in the Security Council reached its most heated point.

The Soviet representative took the floor and the television cameras were trained on the Soviet delegation.

Fedorenko reported the Soviet government's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in consequence of Israel's having continued its aggression despite the resolution of the Security Council and warnings from the governments of the USSR and other socialist countries. He went on to announce that the USSR and other peaceable states would take sanctions against Israel if it did not cease hostilities.

This declaration by the Soviet government

¹ *Pravda*, June 10, 1967.

and other socialist countries¹ had an exceptional effect. A few hours later U Thant informed the Council that the Israeli government had ceased all hostilities and agreed to the stationing of UN observers on both sides of the Syrian-Israeli front. Israel did subsequently continue to violate the Security Council's resolution, but on a smaller scale.

Thus, the Six Day War had come to an end. It had taken several resolutions on the part of the Security Council to bring this about. A break in diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and other countries had also been needed, as had a firm warning that sanctions would be taken until Israeli troops ceased hostilities.

The cease-fire and cessation of hostilities in the Middle East was a definite success for peaceable forces, but it was only the first step, since Israel's armed forces continued to occupy lands belonging to the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan.

Diplomats ... Join Battle

The acute political struggle surrounding the Middle East continued. When one attends sessions of the UN General Assembly and meetings of the Security Council and other UN bodies, one does not only take part in the examination of the most complex international problems and the solution of all kinds of disputes and conflicts, but also makes the acquaintance of a wide circle of people—mainly statesmen and diplomats. More often than not, these are exceptional people,

¹ The socialist countries which signed the declaration announced simultaneously that they were breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel.

and I would like to talk about some of them individually.

Apart from the USSR the representatives of Bulgaria, Mali, India and Saudi Arabia all made brilliant speeches exposing the Israeli aggressors and their patrons.

The Bulgarian delegation played an active role in the Council, and Milko Tarabanov, the Bulgarian representative, enjoyed widespread fame in UN circles. He was a tall, dark-complexioned man with a grey head of hair, was always well-informed, and maintained contacts with many delegations.

I worked with Milko Tarabanov for a number of years. A professional revolutionary and an active participant in the underground struggle against the fascist monarchy in Bulgaria, he had been forced to emigrate to France. After the victory of the people's uprising on September 9, 1944 Tarabanov was appointed to a diplomatic post. He was ambassador in a number of countries, deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Bulgaria's representative at the UN. I formed an impression of him as a genuine and kind man, a friend of the Soviet people, a talented diplomat and a true communist-internationalist.

Every year Tarabanov invited the Soviet delegation to receptions dedicated to the anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Bulgarian friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty. At one of these lunches he said that Bulgarian people happily and proudly celebrated this historic event which began a new stage in the development of the long-standing friendly relations between the Russian and Bulgarian peoples. Bulgarians will never forget that it was Russian soldiers who liberated their country from five centuries of Turkish rule, and for every Bulgarian Plevna, Shipka, Sheinovo and

Stara Zagora are all symbols of Russian bravery and the blood battles for Bulgaria's freedom. They are also memorials to the brotherhood between our countries, a brotherhood made firm by blood spilt together in battle. Milko Tarabanov emphasised that the Bulgarian people will never forget that their country's revival and flourishing were achieved with the help of the USSR and its constant, selfless support.

While living in emigration and while in Bulgarian prisons Tarabanov learned to speak French well and also mastered Russian and English. He could maintain contacts with practically any delegation without the help of an interpreter, something which is more important in the UN than anywhere else. His speeches were always impassioned and convincing.

Bulgaria has played a vital role in the socialist countries' struggle for universal and complete disarmament and a strengthening of international security, has come out in defence of the rights of the Arab peoples, and supported the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against imperialist aggression.

At the 26th session of the General Assembly (1971) Milko Tarabanov was elected chairman of the First (Political) Committee, which deals with problems of international security, disarmament, and the peaceful use of outer space, the sea floor and the World Ocean. I had to consult with Tarabanov many times on specific questions of the Committee's work and the tactics of implementing resolutions which were aimed at strengthening peace and reflected the interests of the majority of UN members. I could always rely on the support and assistance of the Bulgarian representative. He was a new type of diplomat who had arisen during the diplomatic activ-

ity of the countries of the socialist community and worthily represented his own country.

Ambassador Baroody of Saudi Arabia was a completely different person.

...The chairman of the Security Council made the following stereotyped statement:

"Ambassador Baroody, the representative of Saudi Arabia, has approached me with a letter requesting that he be allowed to take part in the discussion of this matter. If none of the members of the Council objects I shall invite the representative of Saudi Arabia to the Security Council table and give him the floor in due course..."

There were no objections. The hall livened up and a short, elderly man rose from his seat amongst the delegates who were not members of the Council. He slowly made his way to the Council's table. Unlike other speakers Baroody did not prepare the text of his speech in advance. He usually took a scrap of paper with a few lines of writing from his pocket, and that was all.

According to the official lists of the composition of missions to the UN which are published every year by the UN Secretariat, Baroody had already been deputy representative of Saudi Arabia for more than 20 years. The King himself was considered to be the representative. He had not appeared at the UN once throughout its history, but Baroody was nonetheless only his deputy.

Baroody was a colourful figure whom everyone in the UN knew. During sessions of the General Assembly he made speeches in practically all the main committees, at plenary meetings of the Assembly itself, and in the General Committee. He was always likely to be found wherever a keen discussion arose or where there was a clash of opinions or a conflict. He particularly liked making speeches in the Security Council,

and the main theme of these was the exposure of Israeli aggression and its accomplices. Baroody also made distinctive speeches in the main committees of the General Assembly, often without any preparation. Sometimes he would speak in support of proposals advanced by the socialist countries, particularly on the Korean question.

For a number of years Baroody supported the proposals of the socialist and the developing countries that the Korean People's Democratic Republic be invited to take part in discussions of the Korean question, which had been on the Assembly's agenda since the American intervention in 1950. Baroody's activity was not confined to the UN. At a reception I was talking with Edward Euler, vice-chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, when Baroody walked past us and greeted us. I asked Euler whether he knew the Saudi Arabian ambassador. He smiled: "Oh, of course! Mr. Baroody is well-known on the New York stock exchange. I've taken his advice many times and made a lot of money. I'm not the only one who consults him."

The basically pro-American course of the Saudi Arabian government and Baroody's own links with the American stock exchange determined how he voted on acute questions where the interests of the two opposite systems clashed. All the same, he often demonstrated the breadth of his views. People said that he had reliable "back-ups". He enjoyed the confidence of the royal family, for he had educated its children for a number of years and conducted certain financial operations for it.

During discussions in the Security Council Baroody made a number of brilliant speeches criticising the policy of the USA and Great Britain in the Middle East, which was aimed at limiting the rights of the Arabs and supporting

the policy of Israel. He began his examination of the creation of Israel by criticising the Balfour Declaration, which served as the basis for creating the Jewish state.

On November 2, 1917 Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, published a declaration about Great Britain's policy in Palestine in the form of his letter to the banker Rothschild. The declaration announced that the British government "view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object". It also stipulated that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".¹

Baroody viewed this declaration as a betrayal of the interests of the Arab people, and disputed the assertion of the Israeli and American representatives that the Jews had acquired land which their forefathers had possessed two thousand years earlier before it was invaded by the Romans.

He turned to the American representatives and announced: "There is the historical argument of 'I was there'. Therefore, why should not the Red Indians take Manhattan? They were here. They will return the \$24 they were paid for it, with compound interest!"

Amid the uproar in the hall and cries of approval Baroody went on:

"What those western Zionists have done to us [the Arabs—*L.K.*] is exactly what the Amer-

¹ Edgar Dugdale, *The Balfour Declaration. Origins and Background*, Jewish Agency for Palestine, London, March, 1940, p. 4.

icans did to those Red Indians. They live in reservations, and the Arab refugees live in tents... The poor Arab refugees are given only 7 cents a day to live on; I pay 10 cents to buy the *New York Times*..."¹

In a different speech Baroody attacked Yosef Tekoah, an experienced demagogue and the Israeli representative at the UN:

"Tonight again," he said, "Mr. Tekoah mentions that they regained the land which the Romans robbed from them 2,000 years ago... It is a hoax that Palestine belongs to any one religious denomination since Roman days. Palestine or any other country belongs to the indigenous people of the land, and in 1919 the indigenous people of the land were 94 per cent, and some of them were Jewish... But the Jews who were there we had no quarrel with. They were our brothers. Here come Jews from Eastern Europe who have used Judaism as a motivation for political and economic ends. They want, in the twentieth century, to make a nationality out of a religion..."²

Baroody also exposed the pro-Israel stance of the Western powers, which were trying to use Israel to achieve their own aims.

"I have been told with the greatest authority," he said, "that if the Israelis are repulsed they will be given assistance by Western naval and air forces."

He fully supported the draft resolution on the Middle East put forward by the Soviet Union, and sometimes he made speeches exposing the anti-Sovietism of Western delegations:

"I remember," he said, "I am an old-timer here in the United Nations, that anyone who

¹ UN document S/PV. 1357, p. 14.

² UN document S/PV. 1456, p. 10.

talked to a communist ... was stigmatized. But now things are different. The Soviet Union comes with a resolution which tries to help matters. No, the source is communist. Well, I am a monarchist, but I must say that the resolution is logical, it is humanitarian, and it sets everything as it was, with no deceit and duplicity."¹

He also asserted that the Arab people would not reconcile itself to Zionist violence.

"...The Arab people," he declared, "...are no less resilient than the British. When Dunkirk fell, Mr. Churchill did not say, 'We have lost the war'; he promised his people blood, sweat and tears. When Napoleon was at the gates of Moscow, and later when Hitler repeated it, the Russians did not give up. Why? ... They were fighting for their homeland... Why should the Arabs be different?"²

By dragging things out Israel's patrons wanted to give the Israeli military time to consolidate the positions it held. At the same time, however, Western diplomacy did not want to throw down an open challenge to the Arab nations.

On June 7 seven Arab countries (the UAR, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania) broke off diplomatic relations with the USA, thus showing their indignation at the unworthy manoeuvres of the American administration in the UN and at supplies of American weapons to the Israeli aggressor.

On June 14 the Soviet delegation requested that its draft resolution be put to the vote. A tense silence reigned in the hall, which was full of diplomats, journalists and politicians from a number of countries.

¹ UN document S/PV. 1456, pp. 13, 14.

² UN document S/PV. 1358, p. 17.

Hans Tabor, the chairman of the Security Council, announced:

"I am putting the draft resolution contained in document number S/7951/Rev. 2, which was presented by the Soviet Union, to the vote."

Everyone's eyes turned to the diplomats from the Western countries.

"Those in favour?" the chairman asked. "Please raise your hands."

The representatives of the USSR, Bulgaria, Mali and India raised their hands.

"Those against?"

No hands went up. No one dared vote against the draft resolution, for it would be a challenge to world public opinion and lead to sharp condemnation of the policy of the Western powers in Arab, African and Asian countries. For this reason the USA and its allies resorted to the "hidden veto", i.e. they abstained from voting so that the resolution did not receive the necessary nine votes and was therefore rejected.

The Western powers, headed by the USA, had not allowed a just resolution to be adopted on the return of the Arab lands captured by Israel as a result of aggression.

The situation remained tense. In July an Emergency Session of the General Assembly was called in which the heads of state of a number of countries took part. A. N. Kosygin, the head of the Soviet delegation and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, called on the General Assembly to take decisions which would clear the way for peace to be re-established in the Middle East. In demanding a condemnation of the aggression and the withdrawal of troops from the occupied territory of the UAR, Syria and Jordan, the Soviet government did not only proceed from the need to re-establish

peace and settle other unsolved problems in the Middle East.

Allowing the actions of Israel against the Arab countries to go unpunished would mean encouraging the fight against the national liberation of the peoples and hence against the interests of many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The Soviet delegation announced that the Soviet Union did not recognise the seizures of territory on the part of Israel. True to the ideals of peace, freedom and the independence of nations, the Soviet Union did everything in its power both in the UN and outside it to do away with the consequences of the Israeli aggression and further the establishment in the region of a lasting peace.

The overwhelming majority of delegations condemned the aggressor and the seizures of territory in one way or another in the name of their countries, condemned the use of force in international relations, and came out in favour of urgently freeing the occupied Arab lands from the forces of the invader.

Forty-five delegations voted for the Soviet draft resolution, while 53 countries voted for a draft submitted by the non-aligned group, which was actively supported by the Soviet Union (46 voted against).

According to procedural rules, two-thirds of the votes are required for a resolution to be adopted. Neither resolution, therefore, went through. However, the main result was that the aggressor was condemned by a clear majority of states. This important political conclusion is also supported by the fact that 100 delegations voted to condemn Israel's actions in occupied Jerusalem. On July 4, 1967 the General Assembly approved a resolution declaring Israel's meas-

ures to change the status of the city as "invalid" and called on Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. Israel, however, cynically ignored this resolution.

Every morning there was a mountain of documents on my desk when I entered my office in the UN Secretariat. From 1967 on this mountain always included reports filed by UN military observers at the truce line between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan. These reports (there were sometimes several a day) informed the Security Council about exchanges of fire that had taken place and attacks carried out by Israeli forces. The dry text of these reports usually read: Artillery and machine-gun fire was noted in Green sector (or some other sector). It began from the Israeli side at 17.15 C.E.T. Retaliatory artillery and machine-gun fire was noted from the Egyptian (Syrian, Jordanian) side. The exchange of fire ended at 19.35. Other reports by the chief of the observation force in the Middle East came into the UN Secretariat and were sent out to the missions daily. Not a week passed without the representatives of the Arab countries bordering Israel—Syria, the UAR, Jordan and Lebanon—drawing the Security Council's attention to infringements of the armistice conditions on the part of the Israelis. These infringements included the overflying of territory by Israeli planes and the shelling and bombing of populated areas and refugee camps. The representatives of first one and then another Arab country requested a meeting of the Security Council whenever these infringements turned into major clashes.

The Security Council met and there were heated and denunciatory speeches, the result of

which was a condemnation of Israel's actions. However, when the question arose of taking resolute measures against the aggression, the mechanism of the close American-Israeli alliance went into operation. The American representatives Goldberg (1965-68), Ball (1968), Yost (1968-70), Bush (1971-73) and Scali (1973-75) all repeatedly declared that the USA could not support such a resolution. Year after year, however, the growing isolation of Israel from the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America was apparent during discussions about the Middle East in the General Assembly and the Security Council, and this was noticeably reflected in the voting.

Drawing on the support of the USA the Israeli military continued to use force and commit unlawful actions in the occupied territories, provoke military conflicts, and shell towns and villages of the UAR, Syria and Jordan.

On October 24, 1967 the UAR representative requested that a meeting of the Security Council be called to discuss a new act of aggression. Civilian targets—oil-processing plants and residential areas in Suez—had been fired on by artillery units and bombed.

On October 25 the Security Council approved a resolution condemning all infringements of the cease-fire and demanding strict observation of all previous resolutions on this question.

Two weeks later the UAR requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council to examine the dangerous situation which had arisen in the Middle East as a result of the aggression committed by Israel on June 5, 1967 against the UAR, Syria and Jordan.

Between November 9 and 22 there were seven meetings of the Security Council which made a detailed examination of the situation in the Mid-

dle East and discussed draft resolutions put forward by the representatives of various countries.

Lord Caradon, the British representative, submitted his draft resolution on November 16, claiming that it was well balanced and fair.

Lord Caradon was well known in international circles. He began his career under the name of Hugh Foot as an active participant in the Labour Party together with his brother Michael, who later became a famous journalist and Member of Parliament and was appointed Minister of Labour in the Wilson cabinet of 1974.¹ Hugh Foot made quite a rapid career in the civil service—in the field of colonial administration. He headed the colonial administration in Nigeria, was governor-general of Cyprus, and protected the interests of British imperialism in the Middle East.

His services were highly valued by the ruling circles of Great Britain and he was awarded a lordship. He took the name of Lord Caradon. In his apartment on New York's Fifth Avenue you could see photographs on the mantelpiece and on the bookshelves of himself with Queen Elizabeth II, her husband Prince Philip, and the prime ministers of Great Britain.

Lord Caradon usually made his speeches in the Security Council following a text the mission had received from London. He would begin with some aphorism or a joke. Once, in reply, the Soviet representative cited the Eastern saying: "Don't think a lion is smiling when he stretches his lips. He is baring his teeth." This Eastern wisdom caused smiles amongst the diplomats and loud laughter amongst the public.

¹ Michael Foot was leader of the Labour Party in 1980-1983.

With sclerotic veins on his face and the remains of his grey hair Lord Caradon truly symbolised the enfeebled British lion.

Together with the American administration Lord Caradon sharply objected to the Soviet draft resolution. The resolution outlined specific measures to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression—the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories to the lines existing on June 5, 1967, the return of refugees to their homes, and compensation to the victims of the aggression. Because of the objections of the USA and Great Britain, however, it had no chance of being adopted. A threat had been created that what had happened on June 14, 1967 would be repeated, when a Soviet draft did not get the necessary majority.

After setting out their positions the delegations of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France began unofficial consultations in order to draw up a document acceptable to the majority. An exchange of opinions showed that the draft resolution presented by Great Britain had the best chance of being adopted.

It was unanimously approved by the Security Council on November 22, 1967 and envisaged the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, the termination of the state of war, respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace, a just settlement of the refugee problem and a guarantee of territorial inviolability and political independence for every state in the area through various measures, including the establishment of demilitarised zones.

This resolution (No. 242) became an important landmark in the solution of the Middle East

conflict and an international legal basis for protecting the interests of the Arab countries and eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

As well as its fundamental solutions to the problem it requested that the Secretary-General designate a Special Representative to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned and help achieve a peaceful settlement in accordance with its provisions and principles.

After much consideration U Thant selected Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish ambassador to Moscow. As the American magazine *Time* wrote on August 17, 1970, Jarring was entrusted with the world's most difficult diplomatic mission. After he had visited Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Jerusalem and New York in the course of his new duties journalists from many countries began publishing all kinds of material about Jarring, his tastes, his style of work, his family, and so on. Because of the nature of my obligations I had to see the ambassador quite often when he came to New York. We established good working contacts and friendly relations. Jarring was usually reserved and brief, but when he was amongst friends he would willingly talk about his life.

He was born in 1908 on a farm in the south of Sweden which his brother still keeps today. He studied Turkic languages at university and spent several years in Xinjiang gathering material for a book on the problem of Eastern Turkic dialects. When he received his doctorate he taught at a university and during the Second World War was recruited to the Swedish mission in Ankara. He did not return to the academic world after this, although he did not lose his interest in scientific work either.

Jarring moved quickly up the diplomatic ladder. In 1956 he was appointed Swedish representative to the UN, two years later—ambassador to Washington, and in 1964—ambassador to Moscow. Unlike many other Western diplomats Jarring did not strive for publicity or make any announcements to the press, and refrained from making large promises and forecasts. He won the trust of all sides for his reservation and his striving to understand everyone's stance and make sure Security Council resolutions were implemented. *Time* magazine wrote: "Gunnar Jarring is a model of the classic diplomat: discreet, discerning and infinitely patient. His reticence with the press is legendary."¹ He would arrive in the countries of the Middle East without any official announcement being made, would meet the heads of government and quietly leave again because of his wish not to seem biased.

The Soviet government, hoping that Jarring's activity might facilitate a rapprochement of the sides' positions and help bring about a peaceful settlement, gave him diplomatic and political support. Jarring was officially informed that the Soviet Union viewed the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 as an acceptable international legal basis for a settlement in the Middle East and that it would therefore give all the help it could to his mission, which was called on to ensure this resolution was carried out.

The government of the UAR also tried to assist the implementation of Jarring's mission. On May 8, 1968 it sent Jarring a suggestion to draw up a plan to implement the Security Council resolution. It believed that this plan for a

¹ *Time*, August 17, 1970, p. 18.

stage-by-stage settlement could include the following provisions:

a) on condition that Israel announced its readiness to implement the Security Council resolution, periods could be established for the stage-by-stage withdrawal of Israeli troops;

b) on the day Israeli troops began to be withdrawn, the Arab countries neighbouring Israel, as well as Israel itself, could lodge announcements in the UN about the termination of the state of belligerency and the recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

The Israeli government continued its policy of aggression, using all sorts of reasons to avoid taking measures to implement the Security Council's resolutions, in particular sabotaging Jarring's activity by complicating the problem with numerous casuistical demands bearing no direct relation to the settlement and re-establishment of the situation existing before June 5, 1967. While acting in this way Israel was at the same time continuing its provocative attacks on the UAR.

The Soviet Union gave the Arab countries political and diplomatic support.

In the spring of 1969 the Soviet government made important suggestions aimed at promoting a political settlement in the Middle East. These suggestions were discussed by the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France in April 1969 and played a positive role, although they did not lead to an agreement. Those who took part in this exchange of opinion showed that they understood that the fact that the situation in the Middle East had not been settled created a threat of a new war and was poisoning the international situation.

As before Israel did not acknowledge Resolution No. 242. Clashes between the warring ar-

mies intensified greatly in the region of the Suez Canal, on the banks of the River Jordan and in the Golan Heights at the end of 1969 and in the first half of 1970. Missiles and aircraft were used and troops often made landings. The continuation of the war had become a fact, and this was noted in U Thant's reports.

The discussions which were going on within the framework of the UN in New York between the four powers gave no results, while the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies were intensifying their repulse of the Israeli military. Israel's desire to solve the Middle East problem by force provoked more and more condemnation in the UN, and the weakening of American positions in the Middle East was an inevitable consequence of the United States' support for that country.

In the summer of 1969 Cairo newspapers published an American plan to settle the conflict. This plan came down to supporting demands to amend the borders of Arab countries with Israel, transfer the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights to Israel, unilaterally demilitarise the west bank of the Jordan and part of the Sinai peninsula, grant Israeli ships the right of passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, and so on. In practice the question of Jerusalem remained unsolved, as did the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

When the plan became known people in Cairo and other Arab capitals called American policy a policy of "everything for Israel and nothing for the Arabs".

One of those paradoxes which at first appear mysterious came to light in this wish to foist on the Arab countries what was good only for Israel. In actual fact the most important economic and strategic interests of the USA, Great

Britain and West Germany in this region are linked not with Israel, but with the Arab countries. It is sufficient to recall the Kuwaiti, Saudi and Libyan oil which is exported to Western Europe, but despite this Great Britain, the USA and West Germany all actively supported Israel.

The solution to this paradox is that the main oil-producing Arab countries—Saudi Arabia, the principalities of the Arabian peninsula and some others—resisted the progressive countries of the Middle East. Their monarchies are the political and social underpinnings of the imperialist powers in the region, and for this reason the American, British and West German monopolies were not threatened with being deprived of the right to use Arab oil. Otherwise the pro-Israeli line of the USA, Britain and West Germany could not have stood up to the trial of facing anti-imperialist Arab solidarity.

Meanwhile armed clashes on the armistice lines became constant and systematic. Jarring was forced to discontinue his work as Special Representative to the Middle East in the autumn of 1969 because of the deterioration of the situation and Israel's unwillingness to implement the Security Council resolution.

The Problem of the Palestinians

The question of the Palestinian refugees is one of the key problems in doing away with the Middle East crisis.

More than a million Palestinian Arabs were driven from their homes and their land as a result of the Israeli-Arab war of 1947-1948 and forced to seek refuge in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Not having accommodation, work or a livelihood they lived in refugee camps maintained on voluntary donations from several UN

member countries. The number of refugees grew by 350,000 as a result of the Israeli aggression of 1967, when the Arab population fled from the territories the Israelis had occupied on the west bank of the Jordan, in Gaza Strip and other places.

The Palestinians want to return home. This right of theirs has been set out in several UN documents, including the famous resolution No. 194-(III) of the General Assembly which was adopted in December 1948 and declared that those refugees wishing to return to their land and their homes should be given the opportunity to do so, while those who did not wish to return should be paid compensation. By signing the Lausanne protocol in 1949 Israel voluntarily took on itself the obligation to accept refugees or pay them material compensation if they so wished. It has refused for more than thirty years to carry out these obligations.

Every year the General Assembly discussed reports made by the specially founded United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Speeches by the representatives of Arab, socialist and non-aligned countries always condemn Israel's ignoring of the 1948 resolution, which has been confirmed every year by decisions of the General Assembly.

On June 14, 1967 the Security Council adopted resolution No. 237, in which it obliged the Israeli government to ensure the safety of the Palestinian refugees and facilitate their return to the areas they left after the outbreak of hostilities.

Not only did Israel ignore these resolutions, but it also carried out armed attacks against the refugee camps, as a result of which people were killed and injured.

The problem of the Palestinian refugees is above all a political one. It cannot be separated from the situation which has taken shape in the Middle East, and cannot be solved without an immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories they occupy.

The problem of the refugees, their rights and their position has also been repeatedly discussed in the Security Council. Speaking in the Council on November 4, 1968 Ambassador Baroodi of Saudi Arabia said: "It fell to me years ago to draw the attention of the General Assembly and that of the Security Council to the fact that Palestine did not belong to Egypt, or to Jordan, or to Lebanon, or to Syria, but to ... none other than the Palestinian people, regardless of whether they were Arabs, Christians, Moslems, or adherents of any other religion..." He also warned of the dangerous consequences of the policy of creating privileged conditions for the Jewish population. "Well," he said, "it is human for any person ... to get privileges... But when it is at the expense of a whole people—the Palestinian people—then we must heed the fact that if we do not stop Israel there will be a world conflagration... The Israelis do not want peace. They could have peace if, instead of hoisting the banner of Israel they brought it down and became components of a Middle East community, living in peace either by way of cantonization or some other political device, like the Swiss for example, and forget about the in-gathering of the Jews from all over the world. The majority of the Jews do not want to go to Israel; they are happy where they are. They are building skyscrapers in Manhattan, they control lots of business in Western Europe... The Palestinian people cannot be denied the right to regain their homeland... If those who created Israel would prevail

upon it to see wisdom and not go back to those days of its creation by pressure, there would be peace. There will be peace if it is based on justice, and justice means the non-denial to the Palestinian people of their homeland."¹

The enormity of the invaders in the occupied Arab territories led to a new wave of refugees. By the beginning of the 1980s around 3 million Palestinian Arabs (taking account of the natural increase of 55,000 each year) were in exile. They were in a most difficult position. Many families were split up, while schools operating on UNRWA resources were in a sorry position, the funds for their maintenance being reduced every year because of voluntary contributions to the UNRWA shrinking from year to year. The material position of the majority of Palestinians who have been living in huts and tents for many years is very grave. It is perfectly natural that the Palestinian people has taken up the fight for its rights and its land.

In 1964 a resolution was adopted at a meeting of the heads of Arab states and governments on the creation of a Palestine political organisation and a Palestine liberation army.

In June that year the formation was announced of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which was called upon to represent the interests of all Palestinians. At the time, however, the PLO could not unite the Palestinian armed detachments for a number of reasons.

The Palestinian movement is not uniform in the class respect. Alongside the forces steering towards progressive development (which make up the main body of the movement), there are also reactionaries and extremist-minded people who do not understand the true correlation of

¹ UN document S/PV, 1457, pp. 13, 14, 15.

forces and are unable to select the correct tactics for the struggle. The grave, interminable situation in the refugee camps and terrorist acts by the Israeli military have pushed some groups into taking thoughtless actions (hijacking civilian airliners, sending self-exploding letter-bombs through the post, murdering Israeli athletes in Munich, etc.) which have caused detriment to the Palestinian resistance movement.

For all this independent action, however, the main thing in the Palestinian movement is the striving to liberate the land occupied by Israel and to help the Palestinians return to their native parts. On January 1, 1965 the Palestinians began a partisan war with a military operation against Israel.

The Soviet Union, which is an advocate of national liberation movements, firmly supports the Palestinian movement and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination right up to the creation of their own state. In 1974 the PLO was recognised by the USSR and the Arab countries as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.¹ A representative of the PLO was invited to the 29th session of the UN General Assembly, where, before the representatives of 138 countries, he was able to set out the demands of the Palestinian people for the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

Golda Meir in New York

Golda Meir, who was Israeli Prime Minister from 1969 to 1974, was a frequent visitor to the USA, where she would meet with leaders of the

¹ In 1981 the USSR granted the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Moscow full diplomatic status.

administration, business circles and Zionist organisations. Her visits always resulted in large sums of money collected by Zionists and agreements on new loans and supplies of American weapons (Phantom and Skyhawk jets, missiles, tanks, etc.).

At a press conference on September 23, 1970 she confidently declared: "We shall never return to the 1967 borders."¹ On the 24th she visited the UN, and, as is international practice, the Secretary-General gave a breakfast in her honour.

By the will of fate, or, more exactly, because of the protocol rules of the UN, I found myself next to the Israeli Prime Minister. At the time she was 70 years old. She was wearing an old-fashioned sand-coloured suit, cheap brown shoes with a low heel, and carelessly pulled on stockings, and was carrying a black handbag. Her appearance was meant to say that Israel was conducting a fight for its existence and was mobilising all its forces and energy. Every cent was needed for the country's defence. This created an impression on the masses of the American Jewish population who had been fooled by Zionist propaganda. On her first visit to New York as Prime Minister in 1969 John V. Lindsay, the city's mayor, organised a terribly ceremonial and splendid reception. He himself appeared at this reception in a Jewish skull cap. Everyone, of course, understood the reason for this special attention to the Israeli Prime Minister. More than 2.5 million Jews live in New York, and Jewish capitalists control major banks, industrial enterprises, and part of the mass media. In many ways the position of these circles determines the outcome of mayoral elections in New York. But it is not only mayoral elections

¹ *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1970, p.59.

that they influence. Senators, members of the House of Representatives, states governors and even Presidents are all forced to reckon with this force.

On the eve of the 1948 presidential election at a sitting of the American administration President Truman frankly declared that he had to answer to hundreds of thousands of voters who wanted Zionism to succeed and that he had no voters amongst the Arabs.

Let us, however, return to that breakfast on the 38th floor of the UN building given by the Secretary-General in honour of Golda Meir. To the surprise of those present the USA and Great Britain were represented not by their permanent representatives, but by their deputies.

Golda Meir noticed this at once and her mood was ruined.

"Where is Ambassador Yost?" she angrily asked Yosef Tekoah, her representative at the UN.

At that time Charles Yost was the American representative at the UN. Rumours were flying that he did not share his administration's view on the Middle East settlement. (An expert on Middle East problems, Yost spoke out in favour of Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council becoming the basis for a peaceful settlement and opposed the United States' unreserved support for the aggressive policy of Israel.) Ambassador Phillips, his deputy, a tall, thin man, explained in an apologetic tone that Yost had not been able to attend the breakfast because of a previously planned engagement. This explained very little, for the Prime Minister of Israel, America's closest ally, was the guest of U Thant.

The general discussion was sluggish. U Thant, who sat opposite his honoured guest, asked ques-

tions, joked and tried to create a natural atmosphere.

Golda Meir replied to his questions tersely and morosely.

My conversation with her, which was at first of a general, protocol nature, was in English. Then I asked her something in Russian. She looked at me in surprise and then replied that although she had been born in Russia she had completely forgotten the Russian language. Before the October Revolution she emigrated with her parents to the USA, where she lived in the state of Wisconsin and taught in a school. In 1921 she went to Palestine in connection with the creation of a "Jewish homeland", and after the formation of Israel began to engage actively in politics.

During our conversation I remarked that Abba Eban (her Minister of Foreign Affairs), Moshe Dayan (Minister of Defence) and Yigal Allon (Deputy Prime Minister) often voiced contradictory opinions regarding a peaceful settlement. Golda Meir looked at me and abruptly said in a coarse, low voice:

"Who knows what my ministers say. You listen to what I say."

After the breakfast a discussion took place between U Thant and Golda Meir. Ralph Bunche of the USA, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, attended and took part in the discussion for the UN Secretariat.

He later explained that Golda Meir had taken a firm stance in the discussion and given one to understand that she was against Jarring resuming his activity. She had repudiated certain "conciliatory" statements by Eban, saying that it was necessary to take account not of what her ministers said, but of the position she herself expressed.

Unrealised Hopes

In the summer of 1970 Israel's growing isolation in the international arena and the pressure of the oil monopolies on the American administration forced Israel to announce its recognition of Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council, and to agree to a three-month cease-fire and the resumption of Jarring's mission.

The American administration was seriously worried that the policy of all-out support for Israel might take away some of the United States' prestige in certain Arab countries and place the interests of American oil companies operating in the Middle East under a serious threat.

In agreeing to the resumption of Jarring's mission the USA could not fail to take into account the ever-growing resistance of the Arab states to the Israeli aggression and their resolve to do away with its consequences. A significant factor pushing the USA into taking such a step was the steadfast and constantly expanding political, diplomatic and economic support of the Soviet Union for the just fight of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression.

The UAR and Jordan always recognised the importance of Jarring's mission and expressed their readiness to cooperate constructively with him and practically assist his activity. The agreement of the UAR and Jordan to a cease-fire and a resumption of Jarring's mission was a weighty contribution to the efforts to establish peace in the Middle East.

As soon as it became known that Jarring was resuming his mediatory mission journalists rushed to see him where he was on holiday in the south of Sweden. They were hoping to clarify the details of his forthcoming activity and hear what he had to say about the new round of negotia-

tions on a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

To their great disappointment Jarring replied "No comment" to all their questions. When the fruitless interview was coming to an end Jarring finally said:

"The sun is shining brightly today for the first time during my holiday."

The reporters began to analyse this remark from the point of view of the prospects for peace in the Middle East, hoping for a chance to make some sensational reports. They exchanged opinions and, as one of them later related, after much thought, came to the conclusion that Jarring had meant no more than what he had said: this really was one of the rare sunny days in the unusually rainy summer of 1970 in Sweden.

Announcing Jarring's arrival in New York on August 6, 1970 U Thant praised him as a master of quiet diplomacy which, it seemed, could be the most productive in the Middle East.

The pro-Israeli press threw a lot of mud at Jarring, expressing doubt and scepticism about his ability successfully to see the matter through to the end. This was done in order to bring political and psychological pressure to bear on him.

Negotiations were resumed on August 21, but were soon broken off again, Israel having refused to hold them on the grounds that the UAR had infringed the cease-fire agreement. The Israeli and the Western press, particularly that of the United States, ran loud headlines about the introduction of new UAR missile complexes into the 50-kilometre zone to the west of the Suez Canal, the "violation of the balance of forces" and so on. The true reason for the uproar surrounding the "violation of the balance of forces" was that Israeli ruling circles were seeking new grounds for delaying a settlement by sabotaging

Jarring's activity and thinking up newer and newer pretexts. As early as June 1970 the Soviet government submitted its proposals for a practical solution to the conflict. These proposals in particular envisaged the participation of the UN and the Security Council in the solving or guaranteeing of certain specific problems in a Middle East settlement: supervision of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, guaranteeing the status of the demilitarised zones, and guaranteeing the security of Arab-Israeli borders.

U Thant was acquainted with the USSR's proposals during his visit to Moscow in July 1970. At a press conference in Geneva on July 7 he remarked on their significance and stressed that they had a number of new, interesting and concrete elements with the aim of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. After the press conference he explained:

"I made this declaration as a preparation for my meeting with the American President. I do not see any great point in the meeting since the President knows my position and I know his. But I did not consider it proper to refuse to meet the President of the USA. I wanted to use my declaration to prepare the ground for a conversation with Nixon. I want him to know my attitude to the proposals of the Soviet government. I believe they are more concrete than the American proposals, and that they form a good basis for a peaceful settlement."

Jarring was only able to resume negotiations in January 1971. In February he tried to break the deadlock by suggesting that Israel and the UAR accept obligations which he believed were essential if the talks were to continue. He tried to get Israel to oblige itself to withdraw its troops to the former border between Egypt and

British-mandated Palestine, while he wanted the UAR to accept the obligation to enter into a peaceful agreement with Israel which would envisage various obligations and acknowledgements following from the relevant principles of Resolution No. 242 (1967) of the Security Council. The UAR agreed to accept the concrete obligations which were suggested to it, but Israel did not reply to Jarring's proposals.

The talks were discontinued at the beginning of March 1971. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the UN U Thant wrote: "Ambassador Jarring feels, and I agree with him, that, until there has been a change in Israel's position on the question of withdrawal, it would serve little useful purpose to attempt to reactivate the talks."¹

Jarring tried to restore contacts with the Israeli side in 1971 and 1972, but as U Thant and Kurt Waldheim, the new Secretary-General, told me, Yosef Tekoah had advanced the prior condition that Jarring retract his memorandum of February 7, 1971 and that the provisions not be applied of the resolution of the 26th session of the General Assembly, which demanded the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories.

Naturally, Jarring could not renounce his memorandum, which was based on the provisions of the Security Council resolution, or ignore the resolution of the General Assembly, which was accepted by more than two-thirds of UN members. This provoked sharp displeasure on the part of Israeli ruling circles, and in an

¹ Introduction to the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation. September 1971. General Assembly. Official Records: Twenty-Sixth Session. Supplement. No. 1A (A/8401/Add.1), United Nations, New York, 1972, p. 28.

interview on Israeli television in August 1972 General Rabin, Israel's ambassador to the USA, called for open sabotage of Jarring's mission.

The government of Golda Meir, he said, had to block a political variant envisaging a general settlement on the basis of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967. Jarring's mission was the main tool for bringing about such a settlement.

Outside the United Nations the question of the situation in the Middle East was always at the centre of attention at various bilateral and multilateral meetings and conferences. However, drawing on the support of the USA and international Zionist organisations, Israeli ruling circles ignored both the resolutions of the Security Council and the opinions of other international organisations and the world public. Israel began to declare its annexationist pretensions more and more openly.

Chinese diplomacy avoided condemning the actions of Israel and American support for them. All their speeches in the UN came down to hypocritical arguments about a clash of the super-powers' interests in the Middle East and accusations of expansionism levelled at the Soviet Union. The Chinese stubbornly kept silent about the rights of the Palestinian people to their native land and to the formation of an independent state.

In an interview with a correspondent from the Italian magazine *L'Europeo* on November 23, 1972 Golda Meir declared: "Israel will never give up Jerusalem... We cannot tolerate the question of Jerusalem being put up for discussion." With regard to the Palestinian Gaza Strip she said that "Gaza must remain a part of Israel", while on the Syrian Golan Heights she said that Israel was ready to talk with Syria

on condition the new borders guaranteed Israel's presence there. "In other words," she went on, "the Syrians are now just where we need to establish the border. We will not yield on this question."

Touching on the question of the Palestinians the Prime Minister excluded the possibility of their returning to the occupied territories and declared that she did not agree with the idea of creating a state situated between Israel and Jordan, i.e. she was against the creation of a Palestinian state. Such a position on the part of Israeli ruling circles could not but worsen things in the Middle East, creating an explosive situation.

Israel's stance provoked growing indignation in the Arab countries and dissatisfaction with the work of the UN, which, it seemed to many, was not trying actively or firmly enough to implement its own resolutions on the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Hot-headed students at Cairo University and young officers in Egypt, Syria and Jordan insisted that the cease-fire established in August 1970 be revoked and military operations begun against the aggressor.

Meetings in Cairo

The World Federation of United Nations Associations invited me many times to speak at its seminars and meetings, where the problems of peace and security were discussed. I was prevented from absenteeing myself from the UN headquarters by my numerous obligations in the Secretariat, the fact that I had to prepare documents for the Secretary-General and take part in the work of committees, and also by the fact that I had to represent my country in a number of international bodies. At the beginning of

February 1972 I attended a session of the Security Council in Addis Ababa. The World Federation of United Nations Associations planned to hold a seminar of ministers of higher education from the Arab countries in Cairo in the middle of the month. This seminar was to be devoted to the problem of education with the aim of peace and international cooperation. The Federation and the Arab League approached the Secretary-General with a request to send one of his deputies to the seminar, and he responded by asking me to make a stop in Cairo on my way back to New York from Addis Ababa. In Cairo I was to make a report at the seminar entitled "The Security Council and the Activity of the UN in Support of Peace." It was a very topical subject. The inability of the UN to make sure Resolution No. 242 of the Security Council was implemented could not but provoke a feeling of disappointment and disbelief in the power and possibilities of the UN in the Arab countries. For this reason a lot had to be explained, above all the fact that the United Nations is not a supreme government. It is only in exceptional cases that the UN can implement its resolutions by force. For this, however, a resolution of the Security Council is necessary, which has to be agreed to by all its permanent members.

My speech provoked lively discussion and many questions and comments. Instead of the one and a half hours set aside in the programme, the discussion afterwards took up the whole of the morning session—from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.

In the evening there was a meeting with Sayed Marei, First Secretary of the Arab Socialist Union. A tall, bronze-faced man with a greying head of hair got up from the table.

"I have just been talking with a group of peasants," he said. "They expressed their anxiety

that we have not yet liberated our lands from the Israelis. They came to me unhurriedly and quietly for advice and to talk. It is even harder to talk with young people. This morning I was at the university and consider it a great success for myself that they let me speak. They don't even let other workers speak. Young people believe it's no good waiting for help from the UN or anyone else. You have to arm the people, conduct military training in the universities and unleash a national liberation war. Yes," he concluded, "the people are tired of waiting."

A famous Arab journalist who attended the discussion remarked in a conversation with myself:

"The students and our young people are right when they demand that they be given military training to fight against Israel. We have a lot of people up top who engage in nothing but idle talk instead of training people for an armed struggle and mobilising the nation. All the hopes of such figures rest on the UN resolutions and help from the Western countries. They forget that cooperation with the Soviet Union in the military field, supplies of Soviet arms and the assistance of Soviet military specialists have all allowed us and other Arab states to create our own national armed forces for the first time in history. This cooperation plays an important role in our struggle for national independence, and also in repulsing the Israeli aggression.

"The imperialist powers and local reaction," he continued, "are trying to use the difficult situation to undermine progressive regimes and break our resolve to move along the path of economic and social development. The bourgeoisie and the feudals are afraid to create new social relations and prefer to resort to a deal with the capitalist West in order to protect their property and privileges.

They are trying, on the one hand, to mobilise the nationalistically-minded strata of the population, and, on the other, to cause a rift between the Soviet Union and Egypt with the help of political speculation and slanderous fabrications. The patriotic and national liberation forces, however, will not submit to the provocation of their enemies. We reject the slogans of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism and favour strengthening friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union," he said warmly. "Most people believe that the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which the Soviet Union and Egypt signed on May 27, 1971 opened up broad new prospects for the development of Soviet-Egyptian relations."

The following day there was a meeting with the Secretary-General of the Arab League. We exchanged opinions and information on the prospects of implementing the Security Council's resolution on the settlement of the Middle East problem. The Secretary-General told us that the League's experts were studying the question of the role and influence of Arab oil on the foreign policy of the capitalist countries.

"We realise," he stressed, "that oil can be used as our weapon in the struggle against Israel and its allies, but it is a difficult task to unite the oil producers to bring pressure to bear on the USA and other friends of Israel. American diplomacy is making broad moves to cause a split amongst the Arab states. Serious disagreements and various political sympathies and foreign policy ties all serve as an obstacle to achieving unity amongst the Arab states, but we are working on overcoming these difficulties. As an extreme remedy," the Secretary-General concluded, "Arab oil will come into the fight for our independence and the return of Arab lands."

I recalled his words in the difficult days of October 1973 when the Arab countries announced an embargo on oil supplies to the USA, Holland, Denmark, Japan and other allies of Israel. It is well known that this embargo forced the USA, Japan and a number of European countries to renounce their unreserved support for the aggressive policy of Israel.

In 1973 Israel continued its policy of ignoring the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Extremist Israeli circles adamantly opposed the detente which had begun between the East and West, realising that if it were to develop further this process would require the elimination of the seat of war in the Middle East and bury the great-power plans of the international Zionist organisations. Trying to wreck the process of detente and worsen relations between the USSR and the USA, Israel provoked a new Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, the fourth of its kind. Once again, the Soviet Union rendered support to the Arab countries.

The war of October 1973 showed the strength and effectiveness of this support. The Arabs skillfully used the Soviet-produced weapons that they had at their disposal to defend their sovereignty, while Israel lost superiority in the air—something which had earlier ensured it many victories. The events of 1973 were a crucial military and political factor for the Arab world. The spirit of detente and Soviet diplomatic activity led to the USSR and the USA jointly submitting a draft resolution to the Security Council on a cease-fire and the calling of a peace conference to settle the Middle East problem on the basis of Resolution No. 242, to establish a just and lasting peace and, consequently, to ensure security in the region. The Security Council's resolution of October 23, 1973 prevented the fan-

ning of the military conflict in the Middle East into a major international conflagration.

I returned to the USSR in 1973 and was not able to follow the development of the Middle East situation every day. The underlying trends, however, remained the same. As a result of the activity of imperialist forces and the treacherous policy of Anwar Sadat's government in Egypt, the Middle East problem remained unsettled. By getting a dominant position in the Middle East Washington was trying, with the help of Zionism and reaction, to undermine progressive regimes, split the Arab world, and foist its will on peoples who wanted to determine their own future. By supplying Israel with modern arms the USA was urging it towards new acts of aggression against Lebanon, Syria and other states in the region.

At the 26th Congress of the CPSU the Soviet Union proposed calling an international conference on the Middle East. This proposal gave a good chance of working collectively to stabilise the situation in the region and met with a broad, positive response in the Arab countries and many other countries of the world.

HISTORY ADDRESSED TO THE FUTURE

The Peoples Want to Determine Their Own Future

On October 31, 1968, U Thant gave a dinner in honour of Abdelazizj Bouteflika, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had come to New York in connection with the 23rd session of the General Assembly. The members of the Algerian delegation at the Assembly—Algeria's ambassadors to Argentina and Kuwait and Tewfik Bouattoura, its permanent representative at the UN—were also invited to the dinner. A young and capable diplomat, Bouteflika was very popular amongst the representatives of the developing countries and the Arab delegations. His speeches stood out for their rich content, and he was also a good speaker. A short, thin man with a small ginger moustache, he looked very young. He was in fact a little over 30 and had behind him the years of struggle against the French colonialists and much state and public activity. He was General Secretary of the General Staff of the National Liberation Army and after liberation in 1962 he became National Commissioner of the National Liberation Front in the department of Oran. From 1963 he was a member of the government of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

That morning it had been announced on the radio that President Johnson was to make a speech to the nation. It was expected that he

would announce the cessation of bombing raids against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the beginning of negotiations, which was what world public opinion and the American population wanted. For this reason the discussion at the dinner was sluggish in anticipation of the important report.

The USA's war provoked widespread discussions in the UN, although the matter did not formally stand on its agenda. The DRV was not a member of the UN and, naturally, refused to take part in discussions of the problem, insisting together with other socialist countries that it be settled in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, which envisaged the withdrawal of foreign troops from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the prohibition of the establishment there of foreign military bases and the import of arms, respect for the neutrality of these states, and the holding of a general election in Vietnam with the aim of uniting the country.

Soon after the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina the USA began to build up its military potential in Vietnam with the aim of strengthening the puppet authorities of the South which had entrenched themselves in Saigon. The Saigon authorities prevented the holding of a general election by unleashing a wave of terror and violence against the population. The situation in the South grew worse and worse and a widespread partisan movement developed. These small bands of patriots, which at first operated as uncoordinated groups, became a powerful liberation force. In December 1960 the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (SVNLF) was formed, uniting broad strata of the population and the various patriotic organisations. A large part of the territory of South Vietnam was under the Front's control.

Trying not to let Vietnam fall out of the capitalist system, the USA began an open war of intervention, using an incident with the destroyer *Maddox* as its pretext.

In August 1964 the *Maddox*, which had already violated the DRV's territorial waters, had entered the Gulf of Tonkin and opened fire on Vietnamese patrol vessels. Defending the borders of their country the patrol vessels returned fire and drove the destroyer into the open sea. Two days later there was a new provocation on the part of the American military: the USA announced that the Vietnamese ships themselves had attacked the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*, another destroyer, in international waters.¹

The Senate was hurriedly convened and adopted the Tonkin Resolution, which sanctioned the adoption of measures to repulse any "armed attack" on the forces of the United States and avert "further aggression". That was how the barbaric aerial war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was begun.

American aircraft bombed roads, ports, industrial works, towns and villages. At the same time intervention in the South of Vietnam expanded, and at the end of 1965 American troops in that part of the country numbered 200,000. By the end of 1968 the operations of the now 585,000-strong army were being supported by the USA's 7th Fleet. The United States' action was a blatant violation of international law and the UN Charter, which forbids not only armed attack, but

¹ An investigation conducted afterwards by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee showed that the American destroyers had been within the 12-mile strip of territorial waters and that the military authorities of the DRV were therefore right to take the measures of self-defence which are usual in such cases. Secret Pentagon documents published in 1971 showed that this was a planned provocation.

also the threat of force. The USA rejected the peaceable proposals of the DRV to settle the Vietnamese conflict, banking instead on forcing the Vietnamese people to capitulate by military means. Armed pressure on the DRV also had more strategic aims: to isolate Vietnam and produce a split in the world socialist system. In March 1965 China refused to make a joint declaration with the DRV, the USSR, the DPRK and other socialist countries exposing the USA's violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The leadership of the PRC declined the USSR's suggestion to take specific action to defend the DRV from the raids of American aircraft. It also declined the suggestion to hold a top-level meeting of representatives of the DRV, the USSR and the PRC to discuss measures to repulse the American interventionists.

American diplomacy tried to internationalise the aggression in Vietnam, strengthen the Saigon regime and conceal the crimes of the US military, but it was not successful. Britain did not enter the war and France took an abrupt negative stance while Finland and Sweden showed benevolence towards the fighting Vietnamese people. Amongst America's allies it was only Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the South Korean puppets that decided to send troops to South Vietnam.

The USSR declared its total support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its fight against aggression. The government of the USSR repeatedly drew the attention of the American administration to the dangerous nature and hopelessness of the aggression in Vietnam. The Soviet side demanded a halt to the aggression and the bombing of North Vietnam, the withdrawal of American troops and those of its allies from the country as a whole, and respect for the

right of the Vietnamese people to decide its own affairs.

The courageous struggle of the Vietnamese people, the help and support of the USSR and other socialist countries, and the enormous upsurge of the anti-war struggle of the American population all forced President Johnson to issue an order on the partial cessation on March 31, 1968 of the bombing of North Vietnam and to agree to negotiations.

As a result of five months of negotiations the President undertook to announce the cessation of bombing raids and other armed acts against North Vietnam from November 1, 1968.

U Thant actively opposed the imperialist aggression in Vietnam in his public declarations and in conversations with ministers and ambassadors. On the eve of President Johnson's expected announcement of the cessation of bombing raids against North Vietnam correspondents approached U Thant with a request that he comment on this announcement in advance.

U Thant said:

"I must first study Johnson's announcement and only then express my opinion. On the whole, Johnson is very late in making this announcement. It has taken 30,000 American lives, an incredible number of victims amongst the Vietnamese, and more than \$130,000 million in expenditure to make Johnson finally decide to take this step."

Ralph Bunche, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, whose son was sent to fight in Vietnam, declared:

"The most tragic thing for the USA is its loss of international prestige and trust on the part of many nations. The USA has also shown its weakness in the fight with liberation movements..."

During the dinner with the Algerians we time and again returned to the problem of Vietnam. Shortly after U Thant's assistant handed him a sheet of paper, the text of which he read out. President Johnson had announced that from 8 a.m. on November 1, 1968 the USA would stop its bombardment of the territory of North Vietnam from the air, sea and land. There was to be a meeting of representatives of the DRV, the USA, the South Vietnam National Liberation Front and the Saigon regime in Paris on November 6. The President's declaration also specified that the participation of the SVNLF in the talks did not mean that the United States recognised it.

U Thant commented:

"I have been calling for this for more than three years. I personally talked to Johnson about this in June 1965 at the jubilee session of the UN in San Francisco. I had put forward my suggestion about the need to hold negotiations with the SVNLF in a conversation with the American representative Stevenson as early as in January 1965, a few months after the so-called Tonkin incident. But at that time no one wanted to listen to me. American public opinion did not support me, either. In the summer of 1965 Stevenson told me that public opinion polls showed that 53 per cent of the population was against bombardment being halted. And Johnson paid a lot of attention to this."

It was pointed out to him that even polls conducted by the authoritative Gallup and Harris institutes often do not reflect the true mood of the people. It is a well-known fact, for example, that before the Republican Party Congress in the summer of 1968 Gallup and Harris both reported that most voters supported Rockefeller and not Nixon. At the Congress, however, it was Nixon

who received the vast majority of the votes.

U Thant remembered the reaction of the American administration to his declaration of September 21, 1968 on the need to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam.

"I was visited by George Ball, the American representative at the UN," he explained. "He said: 'I am very surprised by your declaration and am making a formal protest.' I always keep my balance and remain patient and calm, but there I could not contain myself. I exclaimed: 'I am astounded that you are surprised by my declaration. I have been demanding a halt to the bombardment of Vietnam for three years.'"

The most surprising thing, however, came later. Ball retired two days afterwards, announcing that he wanted to help Hubert Humphrey fight for the presidency. Humphrey and Ball together announced that they were in favour of a halt to the bombardment of Vietnam. All this sounds like a paradox.

Despite Johnson's announcement negotiations only began on January 18, 1969. Until then the American representative in Paris had drawn things out by protracted bargaining in an attempt to prevent the representative of the SVNLF enjoying full rights at the negotiations. The four-sided conference went on for around three years.

In accordance with the programme published in May 1969, the delegations of the DRV and the SVNLF aimed at winning respect for the national rights of the Vietnamese people, including the right to independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam was formed in June 1969. The USSR was one of the first to recog-

nise it, and the representatives of communist and workers' parties who had gathered at that time at an international meeting in Moscow announced their combined, vigorous support for it. The Provisional Revolutionary Government was recognised by all the socialist states and a number of Asian and African countries. It had information bureaux in France, Sweden, Norway and Finland and took part in all progressive international democratic organisations.

Skilfully combining all forms of their struggle, the Vietnamese patriots were active on the political and diplomatic front at the same time as they were taking resolute armed action. During the long negotiations in Paris on a political settlement the representatives of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam gave a striking example of revolutionary diplomacy—firmness and adherence to principles in combination with a constructive approach and flexibility. They consistently stood up for the fundamental national interests of their people and the principles of international law, actively helping expose the imperialist aggression and attract world public opinion and the most diverse political forces onto the side of Vietnam.

The just fight of the Vietnamese and the realistic and constructive proposals of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam met with support on the part of the broad popular masses in the USA and other countries of the world. I witnessed mass demonstrations by American working people against the war in Vietnam, and remember meetings and conversations with workers from other countries.

At first the government of the People's Republic of China helped Vietnam, but in the final

stage of the war it began to apply the brake to the transportation of equipment, food and medicines from the Soviet Union across its territory. Ships from the USSR had to take a roundabout route round Africa in order to get to the Indian Ocean and reach the Vietnamese port of Haiphong.

U Thant in Moscow

U Thant arrived in Moscow on June 17, 1970. The programme of his visit included meetings with Aleksei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During these meetings opinions were exchanged on the most pressing problems of international life, including the acute problem of the Middle East.

"After my discussions in Moscow I have once again satisfied myself that the Soviet government is full of resolve to achieve a just peaceful settlement within the framework of the Security Council," U Thant declared. "I give the Soviet leaders their due for their efforts to ensure peace."¹

U Thant's condemnation of the war in Vietnam and Cambodia and his emphasis on the need to implement the Security Council's resolutions on the Middle East provoked malicious, hostile commentaries in the bourgeois press. The *International Herald Tribune*, for example, published an article with the headline: "TASS Cites Thant as Agreeing With Moscow on Cambodia".

Later, after his retirement, U Thant said in

¹ *Pravda*, June 20, 1970.

an interview with the magazine *Gallery* in January 1973:

"I had marvellous personal relations with presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, but I disagreed with all of them from time to time on their foreign policy. I did not agree with Kennedy's venture in the Bay of Pigs or with Johnson and Nixon in respect of their policy in Vietnam. Vietnam is becoming a desert as a result of the war there because its ecology was poisoned. The country's sufferings are truly unprecedented in human history. The Vietnamese war was a gross mistake from the very beginning and, in my opinion, the most tragic the USA has ever made. When you think that a quarter of the Vietnamese people are refugees and that by now the figure is approaching a third, when it becomes clear that most of the country's rural areas have been turned into wasteland by bombs, and when you see that the culture, religion and traditional bases of the inhabitants of South Asia were completely ignored during the war, you come to the conclusion that this war was a mistake. It was the most barbaric war in history."

On January 27, 1973 Agreements on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam were signed in Paris.

These agreements envisaged a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of American and other foreign troops from Vietnamese soil, and a renunciation by the USA of interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam.

The termination of the war and the restoration of peace in Vietnam went down in history as an important landmark in the struggle of the peoples for freedom and national sovereignty and as the victory of the heroic and courageous Vietnamese people over the forces of aggression.

Patriotic forces controlled much of South Vietnam. In the liberated regions the Provisional Revolutionary Government carried out democratic reforms and took measures to develop the economy, culture and education. Heroic Vietnam triumphantly celebrated the complete liberation of the South of the country on May 15-17, 1975.

The elimination of the seat of war in Vietnam created conditions for a further improvement in the international situation and opened up more prospects for detente.

The Security Council in Africa

On January 25, 1972 an army of 125 employees of the UN Secretariat, several ambassadors and representatives of African members of the Security Council left New York aboard a plane chartered by the UN. A short overnight stop in Madrid—and we were flying over Africa.

For the first time in the history of the United Nations the Security Council had decided to hold a session devoted to African problems on African soil, in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. This was also the first time the Council had held a session outside New York.

The decision to hold the meeting in Addis Ababa was preceded by long consultations and discussions in a specially formed Security Council committee on holding Council meetings outside the main headquarters of the UN. Western delegations, above all those of Great Britain and the USA, advanced numerous reservations and pretexts with the aim of preventing the session being held in Africa. The Americans spoke of the need to make financial economies, while the British expressed apprehension lest some international crisis should arise while the Council

members were absent and the world should find itself under threat with no one to save it.

At the same time the Americans and the British demanded that the Council should have exactly the same back-up service as in New York: the rapid issue of shorthand reports in all working languages, simultaneous translation, and so on. This meant that almost 100 translators, stenographers and typists had to be taken to Addis Ababa.

No one decided to directly oppose the holding of the Council session on African soil. The Organisation of African Unity had officially approached the UN with a request that it discuss African problems in an African capital. Guinea, Ethiopia and Zambia vied with each other to offer their capital as a site for the session.

Ethiopia was the winner, its government taking on itself the hotel expenses for all the UN Secretariat's staff, and also the obligation to provide transport and ensure security. Apart from that the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) was sited in Addis Ababa with its personnel, equipment and conference facilities.

After prolonged arguments, reductions in the number of executive officials and technical personnel and cutting of travelling expenses they managed to cut the estimated cost to \$120,000. Expenses were also cut on the charter flight. The lowest price was offered by Trans World Airlines which, like all airline companies, has a large shortfall of passengers in the winter months. Some of the tickets on the flight were sold at a reduced price to the representatives of small countries, for whom paying for the journey from New York to Addis Ababa represented a big problem.

Addis Ababa was a convenient venue for the session. It is also the site of the headquarters of

the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which plays an important role in strengthening the unity of the African countries in their struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism and racism for the complete liberation of the entire African continent from colonial rule.

Supporting the OAU, Emperor Haile Selassie I secured the siting of its main quarters in Addis Ababa and presented its secretariat with a new building. A detached house originally built for one of the princesses was handed over as the personal residence of its Secretary-General.

Ethiopia fought for its national independence for many years. In 1941 it was liberated from the Italian invaders and in 1942 the British government foisted an unequal agreement on it, according to which the British diplomatic representative in Ethiopia was guaranteed preference over any other foreign representatives. The Ethiopian government undertook to invite only British specialists to work in the country. A military convention attached to the agreement stipulated that British forces would occupy the Ogaden and the so-called reserve zone (around one-third of the territory of Ethiopia) for as long as the command of British armed forces in East Africa, in agreement with the Emperor, deemed it necessary.

The Americans, who, considering the country's important strategic significance, were interested in exercising undivided control over its economy, supported Ethiopia's demands that British troops be withdrawn from its territory. In 1954 the British government agreed to sign a treaty on the evacuation of British troops and the transfer of Eastern Ethiopia to the jurisdiction of the Ethiopian government. The ousting of the British increased the expansion of American capital even more.

On May 22, 1953 an American-Ethiopian mutual defence agreement was signed in Washington, in accordance with which the USA promised to provide Ethiopia with arms and assistance in training its army. A Department of State bulletin concerning this agreement pointed out that "In reaching this determination the President took into consideration Ethiopia's strategic location within the general Near East area"¹. At the same time an agreement was signed on the use by American armed forces of defence installations in Ethiopia. The USA also won the right to dredge near the shore and to build harbours, moorings and roads necessary for the movement of American armed forces, etc.

This extreme strengthening of the positions of American imperialism in Ethiopia caused growing concern amongst the public. The growth of opposition within the country and the radical changes brought about in the international situation by the strengthening of the socialist camp and the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism forced the ruling circles of Ethiopia to seek new paths of independent development for the country. Certain measures were taken to develop the economy, help local enterprises and develop the energy base. In an effort to lessen its dependence on the USA, the government expanded links with other countries. In 1956 Ethiopia established diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and signed trade agreements with Czechoslovakia and other countries of the socialist community. Diplomatic relations with the GDR were established in 1973. Ethiopia's political, military and economic dependence on the USA, however, and the presence of many feu-

¹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 727, June 1, 1953, p. 785.

dal survivals from the past continued to seriously impede the country's development.

The ceremonial opening of the Security Council session took place on January 28, 1972. Representatives of African and Asian countries and national liberation movements had all arrived in Addis Ababa, as had a large group of journalists. The chair was occupied by Omar Arteh Ghalib, the Somalian Minister of Foreign Affairs, a tall young African with a curly head of hair. Kurt Waldheim sat on his right, while I sat on his left. Emperor Haile Selassie was present, as was Moktar Ould Daddah, President of Mauritania and Chairman of the OAU. He sat in a chair next to the Emperor.

The amphitheatre and the circle were put at the disposal of the diplomatic corps, and it was not without difficulty that a place was ensured for the government of the GDR, for at the time Ethiopia did not have diplomatic relations with the GDR and the GDR was not a member of the UN. The representatives of the FRG jealously watched the activity of the East German diplomats, and through the Americans expressed "surprise" concerning the arrival at the Security Council session of the GDR representative and his being granted a seat in the diplomatic box. The Western powers did not recognise the sovereignty of the GDR.

President Moktar Ould Daddah made a brilliant speech in which he declared that the Council was facing a serious test. The peoples of the African countries, he said, were going to judge its capability by the decisions it took on such burning African problems as Rhodesia, the colonies, and apartheid in South Africa.

In the evening of January 28 the members of the Security Council and all the employees of the UN Secretariat from the Secretary-General

to translators and typists were invited to a dinner in the Imperial Palace. The Ethiopian imperial court was considered one of the strictest as regarded protocol, and Yu. Zybanov, the deputy head of the protocol department, had to go to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and spend half a day getting agreement that it would be permitted to appear at the dinner without dinner-jackets and long evening dresses, which many of the technical staff did not have.

There were more than 500 people at the dinner, including more than 20 African foreign ministers who had come to the Security Council session, around 100 ambassadors, and prominent Ethiopian officials and ministers. The Emperor's personal bodyguards stood at the entrance to the hall: enormous black guardsmen in full dress khaki uniforms with broad white leather belts. The tall hall with beautiful crystal chandeliers sparkled with light, while a red carpet covered the floor so that the guests' footsteps could not be heard.

Haile Selassie stood at the end of the hall. He was evidently extremely bored and hardly looked at those who approached him, slackly shaking hands and almost not reacting to the words of his guests. Footmen dressed in gallooned uniforms and white gloves took round wine on silver trays. Half an hour later the guests, who were talking animatedly, went into another hall.

There was a gold plate in front of the Emperor and his food was brought to him on gold dishes, while a whole army of waiters bustled around.

As is usual at diplomatic receptions the programme stipulated that Haile Selassie would make a short speech at the end of the dinner, to which the Secretary-General of the UN was to reply.

This ceremony, however, did not take place: either the Emperor had forgotten that he was

expected to make a speech or he had grown tired from the dinner. Whatever, he did not make a speech. None of those attending him dared remind him of this. The champagne was poured and everyone waited, but there was no speech. Those who wanted to, drank. Then the Emperor unexpectedly stood up, shook hands with the Secretary-General, his own daughter and some high officials, and made for the exit.

There was nothing left for the guests to do but follow his example.

The Disease of the Century

The Security Council's agenda was drawn up thus: "Consideration of questions relating to Africa of which the Security Council is currently seized and implementation of the Council's relevant resolutions."

The Council held its thirteen meetings from January 28 to February 4. During the meetings the representatives of the developing countries and the forces of national liberation, which were supported by the USSR and other socialist countries expanded their acute political struggle against neocolonialism.

The formulation of the agenda provided the opportunity to discuss in the Security Council the problems of the fight with the policy of neocolonialism, a policy which represented a threat to peace and had even already led to an infringement of it.

The UN Charter places the responsibility on the Organisation and all its members of taking active steps with the aim of helping all suppressed peoples achieve independence. This flows directly from the principles of self-determination of the peoples, the equality of great and small

nations, and the equality of rights of all peoples irrespective of race, language or religion, which are proclaimed in the UN Charter.

In the early years of the United Nations' existence the principle of the self-determination of the peoples was further confirmed in a number of General Assembly resolutions. At that time, however, only a few countries other than the socialist ones took a consistent anti-colonial stance, and the resolutions got no further than a confirmation of principles. The turning point came in 1960. The powerful rise of the national liberation movement in the colonies and the dependent countries had led to a new group of countries and peoples being freed from the rule of imperialism.

From September to October 1960, 17 new states, 16 of them African, were admitted to the UN at the 15th session of the General Assembly, and in that year the membership of the Organisation grew to 99. The combined Afro-Asian group numbered 45 states, 25 of them African. Most of them had been colonies in the recent past and on the whole took progressive, anti-colonial positions. This radical change in the correlation of forces also told on the positions of the Latin American countries and some of the Scandinavian ones.

The Soviet government proposed formally declaring the entire colonial system illegal by adopting a special declaration, and at its suggestion the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was included in the agenda of the 15th session of the General Assembly in 1960. This suggestion served as a concrete political programme which united the anti-colonial forces in the UN with the object of condemning colonialism and creating an international legal basis for the demands for the

self-determination and independence of all peoples under the yoke of colonial rule.

As the result of an acute political struggle the Assembly approved the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reflected the main ideas of the Soviet draft and in particular the demand rapidly and unconditionally to eliminate colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The provisions of the Declaration lay at the basis of the UN's activity in the field of decolonisation and the UN moved from a position of recognising the right of peoples to self-determination to one of helping eliminate the entire colonial system. It began actively to interfere in the solving of problems of decolonisation, and its resolutions confirming the right of peoples to independence acquired the significance of direct moral and political support in a number of cases (the question of Algeria in 1960-1961, of Aden from 1963-1967, etc.) They also became a material factor, since they were supported by most UN member states. A number of countries (South Yemen, Guayana, Nauru, former British protectorates in southern Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Oman, Fiji and some others) achieved independence under the influence of the relevant discussions and resolutions of the UN, although, of course, these resolutions were not and cannot be decisive. UN documents set out the right to independence and self-determination of territories including Namibia, French Somaliland and other smaller territories such as the Solomon Islands, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and so on. At present all non-self-governing territories are in the charge of six colonial powers (Great Britain, France, Spain, the USA, Australia and New Zealand). South Africa illegally keeps the territory of Namibia under its control.

In 1965 after a long and pointed struggle the General Assembly recognised the legality of the fight of the colonial peoples for liberation. It also recognised the lawfulness of armed struggle to this end.

Resolutions of the General Assembly have repeatedly confirmed that colonial rule threatens international peace and security. In Resolution No. 2189 (XXI) of December 13, 1966 the General Assembly established that the practice of apartheid, as also of all forms of racial discrimination, constituted a crime against humanity. Basing themselves on this, those countries opposing colonialism in the UN conducted a fight to have sanctions imposed through the Security Council against colonial and colonial-racist regimes.

The presence in the Security Council of colonial powers—Great Britain, France and the USA—having the right of veto led to the Council playing a considerably lesser role in the fight with colonialism than did the General Assembly. In 1968 the Council adopted a decision to impose economic sanctions against South Rhodesia. This resolution, however, did not have the necessary effect, for it did not envisage measures to be taken against countries infringing it. The imperialist powers rose up resolutely against the adoption of such measures.

The resistance of the forces of reaction was particularly desperate and stubborn on questions on the situation in southern Africa where, as is well-known, a bloc of colonial racist regimes had taken shape: the RSA with its barbaric system of apartheid and its virtual annexation of Namibia, and South Rhodesia with its racist regime of the white minority. More than 30 million native Africans (on 4 million square kilometres) lived under the rule of the colonial white minority.

The problem of eliminating colonial racist regimes in the south of Africa became a subject of prolonged and bitter struggle in various UN bodies. The situation in South Rhodesia was not removed from the agenda of the General Assembly or the Security Council from 1962 to 1980. African and socialist countries, supported by a number of Asian and Latin American ones, tried to secure the adoption of resolutions on the exercise of direct pressure on the regime in the Republic of South Africa and the use of coercive measures, including economic sanctions.

In 1963 the Security Council overcame the opposition of the colonial powers and their NATO allies and adopted a resolution on the discontinuation of the sale and supply to South Africa of arms, ammunition and all military means of transport (the USA and Great Britain did not permit the adoption of a resolution on a trade boycott of the RSA). Even this resolution could be effective if it were conscientiously implemented by, above all, the RSA's trading partners: Great Britain, the USA, West Germany *et al.* The members of the North Atlantic military bloc, however, continued their military cooperation with the RSA, thus violating the Security Council resolution.

The question of Namibia has been widely discussed in the UN. In 1966 the Assembly confirmed the right of the Namibian people to freedom and independence by an overwhelming majority of the votes and declared the RSA's mandate over the territory invalid. The resolution created the UN Council on Namibia to administer the territory, but it did not have any real opportunity to exercise its powers because of opposition from the South African authorities. The just principles advanced by the UN were not backed up by practical measures to implement them.

In 1971 the Security Council decided to ask the International Court of Justice for its advice on the question of Namibia¹.

The African countries wanted to use this approach to the Court to attract the attention of the world public to the racist and illegal policy of the RSA in Namibia.

The International Court of Justice has the right to examine disputes between states with the voluntary agreement of all parties and to draw up advisory resolutions on any legal matter in response to a request by UN bodies and specialised establishments. Its advisory resolutions are the opinion of specialists and are of purely recommendatory significance.

Between 1945 and 1971 the Court examined 36 cases and returned 13 advisory resolutions. Most of the cases concerned minor, secondary disputes. On the whole the court plays a small role in the settlement of disputes between states. The domination of Western representatives in the Court led to its activity damaging the cause of peace and harming its own prestige on a number of occasions. Imperialist circles tried to use the Court to revise the basic provisions of the UN Charter in order to force through resolutions which contradicted it (in 1962 the Court recognised the financing of the armed forces in the Congo as "expenses of the Organisation", i.e. it recognised the covering of the expenses for these illegal operations out of the UN budget. This meant that the USSR would also have to pay out enormous sums of money for the "UN operation in the Congo", which was being

¹ The International Court of Justice is the main judicial body of the UN. It is permanently located in The Hague.

carried out in the interests of the imperialist powers.)¹

By 1971 the position in the Court had changed somewhat. As a result of elections to it in 1969 the developed capitalist countries were represented by five judges, the socialist countries by two, the developing countries of Asia by three, of Latin America by two, and of Africa by three.

The Secretary-General was commissioned to deal with the Namibian case on behalf of the UN. Since this decision was taken by the Security Council, which was examining the matter, the political department decided to take a direct part in presenting the problem. This caused a cool, to say the least, attitude on the part of Constantin Stavropoulos of Greece, the Secretary-General's Legal Counsel, who took a Western line in the Secretariat. The participation of the legal department hindered manoeuvres in the interests of the RSA and its imperialist patrons.

The International Court of Justice occupies the majestic old building of the Peace Palace, one of the main sights in The Hague. Inside the building there is a ceremonial silence and semi-darkness, for the marble staircases and the many corridors and halls are poorly lit. Along the sides of the staircases there are busts of great legislators and legal theoreticians.

As I walked along a corridor with Stanislas Aguarone, the Court Registrar, he explained the prospects of the discussion of the problem. The hearing would begin in February, but it was difficult to expect the Court's decision earlier than June or July.

I made an official visit to Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, the Chairman of the Court. We talked in

¹ The Soviet Union and France refused to take part in financing this "operation".

a large room with antique furniture made of dark wood. Bookcases lined the walls. Zafrulla Khan, an aged Pakistani, told me he could not predict the results of the discussion. In all fairness, he said, the African countries had not prepared their cases sufficiently from the point of view of jurisprudence. South Africa had prepared an extensive legal argument and was capable of making a certain impression on some colleagues. He did not name who he had in mind when he said this. I asked his opinion of the materials the UN Secretariat had submitted and of the persuasiveness of our argument. He shrugged. Most likely he did not want to give his opinion, preferring to cooperate with Stavropoulos, who represented Western influence in the UN Secretariat.

Zafrulla Khan did not promise the Court's decision any earlier than June or July 1971, although the African countries had expressed a wish to have the Court's advisory resolution as early as possible in order to discuss the matter in the Security Council before the beginning of the General Assembly session.

As well as the UN Secretariat the USSR and a number of African and socialist countries submitted their opinions to the Court. The RSA sent a group of seven lawyers, including three from West Germany whom it had engaged to conduct its case. The African representatives intended to take about two weeks presenting their case, while those representing the RSA intended to take one to one-and-a-half months.

"There hasn't been a single serious case in the Court for several years," said Luis Padilla Nervo, the Mexican judge. "For this reason the problem of Namibia will be discussed readily—we have to show world public opinion that the Court works."

The office of P. D. Morozov was spacious. He was my old colleague in the USSR's representation at the UN. Next to his office there was a changing room, for when the Court is in session the judges wear black gowns and square hats. Morozov pointed out that some Western countries could try to use the Security Council's request to the Court as a precedent for presenting it as an appeal body against Security Council resolutions, which the UN Charter obliges all member states to implement.

The first session of the Court took place the following day.

The chairman appeared at exactly 10 a.m. He was followed by other members of the Court, who came in in strict order according to their age and term of election. The judges were of an extremely venerable age, Morozov, at 65, being one of the youngest.

The Nigerian Minister of Justice made a brilliant speech, as did the representatives of other African countries. They spoke of the political and legal groundlessness of the South African regime, which was maintaining control over the people of Namibia contrary to international law and the resolutions of international organisations because it was an important mining centre for diamonds and strategic materials where American, British and West German monopolies were dominant.

After the session there was a lively exchange of opinion. Racing ahead a little I want to say that the results of the Court's work on the Namibian question were published in a thick volume. The essence of its advisory resolution came down to the RSA's having lost the right to administer Namibia. Namibia was either to transfer to the control of the UN or to receive independence. A number of delegations subsequently

drew on this conclusion during sessions of the Security Council.

The Racists of South Africa Before the Court of the Peoples

The session of the Security Council in Addis Ababa resumed work on January 31, 1972. During the session the attempts of the British Conservative government to come to an agreement with the racist regime of Ian Smith and thus consolidate the rule of the white minority over millions of Zimbabweans came under sharp criticism. The November 1971 agreement between Alec Douglas Home, the British Foreign Secretary, and Ian Smith, the leader of the South Rhodesian racists, was rejected by the people of Zimbabwe. Despite terror, threats and persecution the African population of South Rhodesia demonstrated its non-acceptance of this deal.

At the basis of the agreement there lay the theory of racial superiority and the theory that the African population was supposedly not yet ready or capable of running its own country and determining its own future. The head of the South Rhodesian racists spoke openly of this in a television interview on December 1, 1971 when he declared that they (the Africans—*L.K.*) were not at the time fit to govern the country. It was difficult, he said, to say what the situation would be in 100 or 1000 years time.

At meetings of the Security Council in New York and Addis Ababa the representatives of the African countries declared that, having thoroughly studied the Home-Smith agreement, they had come to the conclusion that its political essence and basis were racist and imperial-

ist. The deal was rejected by the overwhelming majority of UN members at the 26th session of the General Assembly. The Organisation of African Unity characterised it as "an open betrayal of the future generations of five million Africans by 243 thousand white Rhodesians connected with white rule and apartheid".

While the British representatives headed by Alec Douglas Home were conducting negotiations on strengthening the racist system in South Rhodesia, the USA decided to repeal a ban on the import of chromium ore from that country, thus violating the Security Council's resolution on sanctions against the Smith regime. "The actions of Great Britain and the USA with regard to South Rhodesia and other colonial-racist regimes in the south of Africa," Ya. A. Malik, the Soviet representative, declared, "are directly linked with the plans of the imperialist powers to put together and strengthen a military colonial bloc in southern Africa in order to place a barrier across the path of the national liberation movements of the African peoples, who are finding themselves more and more oppressed by colonialists and racists, and threaten the independence of sovereign African states. The Soviet Union resolutely condemns Britain's deal with Smith's racist regime, which usurped power in South Rhodesia. The Soviet delegation, like the vast majority of United Nations members, stands firmly and resolutely for the adoption of the most effective measures aimed at removing the racist regime in South Rhodesia and transferring power to the legal owners—the people of Zimbabwe."

In their speeches the representatives of African and socialist countries demanded that Britain be condemned for the fact that it had not been able to defend the African population of

South Rhodesia, and that the USA be condemned for infringing the sanctions against that country.

Realising that such a resolution would not be able to get through the Council, three African delegations (Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan) submitted a fairly moderate draft with the aim of winning the support not only of the socialist and the developing countries, but also that of some Western powers.

This resolution once again confirmed that the position in South Rhodesia represented a threat to international peace, and suggested calling an urgent conference at which the African population would be able, through its representatives, to take part in the drawing up of new suggestions concerning the problems of the country's political development. It also called on all states to take stricter measures to make sure the sanctions against South Rhodesia were fully implemented.

This draft resolution advanced the most minimal demands. The representatives of the USSR and Yugoslavia pointed out its compromise nature, but, taking the wishes of the African countries into account, the USSR, India and Yugoslavia agreed to vote for it.

The chairman of the Security Council put the draft resolution to the vote. The bright floodlights came on and the television cameras began turning.

"Those in favour?" the chairman asked.

The representatives of the USSR, Argentina, Guinea, India, China, Panama, Somalia, the Sudan and Yugoslavia raised their hands.

The resolution had obtained the necessary majority.

"Those against?"

Everyone looked to the left side of the hall.

How would the British representative behave? Would he dare throw down a challenge to Africa? The face of Ambassador Colin Crowe flushed with blood and he slowly raised his hand. He had vetoed the resolution! There was a boom of voices and indignant shouts.

One of the African representatives expressed his indignation. "Africa has been aroused," he exclaimed, "and nothing will frighten or slacken the pace of our movement towards freedom."

His words were justified, for the white minority did not succeed in keeping control over the country of the Zimbabwean people. The colonial enclave of South Rhodesia was swept by the storm wave of the popular movement and the independent republic of Zimbabwe was proclaimed in place of colonial South Rhodesia in 1980. One more bastion of colonialism had collapsed.

The time came to solve the next problem—that of the apartheid policy of the government of South Africa. Together with India and Yugoslavia the African delegations submitted a draft condemning the policy of apartheid, the most important clause of which was the one calling on all states strictly to observe the embargo on arms to South Africa. The African and the socialist countries tried to have the embargo extended to all supplies of weapons to the racist regime, since it used practically all the types of weapons it obtained to suppress the national liberation movement.

The resolution was adopted almost unanimously, only France abstaining. The vote condemning the policy of apartheid, however, in fact by no means changed the true content of the Western powers' policy with regard to the South African regime.

The meeting closed at about 2 o'clock in the morning on February 5, 1972, bringing the ses-

sion in Addis Ababa to an end. We returned to our hotel towards morning. Sleepy duty staff looked sullenly at the diplomats filling the foyer. Did they know about the session, were they interested in something? It was difficult to know. It seemed to those from the Western countries that politics did not bother the Ethiopians much and that they were used to the burdens of life and thinking about their earnings and their subsistence.

The outward appearance, however, was deceptive. The cup of ordeals was flowing over and a protest was ripening in the heart of the people. From the end of 1973 there were student demonstrations in Addis Ababa, strikes, and unrest in army units. This unrest spread into the Imperial Guards, the main support of the throne, and patriotically-minded officers took power into their own hands, deposing the Emperor in 1974. The Ethiopian people had shown that it, like the other peoples of Africa, was ready to fight for social progress, freedom and independence.

Panama Throws Down the Challenge

In front of the Panamanian National Assembly there stood a large shield on which were painted the words of Omar Torrijos, the head of the Panamanian government: "Everyone should realise that a nation cannot be forced to its knees. We would rather die than live under a foreign yoke."

These words were painted in large letters in Spanish, English, French, Russian and Chinese, the five official languages of the UN. Panama was expecting the arrival of the members of the Security Council and the representatives of many countries. A sitting of the Council had been set for March 13, 1973.

Omar Torrijos' declaration reflected the mood of large sections of the population—not just workers, peasants and the progressive intelligentsia, but also the national bourgeoisie, which was suffering because of the American monopolies which had ruled in Panama for many decades. The declaration set out the changes which had occurred in Panama.

Panama was for a very long time one of the centres of international business. Right up to the end of the 1960s all kinds of smart operators and financial experts used this international crossroads and "tax heaven" to carry out somewhat doubtful banking and capital investment operations. It was only when General Omar Torrijos came to power that the situation in the country improved. His government resolutely put an end to the activity of the international financial adventurers who had damaged Panama's prestige and impeded the sovereign development and strengthening of the country's economy.

I had to meet with the General several times. He had an aquiline nose and a manly, sunburned face. He spoke briefly in the military style and was unassuming and dignified. He represented those military men whom the ruling circles of Latin American countries had been preparing to take reprisals against their own people. The military men, however, had instead begun to serve the national interests of their own countries. Torrijos enjoyed great popularity with the people and support with the armed forces—the National Guard.

When the question of holding a Security Council session in Africa was being discussed at the beginning of January 1972 Ambassador Boyd, the Panamanian representative, announced:

"My delegation supports the request of our

African brothers that the problems of Africa be discussed in an African country. We hope the Security Council will hold its next session away from New York in Panama. We have many acute problems which our people and our government are counting on receiving help from the UN to solve."

Ambassador Boyd's announcement proved to be unexpected.

As though commanded to do so, everyone looked towards George Bush, the American representative. They were waiting for his reaction. It was perfectly clear which problems the Panamanian representative was talking about.

In 1903 the USA foisted an agreement on the newly-formed Panamanian republic. The conditions of this agreement provided for part of Panama's territory to be seized by the USA. It was on this territory, which divided the country into two, that the Panama Canal Zone was formed (16 kilometres wide and 81.6 kilometres long). After the Canal went into operation the USA began to get enormous commercial benefits from its exploitation.

It has been calculated that since the Canal began operating around half a million ships have passed through it, which has brought the USA more than \$2,000 million. Apart from that the USA has turned the Canal Zone into one of the most important underpinnings of the Pentagon in the Caribbean basin.

The main clauses of the agreement were still in force by the time the Security Council began its session in Panama. The Americanised Zone has in fact been turned into an American colony. A ten-thousand-strong garrison is maintained in the region, and the true owners of the country—the Panamanians—are subjected to discrimination. The USA makes \$100 million profit

from the Canal's exploitation every year, but out of this it pays Panama the paltry share of less than \$2 million. The present generation of Panamanians, Torrijos said in the country's Parliament, will never be able to understand why the territory of another country, with its laws, its policy and its flag is located on Panamanian land. The patience of his people, he said, was not unlimited and a conflict could break out at any moment.

At the 1972 Security Council meeting George Bush pretended he had not heard Ambassador Boyd's announcement, but the members of the Council and the diplomats began a lively exchange of opinion.

After the meeting Ambassador Boyd came up to me. He was a pleasant young man with large dark eyes and it was impossible not to like him.

"What do you think?" he asked. "Will we be able to hold the next session of the Security Council in Panama?"

Employees of the UN Secretariat have to be impartial and not take sides on matters causing sharp contradictions, so I replied:

"Your government, like any other, can, of course, request that a question in which it has an interest be discussed in the region where the international situation is being aggravated."

Changing to a friendly tone I added:

"If the Latin American group supports your suggestion even those members of the Council who, you understand, do not particularly like this idea will have to agree to it. You must remember that some countries will be able to find all kinds of reasons for not allowing the session to be held in Panama. The question of expenses will come up, as will that of providing the technical resources for holding meetings (translation facilities, the publication of reports,

etc.), of communications with capitals, of the personal safety of Council members, and so on. It also seems to me that drawing up an agenda will be no less difficult."

"We are studying all these questions," the Ambassador replied. "We hope the UN Secretariat will give us the necessary help and assistance when we finally decide to try and have the session held in Panama. We look on you as our friend."

Several months went by and when I next met Ambassador Boyd he said:

"My minister has sent an official letter to the Secretary-General. We are requesting that a Security Council session be held in March 1973."

"The Council has to decide that for itself," I observed. "The Secretary-General does not have the right to convene the Security Council. He can only draw its attention to the dangerous situation in a given region of the world."

The Ambassador asked me to speed up Kurt Waldheim's examination of the question.

I should point out that it is becoming more and more usual in the UN for the most important matters submitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council to be discussed in advance in regional groups. There are groups of socialist, African, Asian and Latin American countries, while the Western powers come together as the group of "West European and other countries," which, apart from the countries of Western Europe, includes the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia.

Besides, the Group of 77 has taken shape in recent years. This group consists of African, Asian and Latin American developing countries. It was, in fact, comprised of 103 countries in 1972, but it kept the title of the Group of 77, referring to the number of countries which first

signed the declaration on the problems of the economic development of developing countries. The group gradually began to discuss political questions as well as economic ones, and by using its large numbers it exerts a noticeable influence on the decisions of the General Assembly. Its membership of more than 100 states represents over two-thirds of the votes necessary for the passage of any resolution in the Assembly. As I have already pointed out, a different situation prevails in the Security Council, where a lot depends on the stance of the permanent members, who have the right of veto. For the Council, too, however, the decisions of the Group of 77 do carry a certain amount of political weight.

At a meeting of the group of Latin American countries held in New York in January 1973 even rightist, pro-American regimes did not dare object to Panama's suggestion. Ambassador Boyd stressed that his country intended to draw attention not only to the political aspects of its relations with the USA, but also to the need to make sure the countries of Latin America were able to make free and sovereign use of their natural resources without any external interference. A joint declaration was drawn up as a result of negotiations and an agreement was reached on the main lines along which the Panamanian case would be conducted at the Security Council session.

In January 1973 the Council discussed the question of holding a session in Panama.

The representatives of Indonesia, Peru and the Sudan, who had recently been elected to the Council, approached me before the meeting. They were interested in the opinion of the UN Secretariat: did the question of holding a session in Panama need a positive vote on the part of the

permanent members of the Security Council, or was the location of the session purely a matter of procedure? My reply was unequivocal: it was a matter of procedure. In this case the right of veto was inapplicable.

The Panamanians began to prepare for the session with renewed energy. The Americans did not slumber, either, but they did not decide to oppose the entire Latin American group, which was supported by the African and Asian members of the Council—Guinea, Kenya, the Sudan, Indonesia and India—and, of course, the socialist countries: the American representative merely advanced a few provisos which only won the support of the British and the partial support of the Australians. In principle the question of holding a session in Panama had been solved, and a special committee was charged with working out the details.

The Panamanians had no experience in holding international conferences and were therefore naturally interested in how to make preparations for the session so as not to give their opponents a reason for disrupting it on the grounds that the necessary conditions were lacking. As was to be expected, the Western countries demanded that everything in Panama was to be "exactly as in New York", which meant providing a simultaneous translation service of all meetings into five languages, publishing shorthand reports of speeches in the four working languages on the day after a meeting, and rapidly reproducing draft resolutions in the five official languages (including Chinese). A suggestion that tape recordings of speeches be interpreted when the Council returned to New York (which would have sharply reduced costs) was rejected, and not only translators, but also typists, printers, technicians and so on all had to be taken to Pana-

ma. In all they numbered around 120. Taking the cost of air tickets, daily allowances, the transportation of equipment, etc. into account, the total expenses came to a quarter of a million dollars. And this while the UN was suffering financial difficulties!

The Panamanian authorities understood the situation well and at the first meeting of the special committee Ambassador Boyd announced that Panama would take on itself all hotel expenses for employees of the UN Secretariat and delegations, and would provide free transport, security and, as far as possible, all technical equipment, etc. This cut expenses almost in half.

In conversations with Boyd some delegations expressed concern for personal safety, Huang Hua, the Chinese representative at the UN, being particularly persistent. He said there was "a group of elements hostile to the PRC" in Panama which was inspired and financed by the Taiwanese embassy. Boyd assured him that the Panamanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would recommend that the Taiwanese representative go on holiday or take a business trip during the session of the Security Council. As for the personal safety of the Chinese delegation, he said, the Panamanian government guaranteed total security: a personal bodyguard would be provided and all precautionary measures would be taken.

Boyd also informed him that delegations would be accommodated in the Panama Hotel, the city's best, which had a swimming pool, good restaurants, a casino, and so on. All delegations would be provided with official premises with teletype and telegraphic communications with any capital. At Boyd's request the political department sent a group of specialists to Panama to help

and to check that it was ready to receive the Security Council.

The group's report was reassuring: the Panamanian authorities had done everything to ensure the Council's work. The fact that the group, which consisted of minor officials, had been received by the President of the Republic bore witness to the interest shown by the Panamanian authorities in organising the session.

The group reported that the chamber of the National Assembly was being refitted and that a table had been made which was an exact copy of the horseshoe-shaped table of the Security Council at the UN headquarters which everyone knows from the many photographs in which it appears. Provision had also been made to provide seating for delegations which were not members of the Council, as well as for the press and the public.

The gigantic Boeing in which we were flying circled above the city and we were able to see the Panama Canal—the bone of contention between Panama and the USA and the main reason why this session of the Security Council had been called. We could also see the Canal's locks and, not far off, hangars, take-off pads, radar installations, groups of cottages fenced off from the city's suburbs for American officers and employees of the Panama Canal Company, and soldiers' barracks.

Our plane taxied up to the airport buildings, where the Panamanian tricolour was flying alongside the light-blue flag bearing the emblem of the UN. As the humid warmth of the tropics enveloped us we could hear the sound of loud, melodious music: a large group of girls dressed in the bright national costumes and wearing garlands of flowers around their necks was performing dances to welcome us.

The Foreign Ministers of ten Latin American countries and a large group of ambassadors representing socialist, African, Asian and Latin American countries arrived at the session. The ambassadors of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia used their stay in Panama for active consultations and to set relations going with the Panamanian government. As a result of this an agreement was reached on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Panama and Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, which became firm moral and political support for the struggle of the Panamanian people for sovereignty and independence.

According to the programme the members of the Security Council were to sail to the Canal to see the locks and other installations immediately after the official opening of the session. The first meeting, which I shall talk about in a moment, was drawing to a close, and none of the Council members or heads of the UN Secretariat had received an invitation to make such a trip, so I approached Boyd. In confusion, he told me:

"The negotiations are still going on and it's not clear when they'll end."

Further conversation revealed that stormy debates had been going on right through the night and all that morning between the Panamanians and the Americans as to who should issue the invitations. Both parties were insisting on their right to send them out.

In the end, with just 20 minutes remaining to the close of the meeting, we were all hurriedly given two invitations to make a trip to the Canal: one in the name of Juan Antonio Tack, the Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the other from the American delegation at the UN. When we entered the Canal Zone the American sentries demanded that we produce our invitations from the American mission, but the Pana-

manians were the hospitable and attentive hosts on board the ship.

The meeting was opened without any difficulties arising. General Torrijos was dressed in a civilian suit and a snow-white shirt with a brightly-coloured tie. As he made his introductory comments he took a piece of paper bearing a long, hand-written speech from his pocket. This speech was an emotional one and made a great impression on those present.

"I am speaking," he declared, "in the name of a people which does not feel hatred, whose generous heart has forgiven the offences committed against it and chosen the attainment of sovereignty as its future. Those who are in the right do not resort to insults, and from this rostrum Panama declares that it cannot agree to the economic suppression of one country by another, or with political, economic and cultural interference, since this is nothing other than neocolonialism. In other words, it is masked and concealed colonialism, which is reflected in the conditions of economic aid and has as its goal not the development of our country, but the establishment of control over its people."

In conclusion he said: "I inform the representatives of the United States that it would be more noble to correct this injustice than to perpetuate the mistake. We ask the world which is represented here today to give us moral support in this struggle, which will end in success if the conscience of the world helps it: our people are already nearing the limit of their patience."

Juan Antonio Tack and Ambassador Boyd both made well-grounded declarations during the subsequent discussion, citing staggering facts about the country's destitution and poverty, as well as its subjection to exploitation by

American monopolies which were extorting enormous incomes from the use of the Canal and Panama's natural resources. One could only admire the courage and bravery of these people. Who does not know of the many overturns and murders of inconvenient figures in Latin America that have been organised by the CIA and the US Defense Intelligence Agency?

We all still remember the overthrow of President Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira in Brazil in 1962, of President Jorge Arenales Catalán in Guatemala in 1963, of President Juan Bosch and Fausto Caamaño, the leader of the revolutionary government in the Dominican Republic in 1965, and of President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973.

A little over a year had passed since the Security Council session in Panama when, in June 1974, David S. Pere, the Panamanian ambassador to Costa Rica, announced that his government had evidence of intrigues on the part of the American banana company Standard Fruit. The Panamanians had been able to establish that preparations were being made for Torrijos to be murdered by American and British mercenaries recruited in New York and London from amongst those who fought in Vietnam and belonged to the professional killers' organisation.

The Panamanian leadership evidently already had a good understanding of the threat in 1973 and, fearing possible provocations, took a number of precautionary measures. Not only was the hall where the Security Council sat placed under increased security, but two or three plain-clothes security men patrolled every floor of the hotel. Even in the lifts every passenger was carefully looked over, and sometimes they would be asked:

"Who are you? Why are you going to the fifth floor?"

The casino was the only place where the security services were not present. The casino contained roulette tables and fruit machines: drop a quarter (25 cents) in the slot, pull the handle. Something hums in the machine and the reels stop. Nothing. Drop the next coin in the slot...

Some "more cunning" players change five dollars and select a more complex combination promising a payout of up to \$ 200. Such players sometimes win at first, but then they get excited and, having lost a further sum, which depends on their self-control and the depth of their pockets, leave the building.

The diplomats were no exception, all the more so since the entrance to the casino was on the ground floor of the hotel, next to the entrance to the restaurant where we ate. After supper I dropped into the casino with a group of diplomats to have a look. I changed a dollar and four times dropped a quarter into one of the machines. I listened to it humming and whirring, but I did not win anything.

The croupier looked at me in boredom. It was clear to him that I was not one of those who would bring him earnings, although my companions did fulfill his hopes.

The next morning an Indian diplomat said to me:

"Why did you leave straight away last night? There was such an interesting game. I was in the casino for a few hours and lost \$ 200. But what's that? De Rozas¹ lost \$ 600 during the evening!"

In reply I jokingly observed:

¹ De Rozas—the Argentinian representative at the UN. In the 1971-1972 he was Argentina's representative in the Security Council. He was a career diplomat and a rich landowner.

"I don't have any plantations in Argentina. And the UN is experiencing financial difficulties."

History Bears Witness

Before members of the Security Council make their speeches it is accepted practice for the floor to be given to the representatives of those countries expressing a wish to take part in the discussion.

In their speeches the foreign ministers and representatives of a number of Latin American countries—Cuba, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador—gave a profound analysis of the historical situation which had enabled American imperialism to foist the Panama Canal Treaty on Panama in 1903 and showed its legal groundlessness and the way in which it contradicted the fundamental principles of international law and the UN Charter.

The brilliant and well-argued speeches of Raúl Roa Garcia, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gonzalo J. Facio, his Costa Rican counterpart, made the greatest impression of all.

In the 18th and 19th centuries the population of the Isthmus of Panama was a mix of Spaniards, Indians and Negroes, all of whom, to a great extent, perceived the functions of their country as those of a transit country because of its geographical location. Even then the needs of growing trade, the main centres of which were Portobelo on the Caribbean and Panama on the Pacific, suggested building a canal which would link the two oceans.

The country was dominated by the Spanish for centuries, and it was only in 1821 that it obtained independence as the result of a power-

ful growth in the national liberation movement. The young state constantly felt the pressure applied against it by Britain, France and the United States, which were competing fervently amongst themselves for spheres of influence in Latin America.

In 1846 the USA foisted an unequal agreement on New Grenada (now Colombia) which freed it from customs duties and gave it privileges and immunities in questions of navigation and unimpeded transit through the isthmus. The USA also won economic and strategic privileges allowing it to build a railway connecting the two oceans, since when it had openly interfered in Panamanian affairs.

Britain, which at first proceeded from the need to halt American expansionism and brought forward plans to build a water route across Nicaraguan territory, later agreed to take the role of accomplice to the USA. In so doing it was trying to protect its colonial empire from the aforesaid American expansionism. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was concluded with the USA in 1850, according to which the USA and Britain were to have equal rights to use any shipping canal constructed between the Caribbean and the Pacific. The USA, however, tried to ditch its partner.

France used the contradictions between the USA and Britain to its own advantage. In 1876 it founded the Société Civile Internationale du Canal Interocéanique, which, however, went bankrupt in 1888. In 1894 a new company was formed which won a concession to build a canal. In 1901 the USA abrogated the agreement with Britain and succeeded in concluding a new one which transferred the right to build the canal to the USA. In 1902 the French company which held the concession was forced to sell it to the USA.

That year the civil war began in Colombia and led to a worsening of the situation in Panama. The echoes of the conflict brought to life the movement of the peasant masses. The United States stepped in as arbitrator in the struggle between the liberals and the conservatives, and a peace agreement was signed on board the battleship *Wisconsin*. The Americans executed the leader of the peasant movement and exiled the province's liberal leaders. Almost immediately after this the United States foisted the Herran-Hay Treaty on Colombia, which provided for the construction of an inter-ocean canal. The provisions of the treaty, however, were so unfair that the Colombian Congress refused to ratify it. President Theodore Roosevelt then decided to throw the Treaty aside and resort to force. The USA sent its naval vessels to Panama.

By this time the USA controlled Puerto Rico, the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands, having already foisted a military and naval base on Cuba at Guantanamo, which was intended to defend the inter-ocean canal. An agreement on a canal through the isthmus was concluded on November 18, 1903. Article II of this agreement provided for Panama to grant the United States in perpetuity "the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal." Apart from that the USA inherited for all the time a number of islands in the Gulf of Panama and the right to "the use, occupation and control of any other lands and waters outside of the zone above described which may be necessary and convenient" (for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said Canal). The Panama Canal was opened to navigation in 1914.

Under pressure of the liberation struggle of Panamanians for sovereignty in the Canal Zone a new agreement was concluded with the USA in 1936, according to which payments for the use of the Canal were increased in favour of Panama. The USA was forced to renounce its rights to control, use and occupy any other territories, but it perpetuated the concession on the Canal Zone.

Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 caused a new surge in the struggle of the Panamanian people, but the USA once again rejected a demand that it recognise Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and adjacent territory.

The Panamanians' struggle was suddenly stepped up at the beginning of the 1960s. In 1964 demonstrators tried to hoist the Panamanian flag next to the American flag at the secondary school in the town of Balboa. American soldiers opened fire on the demonstration.

This provoked the indignation of the Panamanian people and forced the country's government to break off diplomatic relations with the United States and approach the Security Council and the Organisation of American States with a request that they examine the causes of the conflict between the two countries, which was placing peace and security on the continent under threat. The USA was forced to agree to begin negotiations on a review of the 1903 Treaty. As before, however, the draft agreements which it proposed in 1967 ignored the just demands of the Panamanians. These proposals were based on the principle of a continuing American military bases until 2067. The government of General Torrijos, which came to power in 1968, regarded these drafts as unacceptable.

The labours of many lawyers showed the complete legal incompetence and impossibility of

such an agreement actually existing in the light of international law and the provisions of the UN Charter.

Speaking in the Security Council Raúl Roa García, the Cuban Foreign Minister, said:

"Panama does not have any significant resources of its own, but even if it had its main resource would nonetheless be its geographical location. The isthmus does not exist because of the Canal: the Canal exists because of the isthmus. The income from its use must be the basis of independence and the main motor of national development. So far, however, it has only held up independence, undermined sovereignty, made for weak development, hindered international trade, discriminated against the local population in favour of those occupying the Canal Zone, and insulted the national pride of the Panamanian people. Cuba considers it to be the inalienable and indisputable right of Panama, a right of which it should make immediate use, to nationalise this natural resource for the good of the people and eliminate the structures and foreign domination standing in the way of its development."

The socialist, African and Asian members of the Council energetically supported Panama's just demands.

"Panama's geographical location," said Ya. A. Malik, the Soviet representative, "which made it possible to build a shipping canal linking two oceans via the shortest route across its territory, is one of its more important, if not its most important natural resource. We therefore support the aspiration of the people and the Panamanian government to re-establish sovereignty over this natural wealth and use it for the good of the people and the country's development. We also support the striving of the Panamanian govern-

ment to restore the territorial integrity of its country. There is not a single people which could come to terms with a situation as unnatural as one whereby its country would be split into two parts by territory held by a different state. The Canal Zone, which belongs to Panama in the geographical, political, economic and social respects, constitutes an inalienable part of its national territory. The restoration of Panamanian sovereignty over this Zone is one of the unavoidable and main factors in the development of the Panamanian nation and the removal of the focus of constant tension in America.

"At the same time, the Panama Canal is an important inter-ocean shipping route of world-wide significance, the use of which, without, of course, any detriment to the lawful sovereign rights and interests of Panama, must effectively be based on the principle of the freedom of international shipping and must serve to benefit all the peoples of the world."

The Struggle Intensifies

The work of the Security Council was widely reported in the world's press. Latin American newspapers carried front-page reports on the course the discussions had taken, as well as photographs of General Torrijos, the UN Secretary-General and members of the Security Council. We saw our photographs in the Panamanian newspapers every day, so that we were immediately recognised wherever we went.

The North American press also followed all the upheavals in the struggle intently, for the matter concerned the military-strategic positions of American imperialism in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. On March 18 the *New York Times* included an article on the Coun-

cil session in its weekly review, which only covers the major international events. The paper, however, went against logic and, in effect, called on the government and John Scali, the new American representative at the UN, to pursue its initial course, emphasising the importance of the Canal for the American military presence in both oceans. In the photographs published in the newspapers Scali, who replaced Bush in March 1973, looked extremely preoccupied. As well he might. He was faced with beginning his diplomatic career in the Security Council in a complicated political situation which was unfavourable for American diplomacy.

Scali was unknown in UN circles. From newspapers it was known that he had made a career as a journalist and won recognition in government circles in Washington as early as during the so-called Cuba crisis of 1962, when the world was within a hair's breadth of war as a result of the reckless activity of the American military.

The papers also reported the urgent marriage of the new American representative. Journalists believed that Scali, who was over 50 and had a reputation as an inveterate bachelor, intended to begin extensive representative work, in the implementation of which a large role belongs to an ambassador's wife. It was not by chance that in the character references compiled on American diplomats at embassies and other American institutions in foreign countries there was a special column requesting an appraisal of the wife's activity in the diplomatic work of her husband. The papers predicted that Scali, an experienced and cunning journalist, was going to resort to various kinds of tricks and refined demagoguery more often than his predecessors in order to carry out his government's policy.

On the eve of our departure from New York

I asked Scali how he saw the possible results of the session in Panama. He looked at me seriously through his spectacles and thought before saying:

"I am in a difficult position. It's difficult to start from such a question. Our stance will be determined at a cabinet meeting on Friday, March 8. The President, Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers, who has just returned from Paris,¹ are giving the problem serious attention."

In the first days of the Security Council's work the Peruvian and Panamanian delegations submitted a previously prepared draft resolution on the main question—that of the Panama Canal Zone. This resolution envisaged abrogating the 1903 agreement on the Canal and the amendments which had been made to it and concluding a new agreement ensuring the reunification of the territory known as the Canal Zone with the Republic of Panama, having first terminated the existence of the aforementioned Zone as an area under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Two more drafts were submitted concerning the sovereign rights of peoples to use national resources. Although these drafts did not directly name the Panama Canal Zone, they did imply it, since the speeches of the majority of delegations saw the Canal as Panama's main natural resource, which it had the sovereign right to administer.

The resolutions were directed against the neo-colonialist policy of the imperialist powers in Latin America, Asia and Africa, and their drafts had been prepared by Latin American diplomats back in New York. The Soviet, Yugoslav and

¹ The international conference in Paris on the question of Vietnam, which was held from February 27 to March 2, 1973.

and Guinean delegations declared their support for the drafts, but the USA and its allies—Britain, Australia and some other countries—let it be understood that, for them, the main draft resolution on the Canal Zone was unacceptable. The unofficial consultations which are usual in such situations then began. They were started in Panama and then continued on the island of Contadora, where the Council members had been invited to relax one Sunday by the island's owner.

Contadora is a small, picturesque island lying not far off Panama's Pacific coast. From the air it looks like a pearl which has been tossed into the turquoise waves of the ocean. I was told a curious story about the island. Five or six years ago an enterprising businessman bought it from the Panamanian government for \$5,000. He then obtained a loan from an American bank and turned the island into a pleasant leisure and entertainment centre. Roads were laid and restaurants, cottages, ordinary houses and a small airport were built. A water supply was laid on and telephone lines were installed. Some of the cottages were sold immediately, while others have been kept to be let out at the comparatively moderate price of \$20 for a weekend. This means that, once a month, a person with an average income can allow himself to fly off to this island where the water is clean and transparent, the beaches are comfortable, and a mass of exotic plants abounds. The island is already valued at \$3 million.

Not without prompting from the government, the owner of the island invited the heads of delegations at the Security Council session and the leaders of the UN Secretariat to spend a weekend on Contadora. The Panamanians were hoping to hold consultations in the relaxed atmosphere,

sound out the stances of the main delegations, and succeed in drawing up a draft which would win the support of the majority. Foreign ministers and ambassadors dressed in light summer suits or, sometimes, simply in swimming costumes and the large sombreros we had been given on our arrival exchanged both political news and opinions on the possible final documents on the island's beaches, in its restaurants, and on its green lawns. Tack told me that the Americans were threatening to use their veto if the draft resolution submitted by Panama and Peru was put to the vote.

The minister looked preoccupied and downcast. He observed that, in the situation which had taken shape, it was essential to attract other co-authors in order to give the draft more weight and thus to ensure it broad support from both the Council members and the representatives of the main groups of states. He intended, he said, to work in this direction with the delegations of African and Asian countries: India, Guinea, Kenya, Indonesia and the Sudan.

The Panamanians, as Tack informed me, were placing a lot of hope on winning support from the People's Republic of China. When, however, a bitter diplomatic struggle developed at Council meetings and during consultations, the Chinese delegation held aloof, their representative limiting himself to one concise, formal statement on Panama's right to the Canal at a Council meeting.

Boyd said to me:

"We were hoping the Chinese representatives would take a more active part in the Council's work and give real support for our stance... The Chinese could have influenced the stance taken by other non-aligned countries if they had wanted to."

The Panamanians showed the necessary flexi-

bility and toned down a number of formulas, while keeping their main demand: that negotiations on a new agreement should be conducted on the basis of a recognition of Panama's sovereignty over all its territory. In the new reading the key second point took note of "the willingness shown by the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Panama to establish in a formal instrument agreements on the abrogation of the 1903 convention on the Isthmian Canal and its amendments and to conclude a new, just and fair treaty concerning the present Panama Canal which would fulfil Panama's legitimate aspirations and guarantee full respect for Panama's effective sovereignty over all of its territory."

American diplomats demanded that the lines about guaranteeing Panama's effective sovereignty over all its territory be removed from the document. Negotiations and unofficial meetings alternated with relaxation, swimming and boat trips around the island.

Lightning Breaks Through the Clouds

Meanwhile the Panamanian delegation completed its consultations and, on March 20, officially submitted a new draft resolution containing, as I have said, demands that the 1903 agreement be annulled and Panama's effective sovereignty over all its territory be guaranteed. The co-authors of the draft were Guinea, Peru, the Sudan, Yugoslavia, Kenya, India and Indonesia. So when the vote was taken the draft would be supported by 11 or 12 delegations. Although the French ambassador made a number of observations, he let it be known that he would not vote against the draft, while Scali insisted on the removal of the

demand that Panamanian sovereignty over the Zone be restored.

The support of almost all Latin American, African and Asian countries as well as of the vast majority of Security Council members created a favourable situation for the Panamanians.

The decisive moment moved ever closer: on March 21 the Council was to complete its examination of the question.

On that day the opening of the afternoon sitting was held up because of a meeting between the Panamanian and American delegations.

At last, Tack appeared in the hall and approached the chairman of the Council. He looked excited and determined, and his lips were pressed tightly together.

I asked:

"What are the results?"

"We cannot back down any more," he replied. "The Americans are insisting on their amendment, and we are in no position to accept it. It would be an unwarranted retreat. We would lose respect with the peoples and cease to respect ourselves."

I looked around the hall. The amphitheatre was packed full with members of the public, diplomats, journalists, and community representatives. All the Council members were in their places, the only absentee being Scali, the head of the American delegation.

As we later learned, he was telephoning the President to outline the situation. Nixon gave precise instructions to prevent the resolution being adopted at whatever cost.

Scali came into the hall after Tack had opened the meeting.

The chairman spoke:

"I shall first put to the vote the draft resolution... sponsored by the delegations of Guinea,

India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, the Sudan and Yugoslavia... Those in favour, please raise your hands."

I quickly looked around the members of the Council and counted how many were voting in favour of the draft resolution. There were thirteen, including Australia, the USA's closest ally.

"Those against?"

Everyone's gaze was fixed on the American and British representatives, and the television cameras were focussed directly on their faces.

Lingering for a few seconds as though doing so reluctantly, Scali raised his hand and vetoed the resolution.

An explosion of indignation rushed round the hall: the USA had prevented the adoption of an important resolution.

"Those abstaining?"

Sir Colin Crowe, the British representative, raised his hand. Even the British Conservatives had not dared support their transoceanic ally.

A general resolution recognising the right of states independently to administer their own natural resources was adopted without opposition. Tack read out the closing statement, which reflected the long discussions and the positions taken by the various sides during the debates. This was a denunciatory document demonstrating the isolation of the neocolonialists.

The minister then made a speech in his capacity as Panamanian representative. He spoke passionately and ardently, and his voice, boosted by the microphones, rang out all round the large hall of the Assembly. All Panama and a number of neighbouring countries listened to him on the radio or watched him on the television. The main message of his statement was that Panama had won a moral and political victory. His country had been supported by those of

Latin America, as well as by almost all the Council members representing Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. The American administration's frustration of a balanced and just resolution, he said, would encourage the Panamanian people to fight more determinedly for its rights. The fight, he added, was not yet over, but was only just beginning.

The meeting was declared closed and everyone got up from their seats. One after the other, the foreign ministers of Cuba, Peru, Costa Rica and Colombia and the representatives of the USSR and the African, Asian and Latin American countries went up to Tack. As though summing up the results of the Council's work, he said:

"I think that an almost unanimous vote like this in the Security Council and, maybe more importantly, the solidarity that all Latin America has shown with us mean more than the approval of a resolution which the USA will dismiss at the first convenient opportunity. We did not foster illusions concerning the stance of the USA, which will use any means to hold on to the Canal, since it is not only a source of huge profits, but also an important military-strategic base. The Americans need it for both the security of their maritime communications and in order to exercise pressure over the countries of South America. We are content with the results of the session. It has shown the true face of American imperialism and opened the eyes of millions of people. Who, before this session, gave the Panama Canal serious thought, who knew of Panama and its struggle? This question has now been placed on the agenda of world politics. Our stance is shared by millions of people, and not only in Latin America at that. This gives us the opportunity to continue our fight for our rights."

We left Panama on a hot and humid morning believing in the future of the Panamanian people, which was faced with fighting a difficult battle against the forces of imperialism and local oligarchy. Tack's words that the Panama Canal question had become a part of world politics proved to be prophetic.

Drawing on growing international support, the Panamanians are continuing to fight vigorously for genuine independence and social progress. On August 29, 1973, Tack once again declared:

"The revolutionary government of Panama is fully resolved to achieve an abrogation of the agreement, in accordance with which the USA is trying to perpetuate its control over the Panama Canal Zone."

Having run into a united front of Latin American states and realising that it could not even rely on the support of most of its allies, the American administration was forced to reopen negotiations with Panama. At the beginning of January 1974 a preliminary agreement was reached on the restoration "in the final analysis" of Panamanian sovereignty over the Panama Canal. In the spring of that year an agreement was signed which reflected a number of Panama's demands concerning the restoration of its rights. Speaking on March 1, 1975, US Secretary of State Kissinger declared that because of the United States' vital interests in the Canal a new treaty would have to provide for "the operation and defense of the Canal by the United States for an extended period of time". This treaty was not ratified by the US Senate. After a new series of negotiations a new treaty on the Panama Canal was signed and then ratified in 1978. This treaty envisages the gradual return of control over the Canal to the Republic of Panama by the year 2000, although it also con-

tains a number of reservations permitting the USA to retain control of the Canal "for defense purposes". Panama was still faced with a long and difficult struggle.

General Omar Torrijos, commander of the Panamanian National Guard, became a victim of this struggle when he died on July 31, 1981 as the result of an air disaster. Panamanian political observers believe that the disaster was caused not by meteorological conditions, but by the actions of the CIA, which had repeatedly organised attempts on the life of the Panamanian leader. Fearing for his life, Torrijos had had residences in various parts of the country and used an aeroplane or a helicopter to move from one place to another.

The facts show that the plot against Torrijos was prepared by the CIA with the participation of Cuban counter-revolutionaries, American officers from military bases in the Panama Canal Zone, and terrorists from reactionary bourgeois parties. In planning the physical elimination of Torrijos the CIA was carrying out the instructions of the American monopolies and the Pentagon, which were not pleased with the progressive course of the Panamanian government.

The Panamanian people links the name of Torrijos with the signing of new agreements on the Canal which have become an important step along the road towards the complete decolonisation of the country.

THE ECHOES OF PAST STORMS

On October 26, 1974 René Haby, French Minister of Education, Jean-Pierre Soisson, Secretary of State on Universities, and Annie Lesur, Secretary of State of Pre-Elementary Education, gave a reception in the Galerie des Glaces at Versailles in honour of the 18th General Conference of representatives of the member states of United Nations of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

Haby and his colleagues shook hands with their guests as they entered Louis XIV's reception room, which adjoins the Galerie des Glaces, and made the usual conversation for such occasions. The famous Versailles fountains could be seen from the windows of the palace, while an organ played in the farthest hall, the palace's chapel. As I listened to the music I noticed a short man looking at me intently. He was dressed in a dark service jacket like those usually worn by Indians, and his face seemed familiar to me.

"Are you Justice Choudhury?" I asked, not very confidently.

"Yes, I am, Mr. Kutakov!" he replied, and extended both hands to me. "Could I possibly forget that in the tensest days of our people's struggle for independence the Soviet Union and its representatives at the UN gave us invaluable help... We still don't know if I would be able to talk to you now in my capacity as special

representative of Bangladesh if it hadn't been for the support of the Soviet government!"

The Roots of the Conflict

On December 4, 1971 I was woken early in the morning by the ringing of the telephone. It was I. B. Taylor-Kamara, the representative of Sierra Leone, who was President of the Security Council that month, ringing to tell me that the Americans, together with other countries, were requesting an urgent meeting of the Council. He read me a letter from the representatives of the USA: "We have the honour... to request you to convene immediately an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the recent deterioration of the situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan."

As it later became known from an article by Jack Anderson, an observer for the *Washington Post*, a "Secret Sensitive" strategy session had taken place in the city on December 3. At this session it had been decided to request a meeting of the Security Council in order to conceal its manoeuvres, which were meant to give Pakistan support, including, under certain conditions, direct military aid¹.

On December 3, 1971 Pakistani planes bombed 12 Indian aerodromes near north-western border. On December 4 Pakistan declared war on India, and the hostilities became a fact. In a report to UN Secretary-General U Thant, UN military observers gave documentary confirmation that the military operations had started from Pakistan.

The sources of the conflict lay in the colonial past of both countries: Indo-Pakistani relations

¹ *The Washington Post*, December 31, 1971.

were loaded with religious prejudices and disputes which the British had kindled in order to maintain their control over the peoples of Hindustan.

In 1947 Britain was forced to grant independence to its colony of British India. In so doing, however, the British divided the country into two states: India and Pakistan, thus sowing the seeds of armed conflicts and territorial disputes. Armed conflicts broke out between India and Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971.

The British colonialists used the division of India to maintain their influence in the region and weaken the struggle of both India and Pakistan to strengthen their independence. To a large extent Pakistan's membership of the aggressive military blocs of SEATO and CENTO promoted the growth of chauvinistic and bellicose sentiments in that country, which were mainly directed against India.

The anti-Indian stance of the Pakistani military was completely to the liking of the Chinese leaders, too, for it created a basis for a rapprochement between Peking and the military-bureaucratic regime in Islamabad.

Trying to make use of the exacerbation of Indo-Pakistani relations in order to implement its plans in Hindustan and South Asia, Peking urged Islamabad to step up its fight with India.

A long time before the clashes of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war began, we witnessed some dramatic events connected with the aspiration of the military-bureaucratic regime in Islamabad to suppress the widespread popular movement in East Pakistan in defence of civil rights. Islamabad, expressing the interests of monopoly capital and the feudal nobility, regarded East Pakistan as its vassal domain. East Pakistan never received more than one-third of the state

allocation for its development. West Pakistan also used other resources from East Pakistan for its own needs: export revenues (the export of jute and tea alone yielded 70 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings), credits earmarked for it, and so on, even though East Pakistan had 60 per cent of the country's population and produced a considerable part of its GNP. East Pakistan did not actually receive foreign exchange for purchasing the necessary goods abroad. The foreign credits were used to enrich the military-bureaucratic upper crust and to develop West Pakistan. As a result of these discriminatory policies the economic backwardness of East Pakistan, far from being overcome, in fact, became increasingly pronounced, while income per head of population was about a quarter of that in West Pakistan.

In the first parliamentary election in the history of Pakistan (December 1970) the Awami League, led by Mujibur Rahman, scored a decisive victory, winning an absolute majority of the seats not only in the Provincial Assembly (288 out of 310) of East Pakistan, but also in Pakistan's National Assembly (167 out of 313).

The Awami League had secured support from the electorate because of its programme of broad provincial autonomy for East Pakistan, implementation of overdue socio-economic changes, nationalisation of the banks and key industries, limitation of the big landed estates, and allotment of land to the peasants. The Awami League's six-point programme provided that the collection and use of taxes and definition of economic policy should be handed over to the provincial authorities. One of the main prerequisites for fulfilling this programme, the Awami League said, was an atmosphere of peace on the subcontinent, and accordingly proposed a set-

tlement of all outstanding issues with India round the conference table in the spirit of the principles of the Tashkent Declaration, which was adopted in 1965 at an Indo-Pakistani conference in which the USSR took part. The Awami League insisted that these demands in its programme should be written into the country's new constitution.

Although the Awami League's electoral platform did not as a whole go beyond relatively moderate bourgeois-democratic reforms, it aroused strong dissatisfaction and resistance on the part of the ruling military administration, which thus refused to meet the demands of the people of East Pakistan. President Yahya Khan was manoeuvring. For about 10 days he negotiated at Dacca with Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the Awami League, on the country's future constitutional structure. The Islamabad regime had used these talks merely to gain time so as to ferry large army units from West to East Pakistan. As soon as the force was landed on the coast of East Pakistan, the talks were broken off, and Rahman and many of his followers arrested. The Pakistani army began punitive operations against the local civilian population, making use of tanks and aircraft. More than a million people were killed, and, fearing disorder and starvation, millions more fled across the Indian border to safety. Around 10 million people crossed into India, thus placing the authorities there in an extremely difficult situation. Units of the West Pakistani army pursued the refugees right up to the border with India.

The repressions of the Pakistani military, however, did not halt the struggle of the Bengalis. On the contrary, a broad resistance movement gripped newer and newer strata of the population. This movement was led by the Bangladesh

government, which organised its own armed forces called Mukti Bahini (liberty fighters).

Pakistani troops violated the Indian border several times, each of a more serious nature than the preceding one. This caused a crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations, which brought with it a military conflict. As Indian newspapers wrote at the end of March, "the genie of war" had been let out of the bottle. The exacerbation of the situation on the Hindustani subcontinent caused serious concern and anxiety in the international community.

The suffering of millions of people and many deaths amongst the population of East Pakistan as a result of repression, arrests and persecution could not but worry the Soviet people either, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet sent the President of Pakistan a message calling on him to "take the most urgent measures to stop the bloodshed and the reprisals against the population in East Pakistan, and to go over to methods of a peaceful political settlement"¹.

In a letter to President Nixon, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said that the war between India and Pakistan could have been avoided if the governments of other countries, in particular the USA, had used their influence and authority in order to work out necessary measures and a basis for an agreement "which would take account of the actual situation in East Pakistan"².

This, however, was not what Pakistan's supporters wanted. The USA and China gave the impression that they had "not noticed" the crimes that the Pakistani military had been

¹ *International Affairs*. A Monthly Journal of Political Analysis (Moscow), No. 2, February 1972, p. 78

² *Ibid.*, pp. 76-78.

committing in East Pakistan since the end of March.

Soon after the beginning of the March 1971 events U Thant sent President Yahya Khan of Pakistan a letter in which he expressed his concern at the situation which had arisen. In his reply Yahya Khan made promises that measures would be taken to improve the situation, but he also hinted that that matter was one of his government's internal competency.

On May 25 he announced that he had agreed to allow the East Pakistani refugees to return home, while the UN Secretary-General made an appeal for help to be given to both East Pakistani refugees in India and the population of East Pakistan.

Sadrudin Aga Khan, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was charged with coordinating help to the refugees in India, and, with the agreement of the Pakistani government, U Thant appointed a representative in Dacca in order to make optimal use of the international aid being sent to the people of East Pakistan. The United Nations Relief Operation in Dacca was also set up.

The activity of the UN and other international organisations, however, did not alter the overall situation, and the flow of refugees did not subside. Border clashes became more and more frequent.

A situation had arisen threatening universal peace and security, and U Thant decided to draw the attention of the Security Council to it. On July 20, 1971, he sent the Chairman a special memorandum.

Pointing out that the situation in Hindustan was deteriorating and that "relief programmes, humanitarian efforts and good intentions" were already insufficient to avert advancing catastrophe, U Thant declared that "the United Na-

tions, with its long experience in peace-keeping and with its varied resources for conciliation and persuasion, must, and should, now play a more forthright role in attempting both to mitigate the human tragedy which has already taken place and to avert the further deterioration of the situation.

"The Security Council," he went on, "the world's highest body for the maintenance of peace and security, is in a position to consider, with the utmost attention and concern, the present situation and to reach some agreed conclusions as to measures which might be taken".

At the spring 1971 session of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC), which includes the executive heads of all specialised UN agencies (International Labour Organisation; World Health Organisation; United Nations Development Programme; United Nations Children's Fund; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; United Nations Industrial Development Organisation; Food and Agriculture Organisation; International Atomic Energy Agency; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Monetary Fund; and UNESCO), U Thant made a special point of raising the question of expanding aid to the East Pakistani refugees in India.

He reported that considerable sums of money had been given to help these people, but that these sums were far from sufficient. The Indian government, he said, was still faced with the perplexing problem of helping the millions of refugees on its territory for an unspecified period of time. In the 1971-72 fiscal year alone the Indian government was faced with spending up to \$700 million supporting the refugees.

U Thant's appeals, however, were like a cry on the wind. The USA did not want the UN to

interfere in the activities of the Pakistani authorities. "For many months," Ambassador Sen, the Indian representative at the UN, later said, "the United States resorted to secret diplomacy which paralysed the world organisation. The Nixon Administration publicly adopted a mocking stance, which, in fact, led to the bitterness of the Indo-Pakistani conflict."

Exposing the intrigues of American diplomacy and its NATO allies, Sen said: "On July 20 the Secretary-General sent his memorandum. Why was that memorandum not acted upon? We all know why. In the month of July the representative of Pakistan was flying from Geneva to New York to stop any discussions here, to stop any discussions there; and those attempts went on for months. Reports were suppressed; discussions were inhibited; a complete veil of silence and secrecy was thrown over this."

The Indo-Pakistani Conflict in the Security Council

Despite the fact that it was Saturday the Security Council chamber was full of diplomats, observers and journalists who were excitedly discussing the events in Hindustan and exchanging information, while Taylor-Kamara, the Chairman, was feverishly trying to get a grasp of a previously prepared scenario for conducting the session.

Taylor-Kamara rose from his seat.

"The representatives of India and Pakistan have approached me with a request that they be permitted to take part in the discussion of the matter on the agenda without the right to vote," he reported.

Ambassador Sen and Ambassador Shahi, Pakistan's representative, took their places.

I showed the Chairman a letter from the Indian representative requesting that the Council hear Justice Choudhury, the representative of the population of East Pakistan.

He read the letter out. The representative of the USSR supported India's request. The procedure rules of the Security Council contain an article which makes provision for the Council to hear all persons who may help clarify the circumstances of the problem under discussion. Justice Choudhury, who had arrived from Dacca, was a valuable witness who had seen the events in East Pakistan. He was also an active participant in the "free Bengalis" movement.

Huang Hua, the Chinese representative, who was attending a meeting of the Council for the first time, was strongly opposed to inviting Choudhury, and he was supported by George Bush, the American representative. Not knowing how to get out of this delicate situation, the Chairman decided to postpone the question until the next sitting of the Council.

George Bush then made a speech in which he hypocritically tried to create the impression that, above all, the USA cared about restoring peace.

Painstakingly circumventing everything that had led to the tragic events, and vindicating the military-bureaucratic regime of Islamabad, he laid all the blame for the development of events on India.

He then submitted a draft resolution which proposed a withdrawal of troops and a cease-fire without any of the political problems which had caused the crisis being solved.

I am reminded of an article printed in the influential *Foreign Affairs* magazine, which is published by the Council on Foreign Relations. At that time this Council consisted of extremely influential people: David Rockefeller, president

of the Chase Manhattan Bank; Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; McGeorge Bundy, Kissinger's predecessor, Special Assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson for National Security Affairs; William P. Rogers, US Secretary of State; and a number of major businessmen and bankers.

The October 1971 issue of the magazine carried an article entitled "Pakistan Divided", in which the well-known political observer Sydney H. Schanberg wrote: "... the fanatic fury of a holy war seems to have been the overriding reason why the Pakistani government loosed the army on the Bengali population. This is not hard to understand when we recall that Pakistan is a state based on religion where democratic traditions are almost nonexistent and where the popular will has been often frustrated. When the army troops began their rampage that first night, they seemed to be enjoying themselves." He went on to say that these troops killed defenceless Bengalis and shouted "Victory for God!" and "Long Live Pakistan!" He reported that at least 200,000 Bengalis had been killed, according to foreign diplomatic sources.¹

It may not be superfluous to note that, during this time, while the American representative at the UN was making speeches in defence of peace and a cessation of the blood-letting, 400 kilometres from New York, in Washington, a "Secret Sensitive" strategy session was underway which adopted a decision to send a formation of ships from the US 7th fleet first to the Indian Ocean and thence to the Bay of Bengal. According to Jack Anderson, an observer who studied secret White House documents,

¹ *Foreign Affairs*. An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1971, pp. 126-27.

this task group, which included the US Navy's largest aircraft-carrier *Enterprise*, was sent into Indian waters as a "show of force"¹. Things, however, were not heading merely for a show of force.

As the records of the "Secret Sensitive" strategy session show, things were intended: a) to compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force; b) to weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan; c) to force India to keep planes on defense alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground forces.

Thus, the possibility had been foreseen in Washington of a clash between the American fleet and Indian ships and planes.

The US task force had orders to launch air and sea operations on instructions from the top leadership with the aim of upholding US interests in the Indian Ocean².

As well as military measures, other forms of pressure were brought to bear on India. These included the curtailment of American aid and arms supplies, while deliveries to Pakistan were increased.

Open pressure was also exerted through diplomatic channels. The convening of the Security Council and then, as we shall see, the discussion of the matter in the General Assembly, were meant to prepare the situation not only for diplomatic activity, but also, possibly, for activity of a military nature.

In the first days of armed operations, Yahya Khan informed Washington that Pakistan had received an assurance from the Chinese ambas-

¹ *The Washington Post*, December 31, 1971.

² *Ibid.*

sador in Islamabad that his country's army would move towards the border (i.e. the border with India) within 72 hours.

As one representative at the UN declared, Peking and Washington appeared as a duet at Security Council meetings.

The draft resolution submitted by the Americans was rejected as a result of a veto imposed by the Soviet Union.

The draft resolution submitted by China on December 5 was calculated to encourage Pakistan's aggressive activity, levelled accusations of aggression at India, and encroached upon the rights of the people of Bangladesh. Discussion of the matter in the Security Council showed that this resolution did not enjoy any support, and Huang Hua was forced to announce that he was not insisting that it be put to the vote, explaining this by saying that he wanted consultations to continue. This was a recognition of the failure of the manoeuvres Peking had undertaken.

A TASS statement made on December 5, 1971 played an important part in analysing the true nature of the events in Hindustan and elucidating the principled peaceable policy of the Soviet state. This statement emphasised that "the main cause of the tension which has recently arisen in relations between Pakistan and India is the situation which has taken shape in East Pakistan as the result of the Pakistani government's actions against the population in that part of the country."

"The Soviet government," it continued, "guided by its concern for the preservation of peace, has repeatedly expressed its anxiety to Pakistani President Yahya Khan and the Pakistani government over the situation which has arisen in connection with the events in East Pakistan. Con-

demning the policy of repression and persecution as a way of solving political problems, it has drawn the attention of the Pakistani government to the need for a political settlement in East Pakistan. The Soviet leaders have informed President Yahya Khan that an armed attack by Pakistan on India, whatever its reasons, would provoke most resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union. Considering the fact that these events are occurring in the direct proximity of the USSR's borders and, therefore, affect its security interests, the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to them.

"The Soviet Union favours an urgent cessation of the blood-letting and the implementation of a political settlement in East Pakistan on the basis of respect for the lawful rights and the interests of its people."¹

The Soviet government also firmly pointed out the inadmissibility of interference in the conflict by foreign forces, and this warning undoubtedly played its own positive role. On December 5, 1971 the Soviet delegation submitted a draft resolution which, as well as proposing a cessation of hostilities, contained a demand that the Pakistani government bring about a political settlement and eliminate the main cause of the conflict by taking account of the freely expressed will of the people of East Pakistan.

A tense atmosphere reigned in the hall, which was stuffy and full of cigarette smoke. Some delegates made several speeches.

A heated discussion broke out between the representatives of the USSR and China, and the USSR's draft resolution was finally put to the vote at around 11 o'clock p.m.

¹ *Pravda*, December 6, 1971.

The diplomats, journalists and the public waited in silence. The Chairman spoke:

"Those in favour of the draft resolution contained in document 10418?"

Two hands were raised: the USSR and Poland.

"Those against?"

China.

Seeing that China was exercising its right to veto, the delegations of the USA and its allies abstained from voting.

In explaining his reasons for voting against the resolution, Huang Hua once again made unsubstantiated accusations against the USSR. All the television cameras were focussed on the Chinese delegate as the imperialist information machine willingly made its channels available for anti-Soviet propaganda. Apart from being broadcast on Channel 13, which usually transmits Security Council sessions, Hua's speech was also shown by other TV stations enjoying great popularity with the American public.

Towards the end of the meeting a draft resolution submitted by a group of non-permanent members (Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Japan and Nicaragua) was put to the vote. This draft also divided the problem into two parts, not mentioning the need for a political settlement. It provided merely for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops. Meanwhile, even Agha Shahi, the Pakistani delegate, admitted in his verbose declarations that a serious political crisis did exist in Pakistan.

The draft resolution did not get through, and it was decided to prolong consultations amongst members of the Council to try and find a mutually acceptable formula.

During the consultations and speeches in the Security Council, the Soviet delegation insisted that the main reason for the military conflict

which had arisen in Hindustan were the actions of the Pakistani government, which were aimed at suppressing the just demands of the population of East Pakistan.

Ya. A. Malik, the Soviet representative, stressed that the military conflict in the region was the direct consequence of the violence, terror and mass repression using sophisticated weaponry which had been conducted over a period of many months in order to thwart the clearly expressed will of the 75 million inhabitants of East Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan, he said, had been obliged to respond to this by armed resistance and counteraction. The government of Pakistan, not being in a position to settle the acute political crisis in East Pakistan by political means or to thwart the will of the population of that part of the country by repression, had undertaken military action against a neighbouring country—an action which had resulted in military conflict and an aggravation of the situation.

The Security Council meeting of December 6 went on for more than 8 hours without a break.

Ambassador Shahi of Pakistan made repeated speeches during the meeting. Short and thin, he was a temperamental diplomat who had a lot of experience behind him from working in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the UN, where he enjoyed great popularity and was quite influential. He made many casual arguments to justify Islamabad's position, the basis of these arguments coming down to India's having invaded the territory of East Pakistan, inspired popular unrest, and committed aggression, for all of which it should be punished.

However, neither Shahi's talent as a speaker

nor diplomatic and legal casuistry could refute the facts, excuse the violence committed against the Bengalis, or cancel out the fact that the new, independent state of Bangladesh had been formed.

Time and time again India, the USSR and Poland insisted on the need to hear Justice Choudhury, but the USA, its allies and China all categorically objected. They were supported by most of the delegates.

In the break I went up to Choudhury. There was not a trace of dismay on his face, and his eyes were shining brightly.

"I know we'll win," he said, "for 75 million people cannot tolerate lawlessness and violence forever."

I met Choudhury several times more after that. Later, when the formation of the Bangladesh Republic had become a political reality, he became its first President (1971-72).

Pakistan's supporters in the Security Council—the USA, China, Somalia, Italy and other countries—decided to pass the matter on to the General Assembly for examination. They were hoping that, out of solidarity with Pakistan, the large group of Muslim states in the General Assembly would support a resolution directed against India. Although an Assembly resolution carries no binding force, Pakistan's supporters thought it would create an atmosphere of moral condemnation of India.

On December 7, 1971 as Pakistan's supporters had planned, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on India and Pakistan to agree to a cease-fire and withdraw their troops.

The Indian government's reply stressed that India had done everything to prevent this problem acquiring an international character and had consistently come out in favour of a politic-

al solution agreed between the government of Pakistan and the leaders of East Bengal.

Meanwhile, the Indian armed forces, supported by the People's Army of Bangladesh, were successfully moving on Dacca, which was soon surrounded, together with the 90,000-strong Pakistani army.

Early in the morning of December 13 I was telephoned by Robert E. Guyer, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. He told me that the UN Secretariat had received telegram from the UN representative in Dacca reporting that the commander of the West Pakistani forces in Bangladesh had asked him to pass a letter to the commander of the Indian forces, in which he expressed his agreement to surrender if certain conditions were observed.

Several hours passed. I was at a meeting of the Political Committee of the 26th session of the General Assembly, which was then in progress, when an assistant ran up to me and worriedly reported:

"A new telegram has been received from Dacca. The commander of the Pakistani forces has asked the UN representative to inform the Indian side that he is withdrawing his agreement to capitulate."

Thus, the Pakistanis had decided to drag out the blood-letting. What had happened?

According to reports filed by some journalists close to the White House, the Pentagon had insisted that Yahya Khan be recommended to continue resistance. On December 14 the ships of the US 7th fleet entered the Indian Ocean and sailed towards the Bay of Bengal. The fleet was meant to influence changes in the situation, but it was too late: Indian troops and the Bengalese Mukti Bahini stormed Dacca, cutting off the Pakistani garrison. The skies

were controlled by Indian planes, and there was no way out for the Pakistani general, who was forced to announce his unconditional capitulation on December 16.

On its own initiative India ceased hostilities on the border with West Pakistan, and the war ended on December 17, 1971.

The troops of the Pakistani generals had thus proved to be incapable of turning back the historical process of the Bengalis' struggle for self-determination and independence. The People's Republic of Bangladesh had been born and had begun to grow stronger.

After the war had ended the young Republic was faced with the enormous difficulties of rehabilitating the economy, while a ten-million-strong stream of refugees poured back into the country.

On February 16, 1972 UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim made an appeal to all countries to raise \$ 565 million by the end of the year to help the population of Bangladesh. Apart from giving help through the UN, which the USA, Great Britain, West Germany, Denmark, Sweden, France and many other countries all did voluntarily, a lot of countries gave help on a bilateral basis. The Soviet Union played an enormous role in reviving the Bangladesh economy.

The state emblem of the Republic of Bangladesh is uncommonly expressive: a water lily, two ears of rice, and some jute leaves, symbols which contain an image of the entire country. Bangladesh is essentially a massive delta valley formed by the great rivers of Asia: the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna and their many tributaries. These water channels reach every point of the country, while rail and road transport is only of minor importance. In these conditions

the main ports, such as Chittagong, are of key significance for the country's whole economy.

During the war Chittagong was tightly closed by mines and scuttled ships.

The Soviet government gave Bangladesh gratuitous help to restore the port by sending an expedition consisting of 20 mine sweepers, diving bells, a floating crane and other equipment. The Soviet specialists who were sent to the country had to work in the exceptionally difficult conditions of the tropics, and, appraising this work, Kibria, the director of the port trust, declared in a conversation with an *Izvestia* correspondent: "The Soviet sailors have brilliantly performed an operation on the stopped heart of our country—the port of Chittagong. Not only has it started beating again, it has become even stronger: we are now receiving more cargoes than before the war. Read our newspapers, listen to the speeches of our statesmen, and talk with local specialists and inhabitants and you will be convinced of how warmly the people of Bangladesh are thanking the members of the expedition."¹

The Soviet seamen completed their work in 1973. Sir Robert Jackson, Under-Secretary-General in charge of the United Nations Relief Operation in Bangladesh, told me that the Russians had completed a splendid piece of work in the port of Chittagong. "It's almost fantastic!" he exclaimed. "We thought that only the West Germans, British or Americans were up to such work. They told me it would take at least three to four years to raise the fifteen scuttled ships in the port. The Russians did it in one and a half years. That's something fantastic!" he repeated.

¹ *Nedelya*, No. 34 (702), 1973.

Out of Touch With Reality

While overcoming ruin, chaos and other severe consequences of the war, the People's Republic of Bangladesh was strengthening its economic and international positions. By August 1972 it had been recognised by more than 80 countries, each of which had established diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with it. The country was also accepted as a member of a number of specialised UN agencies, in particular the World Health Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, and others. China, however, was a firm opponent of Bangladesh's being accepted into these organisations.

On January 24, 1972 the Soviet Union became the first of the great powers to recognise Bangladesh.

On March 3, 1972 the Soviet Union and Bangladesh jointly declared that they would build their relations "on the principles of full equality of rights, mutual respect, sovereignty and independence ... without any interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of one another"¹.

On August 8, 1972 the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh sent the UN Secretary-General a letter requesting that his country's application to be accepted as a member of the UN be examined immediately, and that practical steps be taken in this connection.

On August 10 the Security Council was convened to examine Bangladesh's application to be accepted as a member of the UN.

The representatives of the USSR, India and Yugoslavia resolutely supported this application, referring to the fact that the new state

¹ *Pravda*, March 5, 1972.

accepted the obligations contained in the UN Charter and pledged to implement them.

Huang Hua was the only member of the Council to make resolute objections, linking the question of Bangladesh's admission into the UN with its implementation of that part of the General Assembly resolution of December 7, 1971 and the Security Council resolution of December 21, 1971 which concerned the release of Pakistani prisoners of war in India and the settlement of all disputes between India and Pakistan and Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The Chinese representative was not at all troubled by the fact that the proposal of preconditions of this kind for Bangladesh's admission to the UN was contrived and unconstitutional.

The UN Charter does not provide for any demands to be made on a state for admission to the UN to be granted, apart from those contained in Article 4, which reads: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgement of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations." The Charter lacks any clauses which say that a state cannot be admitted to the UN which is involved in disputes or has unsettled problems, particularly if it inherited those problems from the past and therefore, of course, does not bear any responsibility for their having arisen.

"The People's Republic of Bangladesh," said the Soviet representative, "undoubtedly meets all the criteria set out in Article 4. It is an independent, sovereign, peace-loving state and follows a policy of non-alignment and friendly cooperation which is aimed at lessening international tension. In the light of this it is perfectly clear that references to the resolutions of

the United Nations Organisation, the implementation of which should supposedly be a condition of admission, do not stand up to criticism."

China hindered the adoption of the draft resolution recommending the General Assembly to admit the People's Republic of Bangladesh to membership of the UN by using its veto, thereby revealing that the leaders in Peking did not want to open their eyes to the realities of life and were guided only by their great-power calculations.

Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in March 1973. There was a successful exchange of prisoners of war and repatriates, and the PRC, seeing that its final formal pretext for opposing Bangladesh's entry into the UN could no longer be used, was forced to withdraw its objections.

In 1974 the 29th session of the General Assembly unanimously accepted Bangladesh into the family of peoples of the United Nations¹.

¹ On August 15, 1975 there was a coup d'etat in Bangladesh. Mujibur Rahman was killed. A second coup d'etat took place in November of the same year, and a military administration was established in the country.

The Chinese Come into the UN

By 3 o'clock in the afternoon of October 25, 1971 the hall of the General Assembly was crammed to overflowing. All the delegates had occupied their seats, and there was not a single empty place in the rows of chairs along the sides of the hall and in the amphitheatre which were intended for diplomats, employees of the UN Secretariat and journalists. The public gallery was near to breaking under the weight of spectators. The enormous hall was buzzing like an agitated hive of bees as the culmination approached of eight days of discussions on the restoration of the PRC's rights in the UN.

At exactly 3 o'clock Adam Malik, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the 26th session of the General Assembly, came through the door behind the platform where the presidium sits. He was followed by U Thant and Constantin Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary-General for Assembly Affairs. Malik looked very worried.

He struck his gavel on the table and the meeting began.

The agenda consisted of the question of the "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations".

The question of China's representation at the UN had occupied an important place in the Organisation's activity for more than 20 years.

The Chinese Republic was amongst the founders of the UN in 1945 and, according to the UN Charter, it was granted a place as a permanent member of the Security Council. At that time the Kuomintang was in power in China and the government was headed by Chiang Kai-shek. After the victory of the people's democratic revolution in China and the formation of the PRC in October 1949, the question naturally arose of the expulsion from the UN of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang clique, which had been driven out of China by the people and had sought shelter on the island of Taiwan—territory which is a constituent part of China.

Victor Hoo, an important UN officer who worked in the Secretariat first as part of the Chinese staff and then, from 1949, as part of the staff of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, told me that 90 per cent of the Taiwanese population was formed by emigres from the Chinese province of Fujian directly opposite the island. The Chinese, who colonised Taiwan in the 17th and 18th centuries, drove the native population into the hills, thus condemning them to gradually dying out. Part of the native population assimilated itself with the newcomers.

In 1895 the island became a Japanese colony after China's defeat in the war with that country. On the eve of the war the Ching court had squandered massive sums of money, which had been set aside for military needs, on pleasure and entertainment.

"For a long time our family could not reconcile itself to the fact that China had lost Taiwan," Hoo continued. "Neither I, who was to serve at the Russian Imperial court, nor my father, the ambassador to St. Petersburg, ever imagined that Taiwan would become the last refuge for our family. If it had not been for Japanese

colonial rule, who knows, maybe the revolutionary movement would have developed on Taiwan, and then there would have been nowhere for Chiang Kai-shek and his armies to hide!"

Returning to his biography, Hoo said:

"Since I was destined for a career in Russia, I had learned the Russian language and grew very fond of Russian literature."

Hoo spoke Russian beautifully. Of course, he did not want to leave the UN, where he had a highly paid post. He had been Commissioner for Technical Cooperation at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs for many years.

Regarding the situation on Taiwan, Hoo told me that, although the people of the island were themselves Chinese, they looked on those Chinese who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek as aliens. Ever since then the hostility between the native inhabitants and the Kuomintang supporters never ceased. The newcomers from the mainland occupied leading posts not only in the government, but also in the local authorities, while the army and the police, of course, were also in their hands.

In recent years Chiang Kai-shek and his son Jiang Jingguo have taken certain steps to improve relations with the local population. A Taiwanese was appointed mayor of Taipei and another was promoted to the rank of general, but this could not get rid of the contradictions between the local population and the Chinese from the mainland.

I noted that this could also be feeding ground for the movement "for the independence of Taiwan".

"No," Hoo smiled. "The noisy and clamorous campaign of the so-called movement 'for the independence of Taiwan' is a purely American enterprise, It exists on American subsidies. It seems to me that the Americans are consciously

whipping it up in order to make Chiang Kai-shek more complaisant and to force him to agree, if not recognising the PRC, then at least to a dual Chinese representation at the UN. The threat that an 'independent Taiwan' might be created frightens Taipei, for it means rejecting the pretensions to govern all of China."

As subsequent events showed, Hoo's words were just. After President Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972 and American recognition that Taiwan was a part of China, the American-subsidised movement "for an independent Taiwan" died away. An American liaison mission opened in Peking in 1973, while the USA and Taiwan maintained diplomatic relations until the end of 1978. This was assisted by the so-called Chinese lobby¹ in the American Congress.

During the Second World War and the early postwar years the Chinese lobby exercised considerable influence, and the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek spent large sums of money winning over American public opinion and influencing the stances taken by individual politicians.

The demands of the people's government of China that it be granted its lawful place in the UN and the Security Council were energetically supported by the Soviet Union, India and other countries, but found no understanding in the Western camp, which was headed by the USA.

From 1950 to 1960 the USA and its allies, having an obedient majority in the General Assembly, objected even to the inclusion in the Assembly's agenda of the question of restoring the lawful rights of China in the UN.

¹ The Chinese lobby—representatives of political and monopolistic circles in the USA whose economic and political interests were connected with Taiwan.

As China developed and strengthened, and as its international authority grew with the backing of the socialist countries, even the West was forced gradually to change its tactics.

From 1961 onwards the Americans and their allies ceased to oppose the discussion of the Chinese question in the General Assembly, although they did resort to a procedural trick by trying to have the question of Chinese representation regarded as an "important matter" requiring a two-thirds vote in the Assembly for adoption. This meant that if a resolution restoring the rights of the PRC in the Security Council, and also its membership of the UN, only obtained a simple majority, it would not be considered adopted. From 1961 to 1970 this "two-thirds" resolution went through with the support of countries allied with the USA, which were also under its influence.

In 1970 a resolution on the restoration of the PRC's rights obtained a simple majority, 51 countries voting in favour, 49 against. Because of the resolution, however, that any decision on the PRC's representation had to be taken by a qualified majority, this resolution was declared not to have passed.

By 1970 China has exchanged ambassadors with more than twenty countries, including close NATO allies of the USA such as Italy, Canada and Belgium, as well as with a number of right-wing regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The attitude to the People's Republic of China in the USA also began to change noticeably, and a striving appeared for a "flexible" policy.

The change of mood in the USA was reflected in the press, in the activity of public and government bodies, and in American scientific circles connected with the UN. Since the middle of the 1960s the "Chinese question" had begun

to be approached in "free discussions" at many universities, at scientific conferences, and in the US Senate¹. Suggestions that trade and contacts be developed and that the PRC be admitted to the UN had also been made earlier, but in 1969, against the background of the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and the deep concern of Americans over the course of the Vietnam war, American policy towards China adopted a new tone and ceased being a "forbidden subject" for discussion, as it had been in the 1950s. People who held important positions in the State Department also began to come out in favour of a "new approach" to China.

American scientists were paying more and more attention to the idea of a USSR-USA-China "triangle". According to this idea, China, even with its relatively low level of economic development at the time, was to be regarded as a most important object in the formation of various foreign policy schemes meeting American interests.

In February 1970 President Nixon declared that continental China, with its population of 750 million, should not remain isolated from the international community. He also added, however, that the United States would observe its obligations towards Taiwan, thus emphasising the "two Chinas" policy.

On July 15, 1971 a group of African and Asian countries (Algeria, Tanzania, Burma, the Congo (Brazzaville), Syria, the Sudan, and others), as well as socialist ones (Cuba, Romania, Albania, and others) once again proposed including the

¹ In March 1966 a hearing took place in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at which a new concept of relations with China ("restraint without isolation") was advanced. This concept was soon adopted by official American circles. A hearing also took place in the House of Representatives.

question of restoring the PRC's lawful rights in the UN agenda. The draft resolution they submitted demanded that the PRC be restored in all its rights, that the representatives of the PRC be recognised as the only lawful representatives of China at the UN, that the PRC be recognised as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and that the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique be immediately expelled.

At almost exactly the same time the White House made an official declaration to the effect that President Nixon was planning to visit Peking in a few months time. Although the date had not even been set for the visit, this declaration bore witness to the fact that the USA intended to bring the anti-Chinese policy which it had followed for more than 20 years to an end. On August 2, 1971 Secretary of State William P. Rogers explained the policy of the USA towards China in the UN, saying that the United States was trying to bring its role into line with the realities of the modern world and that it was going to support actions in the General Assembly that autumn which were aimed at granting a seat to the People's Republic of China.

He also stressed that, at the same time, the United States would insist that any proposal concerning the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN be regarded as an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for decision.

Rogers' declaration, which had Nixon's visit to Peking in view, and the Chinese refusal to take part in the UN as long as Chiang Kai-shek's representatives remained, all gave rise to numerous rumours in UN circles. Delegations close to the Chinese then drew Peking's attention to stubborn rumours about a possible change in its stance towards Taiwanese membership of the UN. On

the recommendation of the co-authors of the above draft resolution, the government of the PRC published a special declaration on this matter on August 20, 1971.

This declaration said that the PRC's lawful rights in the United Nations should be fully restored and that the Chiang Kai-shek clique should be expelled. It also resolutely opposed "the conspiracy of the American imperialists" about "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan", and categorically declared that the PRC would have nothing to do with the United Nations if it adopted a decision preserving a seat for the Chiang Kai-shekists.

Despite the steps taken by American diplomacy it was beginning to look more and more certain that the PRC would be admitted to membership of the UN. On September 14, 1971 U Thant declared at a regular press conference before the General Assembly that he understood the declaration made by the government of the PRC on August 20 to be a statement of China's firm policy on the matter of a "seat in the United Nations", and that he felt the chances of solving the China issue during the 26th session of the General Assembly had become much brighter than they ever had been in the past.¹

Chiang Kai-shek's government was extremely worried by the threat of expulsion from the UN. Employees of the UN Secretariat who visited Taipei gained the impression from conversations with the entourage of the aged dictator and the factual head of the government—Chiang Kai-shek's son Jiang Jingguo—that Taipei did not have an adequate understanding of the real state of affairs. Chiang Kai-shek did not even want to hear about the possible representation of "two Chinas" in the UN.

¹ *The New York Times*, September 15, 1971.

The Foreign Ministry of Taiwan, however, saw the situation much more realistically.

Shortly before the beginning of the General Assembly session Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs retired.

"That's a reliable sign that things are bad," Hoo said to me. "He always retires when he feels that the cause is lost and that he needs to save his own skin."

Zhou Shukai, Taiwan's ambassador to Washington, was appointed to the post. At the General Assembly he remained self-assured and rarely appeared in the lobby. The Americans took all work with delegations on themselves, Rogers returning to New York in the middle of October 1971, on the eve of the vote in the UN, to hold meetings with almost a hundred representations.

The Conceit of the Powerful

American newspapers once published a photograph of Nixon with William Rogers and George Bush. According to their reports, Rogers had assured the President that the resolutions submitted by the Americans on September 22 had every chance of being adopted. One of these resolutions essentially provided for restoring the PRC's rights in the UN while preserving a seat for Taiwan as a separate, independent state.

The second resolution backed up the Americans' former line that the Chinese issue had to be decided by a two-thirds majority, in the expectation that those who supported the restoration of China's rights in the UN would not be able to gather two-thirds of the votes.

Despite massive efforts undertaken by American diplomacy the co-authors of the resolutions were uninfluential delegations which were openly dependent on the USA such as those of Haiti,

the Dominican Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Thailand, Swaziland, and so on. Of the major countries, Japan and the Philippines agreed to be co-authors of the drafts, the Japanese doing so after hesitating for a long time. It was only Nixon's personal appeal to Eisaku Sato, the Japanese premier, who was well-known for his pro-American sentiments, that decided the matter.

Sato's decision to support the American line in the UN provoked a great deal of indignation in Japan and the government came in for severe criticism. It was claimed that Sato's line had an adverse effect on the chances and prospects for an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations, which had, moreover, been complicated by the Americans' "treachery" of beginning to develop contacts with the Chinese while bypassing Japan.

Toru Nakagawa, Japan's representative at the UN, looked worried and a little confused. He realised that if their line was not successful it would not only be Sato and the Minister that would come in for criticism in Japan, but also himself. Soon afterwards Kiichi Aichi, a former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs who now headed Japan's delegation at the UN, appeared in New York.

Delegates were to be seen in excited conversation everywhere in the many corridors between the halls where the main committees, the Social and Economic Council and the Trusteeship Council meet, as well as in the bar with its massive windows looking onto the embankment of the East River. The scene was the same in the delegates' restaurant. Every seat at the hundreds of tables in the main dining hall and in the seven private dining rooms was taken, and both at breakfast and at lunch talks continued unabatedly.

Walking down the corridor I met Dick Peder-

son, a member of the American delegation who also acted as adviser to the State Department and had come to assist Bush.

"We'll win," he said. "We have a majority of five to eight votes on the 'two-thirds' resolution. That's the decisive test. China's supporters can't gather two-thirds of the votes."

A few minutes later I talked with the Romanian representative. He asserted that victory would go to the supporters of the PRC.

Rogers called a meeting of his chief advisers in order to discuss the expected results of the vote. Advance calculations provided an optimistic forecast—at least 59 countries would vote in favour of the resolution, 54 against.

On October 5 it was announced that Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, would make a visit to Peking. As one diplomat ironically noted, Kissinger and Chou En-lai would be discussing the plans for Nixon's visit to China over a cup of tea while American diplomats and Peking's allies did battle in the General Assembly.

Diplomats shrugged their shoulders and wondered how the USA could hope to improve its relations with the Chinese if it was fighting to preserve Taiwan's seat in the UN, and also to implement the "two Chinas" policy, which was unacceptable to Peking?

The representatives of those countries jeopardising their relations with Peking by backing Washington's proposal wondered bitterly why the United States was trying to demonstrate that its own relations with China would not suffer, whatever the outcome of the debates in the UN.

"The Americans have sent Kissinger to explain to Mao why they are going to vote against Peking's stance," one diplomat told me. "Kissinger is a clever and cunning man, and he may

persuade Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai not to attach great importance to the speeches made here. But what are we to do? We don't have any Kissingers of our own in Peking. How will we explain our support for the American position?"

The American diplomats were in a difficult position. Some of them tried to convince other diplomats that it was Peking, not Washington, that had picked the date for Kissinger's visit. Bush, they said, had insisted that the trip be postponed until the debates in the UN were over, but the Chinese had not listened to him.

"The Americans agonised over it," one Latin American diplomat said. "Peking undoubtedly was aware, although pretending not to be, that the visit might sow confusion and hurt the American case in the UN. But the Americans don't believe this was the primary reason for Peking's timing. The UN is near the bottom of Peking's agenda with the United States."

The agreement on Kissinger's visit to Peking was reached in the middle of September, "mysteriously" coinciding with the elimination of the Lin Biao group.

"The current consolidation of power by Premier Chou's moderate military-civilian faction," the *New York Times* wrote, "augurs well for the continuing Chinese-American dialogue... China's present leadership evidently wants that dialogue started as soon as possible."¹

The dialogue, as Chou En-lai indicated, could proceed without preconditions or deadlines of any kind. This marked a sharp change from Peking's long-held position that nothing could be negotiated with Washington until the USA agreed to evacuate its troops from Taiwan and

¹ *The New York Times*, October 24, 1971.

not to hamper its reunification with mainland China.¹

The debates in the General Assembly were long and keen. The supporters of restoring the PRC's rights and of expelling Taiwan from the UN stressed that it was already difficult to doubt the legitimacy of Peking's right to the Chinese seat in the UN, as well as to its place as a permanent member of the Security Council.

"This is not a question of admitting a new Member," Abdelazizj Bouteflika, the Algerian representative, declared, "but of giving the mandate of a Member State to its legal representatives, which naturally means withdrawing it from those who have no right to it, inasmuch as one country cannot have more than one seat...

"And yet," he continued, "some would introduce into what is really a simple debate a new element designed to present the annulment of a mandate illegally held by the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, as being the expulsion of a Member State. Those who, following the United States position in this, today wish to defend this point of view appeal to our sense of realism and advance legal and moral arguments. Realism, legality, morality: is it not curious that it is precisely those who for more than 20 years have deliberately ignored these virtues who come to remind us of them today?"

There is no need to cite all the arguments set out during the debates by UN member countries in favour of the obvious and long-imminent solution to the question.

American diplomacy was in a difficult position. The Americans could not openly object to the restoration of the PRC's rights in the UN, but they also had numerous obligations to Tai-

¹ Ibid.

wan right up to that of affording military assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime under a mutual defence agreement concluded on December 2, 1954. This agreement provided for American military assistance to the Kuomintang supporters, and also the provision of territory on Taiwan and the Pescadores for American military bases.

A refusal to support Chiang Kai-shek would extremely complicate the USA's relations with its allies. The question would undoubtedly arise in many dependent and allied countries of how far the Americans could be trusted to fulfil their obligations. By starting talks with China without first obtaining the agreement of its allies, including Japan, the most interested country, or informing them, the USA sowed the seeds of mistrust and disbelief in how far its obligations held good. The Americans began to lead things towards a situation whereby the PRC would be admitted to the UN and would take its place as a member of the Security Council, while Taiwan would also remain a member of the Organisation. Speaking about his draft resolution, George Bush claimed that it offered "the most realistic, pragmatic and equitable solution possible to the problem... All the people of China would thus at last be represented in the United Nations..."

The American ambassador tried to present the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shekists and the restoration of the PRC's lawful rights as the expulsion of a UN member. "I submit," Bush said, "that the course of expulsion, first, is most ill-advised and dangerous as a precedent in the United Nations and, secondly, is simply an unacceptable price to pay for the entry of the People's Republic of China into this Organisation."

He then used the disintegration of the United Nations to frighten his listeners: "If we are to start playing with the rights of Members to sit in this Organization," he said, "we will have started the United Nations itself down a very perilous slope. We think that such a step could have a profoundly damaging effect on this Organization and on the attitudes of many Member States towards it. Such a step would lead away from universality, away from realism and towards factionalism, recrimination and, if you do not mind my saying so, irrelevancy. It would damage the very fabric of this Organization."

In conclusion he said: "We want to see both these entities [the PRC and Taiwan—*F.K.*] in the United Nations... And let us affirm representation for the People's Republic of China, but let us vigorously protect the principle that no smaller reality—in this case the Republic of China, which has abided by the Charter, and faithfully abided by it—need ever fear, now or in the future, that it will be expelled to accommodate a larger reality."

Bush spoke several times during the debates, essentially repeating the same arguments in different forms. As diplomats close to the American delegation reported, the USA had several variations on its draft resolutions in store.

The arguments of the Americans and most of their allies were not making a great impression on the audience, and everyone was waiting for these variations to be submitted. It was clear to everyone that whatever was said, whatever arguments were advanced, the majority of delegations had precise instructions. This kind of question is, after all, decided on a high governmental level. Everyone was looking at Bush expectantly: where were the new variations and

the previously prepared legal tricks? They simply were not forthcoming.

Even so, the Americans managed to get their "two-thirds" draft resolution put to the vote first. The result of this vote predetermined that of the vote on the main question.

The Chairman reported that he had received a suggestion that the vote be taken by roll call. Constantin Stavropoulos read out the names of the countries, and the head of each delegation replied: yes, no, or abstain. A light went on beside the name of each country on the two large boards above the presidium's table: if the reply was "yes", a green light went on; if it was "no"—a red light; and if it was "abstain"—a yellow light. One delegation replied after another. Two were missing and did not appear for the vote. Evidently, they did not want to commit themselves.

A machine spent two or three seconds computing the results, while figures ran across the boards. The result was stunning: 59 delegations had voted against the American resolution and 54 in favour of it, while 15 had abstained. The analysts and experts of the American mission and the State Department had not expected anything like this!

The Americans could not even have supposed that so many delegates would abstain.

"The abstentions have ruined us!" Bush exclaimed when he saw the results. This was the failure of one of the biggest diplomatic campaigns undertaken by the United States in recent years.

Such American allies as Canada, Iceland and Ecuador had all voted against the draft resolution, while the abstentions included Belgium, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Turkey and states such as Botswana, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Togo, Senegal and others, whose political po-

sitions were close to those of the Western powers.

The defeat of the procedural "two-thirds" draft resolution presented by the USA, Japan, Australia and other countries predetermined the defeat of the American draft on the main question, which proposed restoring the rights of the PRC while preserving a seat for Taiwan in the UN. Ninety minutes later the Assembly began voting on the resolution concerning the restoration of the PRC's rights and the expulsion of the Chiang Kai-shekists, which had been the first matter on the agenda. Realising that the game was lost, many countries which had earlier voted for the American proposal now changed their position.

Cries of scorn and surprise swept around the hall in a wave when the Israeli delegation replied "yes" when Stavropoulos called on it to vote.

David Vaughan, an American who held the post of Assistant Secretary-General for General Services, was sitting next to me. He smiled in dismay and said:

"The rats are leaving the sinking ship. The game's already lost."

The results of the vote served to emphasise the scale of the defeat suffered by American diplomacy: there were 76 votes in favour of restoring the PRC's rights and expelling Taiwan, while the Americans and their allies had gathered just 35 votes.

This memorable sitting of the General Assembly went on for eight hours without a break. During these eight hours the strategy which the Americans had drawn up gradually fell completely to pieces.

As soon as the results of the vote were announced the Taiwanese delegates rose from their places

and left the hall. Chiang Kai-shek's diplomats had long since realised that they had no future. Even the members of the American delegation who were sitting close to them made no attempt to express their condolences. This defeat in the General Assembly seemed to have paralysed the American diplomats and their friends.

Adam Malik closed the meeting at 11.30 in the evening on October 25, 1971.

The Western press tried to present the results of the vote as "an historic event" which supposedly changed the whole character of the United Nations. Nothing of the sort, however, had occurred. What had happened was that an injustice towards the Chinese people had been corrected. American policy, which for 21 years had prevented China from taking its lawful place in the UN, had suffered a complete fiasco.

Some American Senators and Congressmen came out with harsh and irritable criticism of the UN and the General Assembly. Even before the vote they had tried to bring totally unconcealed pressure to bear on member delegations: 21 Senators and 35 members of the House of Representatives even threatened to cut back American contributions to the UN if Taipei were expelled.

It is curious to note that almost three years later Bush was appointed head of the American liaison mission in Peking. Although not officially so, he was virtually the American ambassador to the PRC.

Bush was an experienced politician who had acquired certain diplomatic skills during his two years as permanent representative of the USA at the UN. In China he began to act like those American politicians who try to win the sympathies of the voters by any means whatsoever.

Seeing that the bicycle was the main means of transportation in Peking, Bush also began to get about the city on two wheels. Contrary to his expectations, this merely produced surprise in the Chinese, and people began to talk about "the strange, eccentric American". Neither did he win popularity with the population of Peking. In 1980, however, the Chinese leadership met his election as Vice-President of the USA with a positive response. In an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor* on January 12, 1981, Deng Xiaoping, deputy chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, declared that "there are a lot of our old friends, for example, Bush" amongst new President Reagan's people who take part in decision making.

Soon after the General Assembly's decision to restore the rights of the PRC in the UN the Peking leadership sent a delegation to New York which was headed by Qiao Guanhua, deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and an experienced diplomat who, for many years, had worked directly with Premier Chou En-lai. He had also accompanied the Chinese leader to many international conferences.

In China Qiao Guanhua had a reputation as an experienced propagandist and journalist (from 1949-52 he headed the Foreign Information Agency, was vice-president of the Chinese Research Institute at the National Society for the Study of International Relations, and so on). Huang Hua, who was also close to Chou En-lai, was appointed his deputy, and then went on to represent China at the UN. He had a lot of diplomatic experience from having worked both in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and abroad as ambassador of the PRC to Ghana and the United Arab Republic. In July 1971 he was appointed ambassador to Canada, where his task was to prepare for work in the

UN and follow the development of the situation in the USA. Huang Hua was the only Chinese ambassador not to be recalled during the Cultural Revolution.

The Peking leaders were hoping to use the experience Huang Hua had gained in Africa to develop contacts with developing countries. Peking aspired to the role of spokesman for this group of countries and, in its eyes, Huang Hua, who had been in charge of efforts to increase China's influence in Africa, was the most appropriate man to try and achieve this aim.

His long acquaintance with the Americans was of no less and possibly even of decisive importance in his selection¹. As early as the 1930s he had taken part in Mao Tse-tung's conversations with the American journalist Edgar Snow, after which Snow published an apologetic biography of Mao and for many years acted as intermediary in contacts between American and Chinese leaders.

■ As U Thant told me, Qiao Guanhua had informed him that the General Assembly's decision to restore the PRC's rights in the UN had been unexpected for Peking. "According to forecasts made by Chinese experts," he had continued, "such a decision could only be expected at the 27th session of the General Assembly. For this reason we were not ready to take part in the Assembly's work." Chinese delegates only appeared at plenary meetings of the Assembly and in two or three committees dealing with social and political problems.

The Soviet Union always fought consistently and on principle for the PRC's rights to be restored in the UN. In November 1949, a month

¹ In 1976 Huang Hua was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of the PRC. He retired in 1982.

after the PRC was formed, the Soviet representative declared at a session of the General Assembly that the USSR did not recognise the authority of the Chiang Kai-shek delegation, and demanded that the representatives of the People's Republic of China be invited to the Assembly.

During all subsequent sessions of the General Assembly and at all other international forums where the question of Chinese representation was discussed, Soviet delegations and representatives invariably came out firmly in favour of restoring the rights of the PRC in the UN and expelling the Chiang Kai-shekists so that the Chinese people were represented at the UN by the People's Republic of China.

It was not without difficulty that, in 1950, in connection with the war in Korea, the Soviet Union overcame resistance and managed to have a delegation from the PRC invited to take part in the work of the Security Council for the first time. The question of whether to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations dragged on for more than two decades because of opposition on the part of the United States and some of its supporters, but, as we have seen, this attempt by the Americans to keep the Chiang Kai-shekists in the United Nations at whatever cost finally ended in defeat. Life had once again confirmed, and in a very specific way, the correctness, principled nature and far-sightedness of the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state, which consistently defend the principles and aims of the UN Charter, including the principle of universality.

Greeting the Chinese delegation which arrived to take part in the work of the 26th session of the General Assembly, the Security Council and all other UN bodies, the Soviet representative ex-

pressed the hope that the restoration of the PRC's rights in the UN and its permanent participation, with full rights, in the Organisation would make a positive contribution to the cause of making the UN more effective. He also hoped that it would help strengthen world peace and international security and further the development and consolidation of mutual understanding and cooperation amongst nations.

The Chinese delegation was also greeted by the representatives of the socialist countries, regional groups and even those delegations which had voted against the draft resolution submitted by African, Asian and socialist countries.

Greeting the PRC, the representatives of Latin American and African countries expressed their indignation at the brazen and malicious way in which the American press and some American politicians had come down on the sovereign delegations who voted in favour of the just decision of the General Assembly, which itself led to the failure of the manoeuvres undertaken by American diplomacy. The representative of Equatorial Guinea indignantly said: "We do not in any way care about the publicity of the Yankee reporters in their news reports or in their newspapers. They can write what they like in their magazines and periodicals. We are not here to serve as students of the United States Government, in politics or in any other matter. We come to preach peace, and our responsibilities can be called to account only by our Government. My delegation is not intimidated by the threats of the United States Government at the failure—or should I say the defeat—suffered by the imperialist policies on the matter we are discussing."

The floor was then given to the Chinese delegate.

A tall, ascetically thin Chinese appeared on the rostrum. As he read his speech first bewilderment and then open disappointment was to be seen on the faces of many delegates, in particular those from Africa and Latin America who had had no idea of the essence of Chinese policy.

Having expressed the general ideas of the victory of the forces of progress over American imperialism, Qiao Guanhua went on to characterise the main international problems through the prism of the Chinese theory of "two superpowers", which was meant to draw a veil over the responsibility of the forces which had created the tense situation in the Middle East. He declared that "with the support and connivance of the superpowers, Israeli Zionism is committing aggression against the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples". In the language of Chinese propaganda "superpowers" refers to the USA and the USSR. The Chinese delegate then went on to back the need to combat "the superpowers' aspiration to dictate their own conditions" in the solving of world problems. By declaring that China was a developing country, he was in fact pretending to the role of spokesman for this group of countries and promised China's full support for both their demands that their resources, national rights and interests be protected, and also for their struggle against economic robbery. He also opposed proposals advanced by the USSR and other socialist countries on the problems of universal disarmament to the effect that a conference of the nuclear powers and a World Conference on Disarmament be called, etc. He claimed that China was improving its own nuclear weapons solely for defence purposes and in order to break the nuclear monopoly so as to do away with nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war for ever.

China's entry into the UN was marked by its explosion of an atomic bomb.

In his speech the Chinese representative demanded that the USA and the USSR accept obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, to do away with all nuclear bases on the territory of other countries, and to recall from abroad all their forces which were armed with nuclear weapons, as well as all nuclear weapons themselves and all means of delivery.

The USSR and other socialist countries had long since been raising these questions in the UN. The representatives of the PRC declared that further progress would only be possible if their demands were accepted. In a conversation with the famous American observer James Reston, Chou En-lai declared: "The United States and the Soviet Union should first undertake forthrightly that neither of them will be the first to use nuclear weapons..."¹

The USSR proposed convening a World Conference on Disarmament in order to discuss what all countries, including the PRC, had to suggest, and thus to draw up mutually acceptable solutions. The Soviet proposal stressed that the conference could pay most attention to the questions of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons.

Ever since nuclear weapons first appeared the Soviet Government has fought an active battle to have them prohibited and to have all stocks destroyed. It has also proposed on many occasions that agreements be concluded on the refusal to use nuclear weapons,² on the elimination of all fo-

¹ *The New York Times*, August 10, 1971.

² In 1982 the Soviet Union officially announced its refusal to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This historic decision on the part of the Soviet state met with the approval of all peace-loving peoples.

reign military bases on the territory of other countries, on the creation of nuclear-free zones, and so on. The Soviet Union also played an active role in drawing up resolutions at the 16th session of the General Assembly in 1961 which condemned the use of nuclear weapons. In 1967, at the 22nd session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which won widespread support in the UN, and a memorandum submitted by the Soviet government on July 1, 1968 raised the question of prohibiting flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons outside national boundaries, and of restricting the areas in which underwater missile carriers could sail.

In June 1971 the Soviet government approached the PRC with a proposal to take part in a conference of the five nuclear powers which would discuss problems connected with nuclear weapons. The Chinese, however, declined.

At the 26th session of the General Assembly in 1971, without explaining why, the PRC did not support a single resolution on the questions of disarmament (which were put to the vote more than ten times) and voted against all resolutions which called for an end to nuclear weapons tests. It also refused to sign a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, which had met with widespread international support.

The Chinese representative's speech on questions of the world economic situation destroyed developing countries' hopes of tangible help from the PRC. He declared: "The material aid we have provided is very limited, and what we provide is mainly political and moral support." The representatives of developing countries did not hide their disappointment with such a stance

on the part of the Chinese government in their conversations with other diplomats.

Neither the speech of Qiao Guanhua nor those of the other Chinese representatives contained any constructive suggestions as to how to make the UN more effective in maintaining peace and bringing about disarmament and social progress. Many African, Asian and Latin American delegations were disappointed with the speeches made by the Chinese because they did not contain any specific suggestions as to how to improve the activity of the UN and solve the urgent problems worrying the developing countries.

The Chinese representative's speech did, however, contain unsubstantiated allegations concerning the policy of the USSR. This was something many observers and delegations at the UN had not expected. The replies which the Soviet delegations and those of other socialist countries were forced to give to these allegations, and the controversy which subsequently arose, delighted the imperialists and drew the attention of the delegations away from the pressing problems of the struggle for peace, security and solutions to social problems. Having in mind the 26th session, the Soviet delegations considered it expedient not to enter into ideological discussions with the Chinese so as not to turn the UN rostrum into a site of futile talk. Soviet delegations have persistently shown in the UN that the USSR is ready to cooperate with the PRC on an interstate basis, and that if such cooperation is not achieved, it is through no fault of the Soviet Union's.

At the 27th session of the General Assembly in 1972, the question arose of what measures to take to implement the decision to convene a World Conference on Disarmament. The idea of setting up a special committee to study all

aspects of the conference and the preparations for it met with widespread support amongst delegates from the developing countries, and a "contact group" was formed from their representatives. This group was headed by Ambassador Lusaka of Zambia and Ambassador de Rozas, the Argentinian representative.

The negotiations were long and tortuous, because the USA, Britain and their allies did not want any concrete decision to be reached which would advance the cause of convening a World Conference on Disarmament. Then someone had the idea of organising informal meetings between the most influential delegations—the permanent members of the Security Council and the chairmen of the regional groups—over a cup of tea before the morning sittings of the Political Committee began.

We started these "working breakfasts" at 9.30 in the committee room next to my office on the 35th floor.

An American waitress brought in coffee, fruit and sandwiches on the first morning. Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka noted, as the representative of a tea-producing country, that there was no tea, and immediately demanded that it be included on our breakfast menu. Most people present, however, preferred coffee, the only tea-lovers at these morning meetings being Amerasinghe and myself.

Almost everyone who had been invited—the representatives of 30 countries, including the PRC—came to the first meeting.

Ambassador Ramphul, chairman of the Assembly's Political Committee, informed those present of how consultations on the most important questions were going, and of his plans for organising the Committee's continued work. Then Ambassador Lusaka of Zambia presented some

information on the draft resolution concerning the convening of a World Conference on Disarmament. It was not clear from the little information he presented whether the "contact group" would be able to draw up a draft resolution which would be acceptable to the majority of UN members.

It is very important for a decision on a question concerning all states to be taken by a real majority of the votes, and not just by a formal one.

There have been resolutions in the history of the UN, and even in my time there, which have been adopted by a paltry number of votes. For example, at the 21st session of the General Assembly one resolution went through with just 20 votes being cast in its favour (and 3 against), most members (around 90 delegations, including many major powers) having abstained. This resolution was therefore a worthless piece of paper, even though it dealt with a very important matter—the maintenance of peace. According to the procedure rules, no less than two-thirds of those present must vote in favour of a resolution for it to pass. Abstentions are not considered in the count. It is theoretically possible for a resolution to be approved if two or three votes are cast in its favour and one against, the rest being abstentions. But what is a decision like that worth? What is more, General Assembly resolutions are only recommendatory, not binding.

The chairman then asked each delegation to say what its attitude was to the consultations currently going on on the question of convening a World Conference on Disarmament. Almost all those taking part in the meeting had something positive to say, although a few had some reservations. The Chinese representative refrained

from explaining his position, and did not attend subsequent meetings. In the end, however, under pressure from a group of non-aligned countries, the Chinese delegation cast its vote in favour of a resolution setting up a special committee to prepare a conference. Afterwards, however, the USA, Great Britain and the PRC did all they could to hamper the convocation of the committee and prevent it from starting work.

Taking the growing international feeling in favour of detente and curbing the arms race into account, Chinese diplomacy tried to follow the line of many developing countries, which made up the vast majority in the UN, on a number of questions of disarmament and international security. Since 1980 the Chinese delegation has taken part in the work of the Disarmament Committee.

The Chinese in New York

Speculating on Americans' interest in China, which had grown considerably in connection with Nixon's visit to Peking, the American press kept the public well informed about the Chinese mission at the UN. At first the Chinese sent an administrative group, which rented a whole floor in the Roosevelt Hotel near the UN for its mission. This hotel, which used to be both famous and expensive, has fallen into decline in recent years, which was why the owners readily made their apartments available to the Chinese. The management was not even troubled by hostile demonstrations staged by pro-Taiwanese elements to express their indignation at the Assembly's decision and demand that Mao Tse-tung's representative be expelled from New York.

The Chinese, however, did not stay at the hotel for long: they very soon bought a fairly large

motel for their mission. As Huang Hua explained, this motel had around 200 rooms, a restaurant, a swimming pool and other conveniences.

A system was introduced at the Chinese mission whereby all its employees ate together and were obliged to spend all their free time at the mission under the watchful gaze of their leaders. The Chinese diplomats, particularly in the early days, also avoided appearing at receptions, lunches and dinners alone. Each of them would always be accompanied by one of his colleagues who would either pose as an interpreter or act as a secretary. Even Huang Hua, who had a good knowledge of English, preferred to conduct conversations in Chinese through an interpreter.

This was all explained not so much by a fear on the part of the Chinese of saying something wrong, which was the case at first, but evidently by a wish always to have a witness to one's conversations.

At lunches and dinners, where guests are seated according to protocol, seats were provided next to the Chinese for their interpreters. These places were sometimes forgotten, and in such cases the interpreter would sit behind his countryman. As a rule, diplomats and employees of missions to the UN can speak either English or French. Work with delegations, uninterrupted consultations and frequent conversations in private all require this. If a representative has no knowledge of a generally accepted language, his work becomes dependent on the presence of an interpreter, and on the latter's ability to understand and precisely to convey what is being said so as to establish contact and mutual understanding.

The Chinese spoke with us, Soviet diplomats or Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat, with particular suspicion and caution. At first they

only spent time examining the work of the Secretariat, taking an interest through their own agents and friendly delegations in the work of its main departments and elucidating the level of their influence on the activity of the UN's various bodies. Not having any trained personnel that it could trust, the Chinese government tried, above all, to use people of Chinese nationality who had worked in the UN Secretariat before.

At the beginning of 1972 Huang Hua raised the question of granting the post of Under-Secretary-General on Political and Security Council Affairs, which was currently held by a Soviet citizen, to the Chinese. As I was later told, Huang Hua had declared to Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General: "A Soviet citizen must not always occupy this post."

Waldheim had replied that agreement had long since been reached and the practice established that this post belonged to a Soviet citizen.

After long negotiations in New York and then during Waldheim's visit to Peking in August 1972 it was agreed that the Chinese would be given the post of Under-Secretary-General for Trusteeship Affairs and Decolonisation, which was held by the Niger representative and which Waldheim renamed the post of Under-Secretary-General on the Political and Decolonisation Affairs. In order to balance things up the post granted to the American Bradford Morse (a Republican member of the House of Representatives) when he joined the UN Secretariat after the death of Ralph Bunche was called the post of Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs. Ralph Bunche had held the post of Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, and he dealt with the problems of the Middle East, operations to maintain peace, and so on. Considering the pro-Israeli stance of the

American administration, many delegations had not wanted these extremely delicate and discrepant matters to be in the hands of the American representative. In the end the Chinese agreed to take the questions of decolonisation into their hands, having first set the condition that they be granted a responsible post in the political department of the Security Council and an important post in the department for economic and social affairs.

The Chinese appointed Tang Mingchao, the former editor of a Chinese newspaper published in English in the USA and a member of the Chinese National People's Congress, to deal with the problems of decolonisation. At the weekly meetings with the Secretary-General he preferred to remain silent, although he did express various "doubts" when the question concerned the positions of the Soviet Union, particularly when the matter was one of granting the USSR posts in the UN Secretariat in accordance with its quota. (The USSR was an under-represented country. According to the 1971-1972 quotas, it had the right to between 230 and 232 professional positions, but in reality occupied only 168, i.e. it had only 58-60 per cent of its quota.) Soviet delegations at sessions of the General Assembly, the Soviet representation at the UN, and officials of the USSR Foreign Ministry all raised the question of removing this clear injustice towards the USSR many times in their conversations with U Thant and Kurt Waldheim. In so doing they were trying to bring the number of Soviet employees up to a level corresponding to the USSR's position in the UN and its contribution to the Organisation's budget.

At Kurt Waldheim's instruction a plan was drawn up to select Soviet specialists to work in the UN Secretariat from 1972-75 so as to bring

their numbers up to the level required to conform with the established quota. Similar plans were prepared with regard to Japan and Italy, which were also under-represented, while Great Britain, the USA, France and other Western countries considerably exceeded their quotas. It was about the plans for the Soviet employees that Tang Mingchao spoke up, remarking that he did not understand why a special plan had been prepared for the Soviet Union.

Fundamental truths had to be explained, after which the Chinese no longer raised the question.

When they arrived in New York the Chinese began actively establishing contacts with the American community, American orientologists, sinologists, and so on. As early as the beginning of 1972 the committee for a change in American policy towards the PRC (which consisted of Congressmen and Senators) had organised a trip to the PRC for the American delegation, one of the aims of which was to organise something like a Chinese-American friendship society.

In 1972 two societies appeared in the USA which stood for developing relations with China. One of them consisted of businessmen and politicians, whose aim was to help develop trade and economic links, while the other was made up of scientists, journalists and public figures. The latter's aim was to develop an exchange of scientists, doctors, journalists, actors, films and television programmes. Charles Yost, former permanent representative of the USA at the UN, was elected president of this society, while Michael Blumenthal, who was to become Secretary of the Treasury in 1977, was elected Chairman of the Directors Board.

Ambassador Boyd of Panama once came up to me after one of the Chinese representative's unfounded declarations in the Security Council.

"See what the unexpected result is of your long struggle for the restoration of the PRC's rights in the UN!" he said.

I did not sense any insult in his words, and all I could see in his brown eyes was regret and disquiet.

"We are surprised by the Chinese delegate's speeches," he stressed. "We weren't expecting this. We were hoping that the anti-imperialist front would be strengthened and widened. What's the matter? What's happening with the Chinese?"

I was known in UN circles as a specialist on Far East problems who had actively supported the restoration of the rights of the PRC in the UN. When, after their admission to the UN, the Chinese began making unsubstantiated declarations about the USSR, diplomat acquaintances of mine often chaffed me—some with irony—others to taunt.

It hurt to hear the hostile speeches of the Chinese representatives. For me it was doubly painful, because I had worked in China, and I respected and loved the Chinese people, its culture, ancient civilisation, wisdom and endurance, and its possession by and devotion to one idea.

Love with Vested Interests

I had the opportunity of getting to know the Chinese people in those years when relations between the USSR and China were both friendly and good-neighbourly. In 1955 I was invited to travel to the PRC as chief adviser to director of the Peking Diplomatic Institute. I was accompanied on the journey by a group of Soviet specialists on international relations and Soviet foreign policy, the state and law, economics, and the history of China.

The sympathies of Soviet people for the Chinese, who fought for many long years against foreign interventionists and mercenary rulers, have always been extremely great. Soviet people were truly pleased by the successes of People's China, and were impatient to help its people build a new life and develop the economy, culture and science. The young Republic also needed diplomatic personnel to defend its interests in the international arena, and, since I had a certain amount of experience in training diplomats and organising scientific work (in those years I was pro-rector of the science department of the State Institute of International Relations in Moscow), I agreed to go to China, even though this upset my personal plans. My colleagues' plans were also upset, but this did not stop us. We considered it our duty as Communists to give all possible help to the fraternal Chinese people.

Our departure was hurried, because the Chinese had asked that I arrive in time for the opening of the Diplomatic Institute. Without even having time to pack properly, I left my family in Moscow and departed for Peking on September 7, 1955. At that time there were not yet any jet aircraft, and the flight to Peking took almost three days, while the train took about ten.

The last stop on the flight from Moscow to Peking was Ulan Bator, where the hot air of the steppe, laden with the smell of different grasses, hit me in the face. We could see the city not far away as we were welcomed at the airport and given breakfast. After this short stop our IL-14 set a course for Peking.

The bright sunshine lit up the scorched earth, through which rivers cut in places like blue ribbons. From the air we could see that Peking was situated on a plain at the foot of the Sichang Mountains.

Our plane began to reduce height. The midday sun was shining brightly and it was hot and humid, so the customs officials and border guards who came up to the plane were dressed in summer uniform. Some of them had their jackets unbuttoned. The door was opened and the plane filled with hot, humid air. The other passengers—Chinese and a few Soviet citizens—were met, and they quickly dispersed. I, however, was not met at the airport: either the employees at the Soviet embassy, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had sent a telegram informing of my arrival, had not advised the Chinese, or the latter wanted to express their displeasure at the fact that I had arrived the day after the official opening of the Diplomatic Institute. I was taken into Peking by some Chinese meeting a Soviet specialist on his way to the Polytechnical Institute.

In the centre of the city we turned into a street where the houses were built in a mixed European and Chinese style; they were almost hidden behind a lace of green branches and behind walls with bright-red and gold gates and large stone lions. This is the ambassadorial district of the city, a former international settlement where ordinary Chinese people had not even been allowed to walk before the victory of the Revolution in 1949. The Guoji Hotel, which was where I was first brought, was at the end of the block, not far from the Soviet embassy. At the Guoji it turned out that I would be staying at the Xijiao Hotel in Peking's western suburb.

Xijiao is a separate town in the west of Peking for foreign specialists. It consists of a group of four-storey stone buildings. The outward appearance of the buildings was notable for its combination of the economic style of our times with elements of ancient Chinese architecture, the simple façades being brought to life by curved roofs of lustrous green tiles, colourful ceramic friezes and the intricate ornamentation of the balustrades at the entrance to each building and around the balconies. The town itself was engirdled by rows of barbed wire, and an armed security guard stood at the entrance to it. Our Chinese comrades explained this by the need to protect the specialists from attacks by agents of Chiang Kai-shek. Cars were assigned for each group of specialists, for the ministries and scientific and educational institutions were a comparatively long way from Xijiao.

The flats contained modern furniture and had all the necessary comforts. Depending on the size of their families, specialists were given a flat with either two or three rooms. There was, however, no flat No. 13—the Chinese, appreciating foreign superstition, had left it out.

In the town there was a canteen, a school for Soviet children, and a large club where Soviet films were shown and concerts were given by Chinese artists and foreign troupes on tour in the capital. It was in Peking that I first managed to see dance companies from Vietnam, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries. Some Vietnamese dancers who appeared with bamboo poles made an unforgettable impression on me. With incredible grace and skill they stepped smoothly and elegantly over the poles, which either moved together in time with the music or slid apart across the stage. An excellent technique and a great deal of skill were necessary to do this at the same time as executing the intricate steps of the dance. There was no limit to the astonishment and delight of the public, and the smooth and graceful movements of the girls dressed in national costume sewn from dark-blue silk, and the deft and coordinated movements of the boys dressed in multicoloured national costume provoked loud applause.

Chinese jugglers appeared for us on several occasions. Their technique of juggling, which had been perfected over centuries, aroused amusement and delight. The performance ended with a procession of artistes carrying red flags rippling like waves in the light of the projectors. Chinese and Russian characters then lit up on a banner and formed the words: "Long Live Inviolable Soviet-Chinese Friendship!"

I am reminded in this connection of another concert in the spring of 1972, a little over 15 years later, when the PRC's rights had just been restored in the UN. President Nixon's visit to Peking was under way and some journalists were hastily painting a picture of the prospects for cooperation between the USA and China, talking in their reports about the opportuni-

ties provided by the immense Chinese market and anticipating a downpour of orders for American industrialists. While Nixon was in Peking, Huang Hua invited the diplomatic corps of New York to watch the skill of Chinese jugglers. It was the same troupe which I had seen when I was in Peking. The performance ended the same way it had in 1956, with the artistes carrying red banners onto the stage. The only difference was that English letters lit up on one of the banners to form the slogan: "Long Live the Firm Friendship of the American and Chinese Peoples!"

Like its activity, the diplomatic corps at the UN is very distinctive. Permanent representatives to the UN (ambassadors) are politicians who have headed governments, ministers, chiefs of African tribes, prominent professional diplomats, famous scientists, professors, and journalists. Amongst them there are a lot of people who, between them, have a wide range of opinions, much profound knowledge, active intellect, and independent convictions. Gathered from all round the world, they represent not only different social systems and political regimes, but also the extremely wide variety of national traditions and cultures. Many of them are highly-refined diplomats who have extensive scholarship and are able to think and react quickly both in open clashes around the committee table and in behind-the-scenes diplomatic battles, which, in United Nations language, are often called "consultations".

George Bush was sitting quite close to me, unable to hide his confusion. Just a few months earlier, at the 26th session of the General Assembly, he and Secretary of State Rogers had energe-

tically tried to win delegations round to their point of view, and, at plenary meetings of the Assembly, had made several speeches in favour of keeping Taiwan as a member of the UN. Considering the stance adopted by Peking, which declared that it would refuse to take part in the work of the Organisation if the Chiang Kai-shekists retained their membership of the UN, the Americans had in fact opposed the restoration of the PRC's rights. Bush himself had headed all efforts in this direction.

The following day I was visited by Li Enchu and He Wushuang, both of whom were deputies to the director of the Diplomatic Institute, and Zheng Ping, head of the instructional department. The formal director of the Institute was Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and first deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. At the time the Minister was Chou En-lai, premier of the State Council. The director's deputies were not at all alike. A thin man of average height with a narrow, oblong face, Li Enchu, a typical, bespectacled intellectual, was the exact opposite of his colleague He Wushuang, a tall, robust man with a wide, coarse face and large hands of a worker. Zheng Ping, the head of the instructional department, was a short man who was frail to look at and had cunning eyes which were permanently darting about. All three were dressed in dark-blue service jackets and soft cotton slippers. Li Enchu had at one time received a higher education, and so spoke a little English, which made things easier since we could exchange opinions without an interpreter. Before he had been appointed deputy to the director of the Institute, Li Enchu had worked for some time in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. To all intents and purposes, he was

director of the Institute and secretary of the Party Committee. Such a combination of state and Party duties was a common phenomenon in China at the time.

He Wushuang usually remained silent at our meetings and consultations, his main function evidently being to carry out politico-educational work and select and check out personnel. Now and then he would speak on the problems of the Chinese Revolution and the foreign policy of the PRC. When he did so it was clear that he was merely relating the relevant Party and state documents.

Amongst the people with whom I had to deal almost every day, Gao Die, the head of the international relations department, also merits mention. It seemed as if this young man embodied all the best characteristics of new China's young people. Outwardly, he was full of charm. He had deep, dark eyes and moved gently and rhythmically, and during my work in the PRC I came to a deserved appraisal of his warmth and intellect. We were many times surprised by his flexibility in conversations, by the way he rapidly switched from light-heartedness to deep thought when things came round to matters of importance, and by his striving to derive as much knowledge as possible from us Soviet specialists. He spent every free minute questioning us about various international problems when seen with regard to China, and was interested in books on the history of international relations, in memoirs, and in translations of Soviet, English, Japanese and American authors. His burning desire to acquire knowledge and raise his scientific standard showed in everything he did.

I was provided with an interpreter called Chen Zhi, a thin, 28-year-old Chinese. Although he was polite in conversation, he persistently preach-

ed the idea of "the great Chinese civilisation" and its superiority over other cultures. He was fairly well educated, spoke Russian well enough and also knew Japanese and English. When he found it hard to understand a difficult sentence or concept, I would repeat it in English or Japanese and, through the medium of the three languages, we would reach a fairly accurate translation.

I had studied Japanese and knew around three thousand characters. The meaning of Chinese and Japanese characters is almost identical, and I was therefore easily able to understand the titles of articles and even the main point of some individual articles in *Renmin ribao* on political or international subjects. I did not, it is true, know Chinese grammar, and was therefore not always able to understand complex sentences.

The hieroglyphic system of writing played an important role in the formation of Chinese culture. Like the Egyptian cuneiform system and the hieroglyphics of the Aztecs, Mayas and others, it has preserved through thousands of years the wealth of Chinese spiritual and material culture, monuments of ancient philosophy and literature.

In contrast to writing systems which use letters, each Chinese character conveys a certain concept. The meaning of a character remains unchanged no matter how it is pronounced, while its graphic nature, which is often extremely specific, also allows intricate concepts, abstract ideas and, sometimes, even entire images to be conveyed.

In China, a land dismembered and fragmented by feudalism, separate dialects took shape which differed sharply from each other, and the only thing linking them together was the hieroglyph-

ic system of writing. The difference between the dialects remains so great that people from one province often either have difficulty understanding people from another province or do not understand them at all.

At first I was surprised that the Chinese were not changing over to a sound-based script, as the Vietnamese had already done, but when I visited Canton I realised just how difficult this would be for them. My interpreter, a Chinese girl from Peking, could not even explain to a policeman that we needed a restaurant. He simply did not understand her, and it was only when she found a piece of paper and quickly scribbled a few characters that he smiled and wrote down the address and how to get to it, again in characters.

As I was later told, most of the people who gathered on October 1, 1949, the day the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, did not understand Mao Tse-tung's speech, because Mao spoke in one of the dialects of Hunan Province, which the inhabitants of Peking did not know.

For thousands of years in the past, however, the hieroglyphic system of writing was the property of the privileged classes of Chinese society and was easily understood only by an extremely restricted circle of people. At the beginning of the 18th century there were more than 49,000 hieroglyphs in the Chinese language, while modern dictionaries contain over 60,000. Naturally, only a very limited number of people who spend many years doing so are capable of learning to write so many hieroglyphs.

The policy of creating a centralised, unified state presupposed, of course, the existence of a single literary language which the entire population could understand. It is not possible to de-

velop an economy and create an industrial base if hundreds of millions of people are illiterate. According to official statistics, more than 52 per cent of people were illiterate in China in 1956, while in individual districts this figure was as high as 78 per cent.

In 1956 it was decided to prepare a sound-based system of writing words with letters and gradually to replace the hieroglyphic system with it. Groups were organised and the radio broadcast lessons in the Chinese spoken language of Putunghua (Mandarin), which had Peking pronunciation as its phonetic base. Imagine, however, our surprise when we learned that it had been decided to use the Latin alphabet to reproduce the sounds of the language! In the meantime, many Chinese philologists claimed that this could be done much better and more precisely by the Russian alphabet. Such a solution to an exclusively practical question forced one to suspect the real political state of affairs.

Two days later I was received by Zhang Wentian, the director of the Institute. He was the first Chinese ambassador to Moscow and made a definite contribution to the development of Sino-Soviet relations. During the war against Japan he held important posts in the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the command of the People's Liberation Army.

Zhang Wentian's office was furnished in the old Chinese style: dark, low chairs, beautifully inlaid redwood screens, and a lacquered table expertly decorated by craftsmen of long standing. We were served the invariable green tea. Zhang Wentian was a thick-set man of medium height, and was dressed in a single-breasted jacket with a high collar, the normal attire for Chinese officials. He greeted me amicably, carefully looked me over, asked whether I had had a

good flight, and questioned me about my work and my family.

Our conversation was businesslike and friendly, and I gained the impression that Zhang Wentian was a clever and subtle person to talk to.

We established good working contacts and Zhang Wentian would fairly often invite me and listen to what I had to say about organising the training of diplomatic personnel. At his initiative it was decided to set up a research institute for international relations affiliated to the People's Society for the Study of International Relations. We also drew up similar recommendations.¹

We were trying to help China begin training operative and scientific personnel in the field of diplomacy and international relations. Our specialists also gave their all in other fields of science, culture, engineering, medicine and education. In those years Chinese leaders many times emphasised that the basis of China's modern industry was formed by enterprises built with the help of the USSR. It was precisely these enterprises which ensured the successful industrialisation of the PRC. A number of new industries grew up in China and, with the assistance of the USSR, a large number of major industrial enterprises, shops and projects were built which were all fitted out with the latest equipment.

In the 1950s there were more than 10,000 highly qualified Soviet specialists working in the PRC, while over 8,000 Chinese engineers,

¹ It has now become known that, for many years, Zhang Wentian was opposed to leftist trends in the CPC. In August 1959, together with Peng Dehuai, he was removed from all the posts he held for criticising the Great Leap policy. He also fell victim to the Cultural Revolution, and was defamed and exiled. He fell ill and, because he received no medical aid, died in 1975.

technicians and workers studied and underwent practical training in the USSR and more than 11,000 Chinese students graduated from Soviet institutions of higher education. Amongst Chinese diplomats there were many graduates from the State Institute of International Relations in Moscow. I had occasion to meet them at the UN, at international conferences in Geneva, Paris and Vienna, at various kinds of diplomatic events.

With the help of Soviet specialists the Anshan metallurgical industrial complex—one of the largest centres of metallurgy in China—was set going again. I paid a visit to Anshan, and the Soviet specialists working there showed me a rolling mill manufactured at a factory in Kramatorsk in the USSR. According to our engineers, it was the latest thing in world engineering. The first such rolling mill had been given to China, and it was only after this that they began to be sent to Soviet factories to replace worn-out machinery. "With the help of our Soviet friends, their experience and technology," Wang Chun-lun, a deputy to the National People's Congress, declared, "we have not only restored what was destroyed. We have rebuilt the Anshan metallurgical industrial complex. If I were to be asked what friendship is between China and the Soviet Union, I would point to Anshan. And if I were asked what Anshan is, I would say: 'friendship'."¹

"We must also point out," Chou En-lai said at the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, "that the great Soviet Union and the People's Democracies have given us tremendous assistance in the carrying out of our First Five-Year Plan."²

¹ *Druzhba*, August 10, 1955.

² *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. I, *Documents*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1956, p. 271.

Chou En-lai also acknowledged the importance for China of the experience of the Soviet people, and also of learning from them, in other speeches. Speaking on June 26, 1957 at the fourth session of the National People's Congress, he said in his report on the work of the government: "Some people are against learning from the experience of the Soviet Union, and even say that the mistakes and shortcomings in our construction work are also the result of learning from the Soviet Union. This is a very harmful point of view. We believe that learning from the Soviet Union has been absolutely necessary. The question lies in how we ourselves do the learning. If we do not learn well, the responsibility lies wholly with us. The Soviet Union is the first country in the world to have established socialism and has a rich fund of advanced experience... In fact, it is exactly because we have conscientiously studied the pioneering experience of the Soviet Union that we have been able to avoid taking many unnecessary detours and so gained great achievements in our construction work... There are still people who attempt to deny the tremendous significance of the Soviet Union's sincere assistance to our country. They are obviously bent on breaking up the friendship between China and the Soviet Union, undermining our international solidarity, and so wrecking our socialist construction."¹ These were perfectly fair words, but the man who said them forgot them fairly quickly.

In conversations with us ordinary Chinese stressed that their lives had noticeably improved. During the first five-year plan (1953-1957) unem-

¹ Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government". Supplement to *People's China*, No. 14, July 16, 1957, pp. 11, 14.

ployment was almost completely eliminated, although this was sometimes achieved by preserving manual labour methods at most enterprises and overmanning others. During my visit to the Anshan metallurgical complex in 1956 I asked the chief engineer how many workers there were at the factory. He replied that there were 175,000, although 75,000 would be sufficient. This, he said, was so as not to give rise to unemployment.

Travelling out to the suburbs of Peking, and later visiting other regions of the country we were able to see, through the windows of the car or train, peasants working their plots of land, whatever the weather. The agrarian reform which had been carried out immediately after the revolution had done away with private land ownership, and a centuries-old injustice had been eliminated by giving the land to the peasants.

The peasant fields were tiny, carefully cultivated rectangles. In the corner of each plot a small mound with a memorial table was usually to be seen. Chinese families buried their dead under these mounds, for there were no cemeteries in the villages.

The peasants would plough their land, sow rice by hand, and fetch water in wooden tubs which they carried on yokes to water their vegetables. They had not even heard about artificial fertilisers or any sort of technology. The only fertiliser they had was cattle dung and human excrement, all of which was painstakingly collected, even in the towns. Every mule or horse was dressed in a nappy to catch the manure. Despite their great love for hard work, the peasants still lived a poor life. They ate meagrely, usually a cup of rice, and sometimes some radishes or cabbage leaves.

A dark, quilted robe served the peasant for all seasons, and was the only garment he had for all life's occasions. In Peking I saw barefooted peasants, and once I noticed a group of peasants dressed in long, worn-out robes in a large department store on Wangfujin Street. On their feet they wore something like sandals. They did not buy anything, just looked at cheap watches, crockery, fountain pens and cotton prints as though they were never-before-seen marvels. It was as if they were looking at lumps of lunar rock. Everything was beyond the reach of their pockets, too. In monetary terms, the annual income of a peasant was 15-17 yuan, but a watch cost 30-40 yuan, and a metre of cotton—2-3 yuan. Most peasants were also illiterate.

Future Diplomats

After I had been officially introduced to Zhang Wentian we went to the Diplomatic Institute, which had been opened a few days previously and was based on the diplomatic department of the People's University of Peking. The reorganisation of the department into an independent institute under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was made necessary by the extremely low level of training of the specialists who graduated from the People's University and the disparity between their knowledge and the requirements of work within the foreign ministry and the PRC's foreign institutions.

In April 1956 the Institute received a new building with a hostel for the students and an accommodation wing for the staff. This new building hardly differed from the Institute's old premises. It was a three-storey structure of dull grey panels, and had a boring and meagre

appearance. The cement floors, bare walls decorated in places with pictures of Mao, and the knocked-together benches and desks in the classrooms and lecture theatres all left the impression of a bleak barracks room.

Heads of department, professors and teachers all came up to us, smiled in greeting, and expressed satisfaction at having met us.

The warm September sun and the cordial and friendly way we had been met by both teachers and students warmed our hearts. As chief adviser to the director and group leader, I was to have conversations and consultations with the board of the Institute two or three times a week. I was also to teach a general course on the history of international relations from 1917 to 1957, giving two lectures a week. Other members of our group also had a considerable burden. Neither the Institute nor Peking's libraries had the most essential documents or materials on the contemporary period. The long civil war, ruin, and the fact that government bodies were dealing with other urgent matters connected with the establishment of a new system and the fight against corruption, inflation, hunger and unemployment, all made themselves felt. The Peking library had received a gift of a lot of literature from the Lenin Library in Moscow, but, of course, there was insufficient specialised literature. I asked my wife, who left Moscow after me, to bring as many books as she could from my home library. It took a lot of time and effort to prepare for the lectures I was to read. First I had to prepare a written text of my lectures, which was then typed and handed to a translator who prepared it for oral translation. I read the lectures in Russian, paragraph by paragraph, while Chen Zhi translated into Chinese. If I felt that the professors, teachers and postgraduates who attended

these lectures and then used them in their own work had not quite understood the idea I had expressed, I would elucidate further.

During our very first conversations we made the acquaintance of leading employees of the Institute, professors and teachers.

At our meetings with the board we were first of all acquainted with the curriculum for a four-year period of study, which made provision neither for graduates to specialise in individual countries or groups of countries, nor for fostering in them the skills of working independently. Neither could the lecture method of teaching foreign languages in groups of 20-30 people of a generally low standard ensure adequate foreign language training. In connection with all this the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to change over to a five-year period of study, and to draw up a new curriculum. The new curriculum, which took our suggestions into account, went further towards meeting the requirements of training qualified specialists on international affairs. It was approved by the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Higher Education of the PRC and was introduced for first and second-year students studying on the five-year course. Partial changes were also introduced for third-year students, and specialisation was also approved.

The Institute also offered two-year courses for people to improve their qualifications. These courses were open to employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and workers in the Party and state apparatus so that they could be trained to occupy middle-ranking diplomatic posts. Apart from that there was a small group of top officials from the Foreign Ministry who were studying for just one year, for the most part a foreign language. In 1956 fifty Muslims from the national

minorities were accepted by the Institute to be trained to work in the Middle East.

In October 1955 there were several meetings with the directors of the Institute and the leaders of Party and Young Communist League organisations. From the discussions at these meetings the ideological and political cast of mind gradually became clear of the teachers, postgraduates and students, as well as of those attending the qualification-improvement courses.

In all, there were 490 people studying at the Institute, those attending the qualification-improvement courses making up about one-third of the total. Almost half of those studying at the Institute came from the families of former landowners, the bourgeoisie, merchants, or rich peasants, while representatives of the working class accounted for less than 10 per cent of the total. All the students were divided into two categories (using Chinese terminology): cadre workers and young intellectuals. The latter were young people who had entered the Institute from secondary school and had very little or no work experience. Cadre workers were former employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, soldiers and commanders of the People's Liberation Army, workers in the Party and state apparatus, or simply members of the CPC. The majority of those attending the Institute were members of the Communist Party (of the 490 students, 292 were members of the CPC)¹. Amongst the teach-

¹ It is interesting to note that, amongst the Party members, almost half came from non-working-class backgrounds—landowners, merchants, the bourgeoisie and rich peasants; around 20 per cent were the children of employees; the working-class group was the most insignificant of all, accounting for just 3 per cent; the rest were people of peasant origin or who came from free-profession families.

ers the Party group was insignificant at a little over 20 per cent. Around one-third of them were members of the Young Communist League, while more than a third had no Party affiliation at all.

This last group consisted of the most highly qualified teachers from amongst the old intelligentsia. Most of them had been educated in the USA, Great Britain, Germany and other countries, and their methodology and opinions on the history of international relations, the policy of the USSR and the international development of the Far East were of a typically bourgeois nature. Followers of the English historian Arnold Toynbee and the American Hans Morgenthau predominated in the group, and taught courses on the history of China, its foreign policy in the pre-revolutionary period, foreign languages and other things. Like the members of the CPC, the teachers who were members of the Young Communist League had an overall idea of Marxism and dialectical materialism, but did not know Lenin's theory of international relations. Naturally, as far as it was possible to judge from conversations with them, their scientific and methodological standard of teaching was fairly low. Amongst the students and teaching staff of the Institute, 50 per cent were members of the CPC and more than 250 people were members of the Young Communist League. A few people were members of different democratic parties, but did not have their own organisations at the Institute.

The directors of the Institute told me about the directions in which political and educational work was moving. Since I myself had previously been engaged in Party work, I in turn told them about the political education of students in the USSR.

To a certain extent the main directions taken by the work of the Party organisation at the Institute were the same as in institutions of higher education in the USSR, the main task of Party work being considered the fulfilment of the curriculum. The Party organisation would try to achieve the aim it had been set with the help of Young Communist League and trade union organisations.

The political education of Party members, Young Communist League members, and students and teachers having no affiliation to the Party was of no less importance. At the Institute there were political lessons, and every Saturday was considered a Party and Young Communist League day. After lunch on that day everyone was free of classes and work to take part in meetings, attend political lessons, and so on. Apart from that, the teachers undertook to attend the evening University of Marxism-Leninism. The Party organisation also carried out ideological and educational work amongst the older professors and teachers, and was charged with conducting political campaigns and movements.

In the summer of 1955 a campaign was started to combat counter-revolutionaries. During the summer vacation it gained mass proportions, but by the autumn had already begun to fade. The Party Committee then appointed a "Committee of Five" from amongst the most proven Party members, which was to check the biographies of Communists. The "Committee of Five" also had sub-committees which engaged in gathering additional materials, investigating and checking statements contained in biographies, including at places where Communists had worked or studied, and in gathering evidence about people's moral cast of mind, and so on.

It could sometimes take weeks to compile biographies. Autobiographies required a most thorough account of all the facts of one's life and a description of all one's errors, transgressions and opinions. In other words, one was expected to subject oneself to self-criticism. Sometimes the autobiographies of students and teachers who were not yet 30 took up 45-50 pages.

According to figures for the middle of October 1955, around five per cent of the students and teachers were being investigated because of suspicions of links with counter-revolutionaries.

A considerable number of young people stood out for their political instability. As Ma Ting, the secretary of the Young Communist League Committee, remarked, almost half of them came from the exploiting classes. The influence of the class environment in which they had grown up, of the families in which they had been raised, and the change in their material situation as a result of the revolution, was all telling on their world outlook.

Members of the Young Communist League showed a great deal of interest in our opinion on a number of questions, including the rearing of the students' political vigilance and class positions, the link between the theories they studied and practice (taking account of China's situation), organising student scientific work, and so on.

Observing caution and tact to the utmost, we limited ourselves to talking about the work of Komsomol and Party organisations in Soviet institutions of higher education, especially the State International Relations Institute in Moscow. The Institute had no department of socio-economic sciences, and we drew the attention of its board to the need for such a department,

which would organise scientific and methodic work on the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, political economy, dialectical and historical materialism, and the history of the Chinese Revolution.

In the spring of 1957 Kliment Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, paid a visit to China. The Chinese leadership gave a reception in his honour in the enormous hall of the National People's Congress, which could seat 2,000 guests. Soviet specialists were also invited.

Mao Tse-tung appeared soon after the reception had begun. He was accompanied by Zhu De, Chou En-lai, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and other top-ranking officials of the PRC.

Mao Tse-tung was dressed in a light grey service jacket and looked massive, particularly next to the thin Chou En-lai. Zhang Wentian introduced me to Mao who, almost without looking, extended his hand. It was chubby, like a woman's. Mao looked at Zhang Wentian and myself with a hard, piercing gaze, not a shadow of a smile on his face. Then, in one breath, he said several fragmentary sentences, and the interpreter bowed towards me and said that Chairman Mao Tse-tung wished us success in training Chinese diplomats. The time would soon come, he said, when all countries would invite the Chinese to take part in solving world problems.

Flash guns went off as photographers recorded our meeting on film. Our conversation was interrupted by the approach of the Hungarian ambassador. Mao said a few fragmentary sentences to him, too, and turned to another guest. Two days later I received a sealed envelope bearing the stamp of the newspaper *Renmin ribao*. Inside was a large photograph of the Chairman of the PRC shaking hands with me.

The Chinese and the Atom Bomb

During a walk around Peking at the end of 1956 my Chinese colleagues informed me with great satisfaction that a major Chinese scientist in the field of mathematics and physics had returned to Peking from America.¹ They believed that he could be included in the three most important scientists in the world.

In January 1967 the newspaper *Grimpson*, which is published in the university city of Cambridge (a satellite of Boston, USA), carried the banner headline: "The Red Flag Over Harvard". Beneath the headline there was a photograph of the bronze statue of John Harvard, the founder of the University. Above Harvard's head were flying the Soviet and American flags. The caption was no less garish: "Have the Reds taken over the University? No, Soviet ambassador Leonid Kutakov has come to deliver a speech."

How, by what means had the red flag appeared at a university standing at the top of the hierarchical ladder of American educational institutions? Harvard is the university where the ruling elite of America and representatives of the titled aristocracy and the ruling circles of many foreign countries all study. A marble memorial board in the University chapel informs visitors that at least a dozen American presidents including William Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy and others were graduates of Harvard, as well no less than a hundred government secretaries and prominent senators. A special selection process and high charges create a reliable barrier to "unsuitable" prospective students.

¹ I later learned that over 100 major scientists in the fields of mathematics and physics returned to the PRC from the USA at the end of the 1950s.

There are 3,500 professors and teachers for almost 16,000 students and postgraduates, while the study process is looked after by the more than 5,500 employees of the administrative apparatus, who also help the professors and research employees select materials, conduct experiments, translate from foreign languages, and so on.

Many famous scientists work at Harvard University, including John K. Galbraith, an economist and sociologist whose name is known all over the world, and who has written dozens of books and is a brilliant journalist; John K. Fairbank, the head of American sinology; Morton H. Halperin, the famous specialist on atomic weapons; Marshall Shulman, a major political scientist and specialist on disarmament; and Hans J. Morgenthau, a major international relations theoretician in the West, who teaches individual courses. Until 1973 future Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was also officially a professor at the University.

Professors from other American universities are invited to hold seminars at Harvard, as are others from Great Britain, West Germany, France, etc.

The University has an excellent library (8 million volumes) and receives scientific literature from most countries of the world. The obliging owners of the library acquainted me with its main catalogue and showed me index cards relating to books of mine which had come out in the USSR and Japan.

I will leave giving an account of the interesting meetings I had with the aforementioned scientists until another time, and here will dwell only on my conversation with Professor Morton Halperin.

At the University I gave lectures on Soviet foreign policy. I also had conversations with a

number of specialists on questions of disarmament. The professors who had invited me to the University suggested that it would be particularly interesting for me to talk with Halperin. The walls of the large room which served as his office were hung with colour photographs of nuclear explosions. These pictures had been taken from various sites around each explosion and enlarged to various sizes. The mushroom clouds thrown up into the atmosphere were coloured blood-red.

"They're photographs of two Chinese explosions," the professor explained. "At the time I happened to be working on a book about the Chinese nuclear potential.¹ Incidentally, I wanted to ask you. In your lecture yesterday you said that the Soviet government opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What is your attitude to this?" he asked, indicating the colour photographs.

"The Soviet Union," I replied "takes a principled stance and does not change it according to the circumstances. We are in favour of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a first step. Speaking more broadly, the Soviet Union is in favour of prohibiting and destroying nuclear weapons as a most barbarous form of arms threatening the fate of mankind. Nor can we approve these explosions. They are a new and dangerous step along the path towards using thermonuclear weapons."

"As far as it's possible to judge from these photographs," Halperin said, "the Chinese are in the early stages of possessing nuclear weapons. The force of their explosions is reminiscent of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

¹ M. Halperin, *China and the Bomb*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965.

At the beginning of 1967 the USA conducted around five hundred test nuclear explosions, the USSR around three hundred, and France thirty, so the Chinese will need several years to develop a bomb and turn it into an effective weapon. They have evidently also started research into the field of hydrogen weapons."

"How have the Chinese been able to develop their own nuclear weapons?" I asked. "I, for example, cannot find an answer to this question. Ten years ago I was in the PRC. As far as I was informed, the general level of development of science and technology in China, like the general level of theoretical thinking, was considerably lower than in the advanced countries."

Halperin did not reply immediately. He was wavering. Then he said:

"As we all know, the basic plan for creating atomic weapons is not a secret. The question is in the technology. We can assume that a Chinese scientist who worked in the USA at the university in Berkeley and then somehow found himself in China helped his country to create nuclear weapons."

I remembered this conversation several months later when I was on the other side of the American continent.

In the spring of 1967 I was invited to Berkeley, a small university town near San Francisco, by Professor Robert A. Scalapino, the chairman of the National Council on American-Chinese Relations. As well as scientists, this Council consisted of representatives of business circles in the west and east of the USA, including such prominent figures as David Rockefeller and Donald Kendall. The town is populated mainly by students, lecturers and research staff.

In the USA it is the custom to build universities outside the limits of big cities, providing

them with special campuses, thereby isolating them from the socio-political life of the country's major centres. Like young people in many other capitalist countries, however, American young people have many times been at the forefront of various anti-government disturbances, protesting against the war in Vietnam, against the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, in favour of banning nuclear weapons, and so on.

These stormy, spontaneous and badly organised demonstrations by young people nonetheless caused considerable problems for state governors and the federal administration. Students occupied university buildings, erected barricades, and fought with police and troops. Students who genuinely believed in the principles of bourgeois democracy and freedom many times fell victim to police arbitrariness and violence on the part of reaction.

At that time there were around 40,000 students and over 5,000 professors, lecturers and research staff at the university in Berkeley, which constituted a part of the University of California. The latter is far more democratic than Harvard: tuition fees are two or three times lower, and most of the students themselves earn the money they need to live and to pay for their education. Anti-government demonstrations have often been sparked off at Berkeley, notably when the students demanded an end to the Vietnam war. Slogans were hung in various places, while on buildings at the university and in the town half-obliterated inscriptions were to be seen: "US OUT OF VIETNAM", "DOWN WITH THE DIRTY WAR", and so on. This was the age of the hippy, and they sat on the town's pavements making their silent protest against the bourgeois establishment, unthinking narrow-mindedness, the chase for dollars, triviality, and the

senseless deaths in the jungles of Indochina.

A battered old Ford stopped by a group of young people. On its back bumper there was a sticker which said: "If you need help and don't like the police, call a hippy!"

The university in Berkeley is a major scientific centre which specialises in atomic energy, mathematics, the study of the Far East, and other problems.

Scalapino, a man of fairly conservative persuasion, tried to restrict my appearances and contacts to just those of professors and lecturers who dealt with the problems of the Far East.

After one of my lectures—I had spoken about the principles of Soviet policy in the East, and on Sino-Soviet relations—I was approached by a group of those who had attended. Some of them asked questions, others simply shook my hand and introduced themselves. A little way away there stood a tall, thin man who seemed to be waiting for something. He walked towards me and held out his hand.

"John Service," he introduced himself. "I heard you worked in China. If you don't object, I'd like to have breakfast together. I also used to deal with Chinese affairs. I think it will be interesting for us to delve into the matter and exchange opinions."

Scalapino, who was standing next to him, added:

"John is in charge of the library at the Chinese research centre."

We arranged to meet the next day. Service promised to pick me up at my hotel and show me the library before going on to a restaurant together. "John Service," I said to myself over and over again. Where had I heard that name? Thinking hard, I remembered. I had come across it in American newspapers from 1945 in connection

with the *Amerasia* magazine employees affairs (which I shall talk about later). I had also encountered it in diplomatic documents published by the US State Department in 1949 in a collection entitled *United States Relations with China. With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Based on the Files of the Department of State*. At the time I had been conducting research into international relations in the Far East during the Second World War and the early postwar years.

The make of a car an American drives and the year in which it was produced represent his visiting card and give an indication of his standard of living and his position in society. Service's battered old Chevrolet bore witness to the fact that his position and standard of living were far from ideal. Service had grey temples and a thin face with deep wrinkles and sunken eyes. His conversation lacked the optimism and assumed cheerfulness which is typical of most Americans.

The library at the research centre was not large, occupying just three rooms. It did, however, have the latest books on Japan and China from most countries of the world (Britain, Japan, France, West Germany, the USSR, *et al*), although this was not what made the collection valuable. Service explained that the library regularly obtained microfilms of all material on China from the American Consulate General in Hong Kong: photocopies of provincial Chinese newspapers, records of interviews with Chinese refugees (of which there were three to five thousand annually), information from Taiwan on the situation in China, and so on. All this material was worked through by the large staff (up to 500 people) of the Consulate General.

"Our centre," Service said, "has established

links with the Peking State Library, and gets new publications from there: books, magazines, pamphlets, etc. Peking publications, it is true, do not contain much of interest and are mainly propaganda literature. The provincial press, which is not intended for foreigners, gives much more material which helps understand the processes underway in China."

There were a lot of people in the small restaurant we went to after the library, including a group of students who were hurriedly eating sandwiches or the invariable hot dogs and washing them down with ice-cold Coca Cola while heatedly arguing about American policy in Vietnam. Another group was discussing the prospect of China acquiring atomic weapons.

We were soon joined by several other sinologists who had attended my lecture.

Indicating the students, one of them remarked:

"They are right to discuss this problem seriously. China has only exploded two atom bombs, but with their discipline and flair for technical sciences the Chinese will be able to catch up with the other nuclear powers quickly."

"If it hadn't been for the professor at the university in Berkeley," I said, "the Chinese would hardly have been able to acquire atomic weapons so quickly."

"You may be right there," my colleague replied. "They say that one of the creators of the Chinese atomic bomb first studied and then worked at the Berkeley Research Centre. He was a man of outstanding abilities. I don't know the details, but in 1956 he was allowed to make a trip to Taiwan. It seems he wanted to visit his relatives. While he was there he disappeared to the mainland."

"It's a strange story, more like fiction," I noted. "Somehow it's reminiscent of a James

Bond film, don't you agree? A prominent physicist works in atomic energy, a field which is connected with the country's security, and suddenly goes to Taiwan, although this can be explained another way: by the fact that there are American troops on the island. But let's go on: the strait between Taiwan and the PRC is patrolled by American ships and planes. Don't forget either that relations between Taiwan and the PRC were very strained from 1955-1957. Possible Chinese landings on Taiwan were discussed, and everything on the island was mobilised. Security was stepped up and thousands of people kept watch over the strait. And suddenly, a scientist whom the USA needs successfully overcomes all the obstacles and turns up in Peking. At the time some Chinese acquaintances of mine, told me with satisfaction that a major Chinese scientist had returned from the USA, but they did not mention that he had reached the PRC via Taiwan. Weren't there influential people in the USA who were interested in helping China build nuclear weapons?" I asked in conclusion.

The others said nothing, and their silence seemed very significant to me.

The Dialectics of Politics

In China we sensed an enormous interest in our lectures and in the opinions we expressed. The lecture theatre was always full to overflowing, and the heads of department, lecturers and postgraduates in all specialities (lawyers, economists, regional geographers and even language teachers) who attended listened carefully to our every word. After every lecture I received written questions, sometimes more than a hundred of them.

This was partly explained by the poor overall theoretical training of the Chinese, their metaphysical way of thinking, and their lack of experience in applying dialectics to phenomena of social development, particularly those of an international nature. But the main thing which made itself felt in the letters my interpreter handed to me was a burning and keen interest in science, and a striving fully and comprehensively to understand historical phenomena and the course of development of international relations.

Most of the older lecturers, who had studied in Kuomintang educational institutions, and even some of the younger ones, had formed a metaphysical, formally juridical approach to the phenomena of international politics. For this reason they needed precise formulations and comprehensive explanations of complex phenomena in international relations and Soviet foreign policy. To make sure they understood properly, a Marxist dialectical approach was needed. For example, many of them found it difficult to understand that the history of international relations is far from restricted to certain international conferences and diplomatic manoeuvres, and that it represents a conglomeration of economic, political, legal, diplomatic and military ties and relations between nations, states and systems of states, as well as between the main classes and economic and political forces and organisations operating in the world arena. It took me a long time to explain, using historical examples, that the socio-economic factors which characterise the worldwide historical process of mankind's advancement from one social formation to another often tell on international relations; socio-political development is an important factor in the formation of foreign policy, inasmuch as foreign policy is closely

linked with domestic policy. To varying degrees such factors as the interests of the ruling classes, the nature of the existing political system, the composition of the ruling elite and how dependent it is on various social and political groups, the role of military circles, and so on, all exert a direct influence on the formation of foreign policy. A less direct influence is exerted by the ideological and political face of the main parties taking part in the process of government, the activity of popular movements, and the dominant trends in public opinion and its evolution.

In different ages and even historical periods, the influence of direct or indirect factors on the formation of the foreign policy of individual countries and on international relations has altered depending on the role of these factors in the domestic and foreign policy of each country.

Those who attended our lectures were for a long time unable to grasp the fact that until the class struggle of the proletariat emerged into the arena, the popular masses only played a spontaneous role in the historical process and in the development of international relations.

Turning to the history of China, I stressed in my lectures that popular movements often took place under a religious flag and that those who took part in them only vaguely realised the purpose of their struggle. This was typical of popular actions in China (the Tai Ping rebellion from 1850 to 1864, the I Ho Tuan (Boxer) uprising at the start of the 20th century, etc.). When taking decisions concerning international problems, China's ruling circles did so proceeding from their own class interests. Thus, in the 17th century Chinese feudal lords preferred to come to an agreement with the Manchu enslavers in order to combat peasant unrest; in the middle of the 19th

century the imperial government reached an agreement with Western colonialists to fight the peasants during the Tai Ping rebellion. This traitorous agreement between the reactionary regime and foreign imperialists manifested itself particularly during the Boxer popular uprising.

In one of my earliest lectures I emphasised that in its first foreign policy act—the Decree on Peace—the Soviet government rejected secret diplomacy and declared that it wanted to conduct open negotiations and would begin publishing secret agreements. It also nullified the imperialist agreements of the tsarist government and the Provisional Government, which were concluded by the ruling circles behind the peoples' backs and against their will. The Soviet government made a complete break with the imperialist policy of the tsarist government and the Provisional Government. It did, however, recognise all clauses on good-neighbourliness in treaties (including those determining borders), and economic agreements. This was the implementation of the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of two diametrically opposed socio-economic systems.

Since 1917 an era of new diplomacy has begun, seriously hampering the intrigues of the enemies of peace. This, however, in no way changes the fact that the bourgeoisie is today trying to an even greater extent than it did in the 19th century to decide its foreign policy away from the eyes of the peoples.

Being under the influence of various essays which were written by foreign bourgeois authors and widely spread in pre-revolutionary China, and under the influence of lectures given by bourgeois professors, my listeners were for a long time unable to comprehend the need for concluding

and then abrogating the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Neither could they understand my justification of the brilliant manoeuvre of Soviet foreign policy in 1939, when the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler Germany. This pact, as is well known, played an important role in the Soviet Union's preparations to repulse the attack of nazi Germany and ensure the victory of the Soviet people. Thanks to the pact, the Soviet Union escaped the need to fight on two fronts—against militarist Japan in the East, which had, in fact, already started the war in the summer of 1939 by attacking Mongolia, an ally of the Soviet Union, and in the West—against nazi Germany. It took several lessons to explain to my listeners the justness of this act in the interests of both the Soviet people and all progressive mankind, including the Chinese people, and in the interests of victory over fascism and imperialism not only in Europe, but also in Asia. Even greater efforts were required on my part to explain the justice of the Soviet Union's actions with regard to Japan at the end of the Second World War. A certain part of my audience was under the influence of essays (memoirs, research papers, etc.) written by Japanese and some American and British scholars and politicians who claimed that the USSR's entry into the war against Japan was in violation of the neutrality pact concluded by the USSR and Japan on April 13, 1941.

In my lectures I had to show in great detail how the Japanese ruling circles had brought the neutrality pact to nought by blatantly violating its provisions.

The Power of Help

At the beginning of 1957 I made a trip to a number of major cities in North-East and South China, where I read lectures on the international situation to Soviet specialists and employees of Soviet consulates. My route took me through Wuhan to Canton, then on to Shanghai, Mukden (Shenyang), Anshan, Talien and other cities.

My first stop was in Wuhan, a city famous for its revolutionary past. In 1927 it was the last stronghold of China's revolutionary government, which was resisting Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolution. In 1938, during the war against the Japanese invaders, major battles took place near Wuhan, in which volunteer Soviet pilots played an active role. As a result of their participation, the Japanese air force, which had previously ruled the skies, suffered severe losses and was forced to go over to cautious actions for fear of being hit by the Soviet "hawks".

Wuhan is the main city of the province of Hubei, a major industrial centre and port in Central China. It consists of three cities—Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang—now constituting a single whole. Wuhan used to be divided by the wide and mighty Yangtze, which was not crossed by a single bridge. The river also divided North China from the South. Communications across the river to Wuhan consisted of railway ferries and launches. In old China the resources had not been found to build a bridge. In view of this the authorities decided to turn to the Soviet government for help. The USSR responded by sending specialists, who arrived in Wuhan in 1954. The group was headed by K. S. Silin, a famous Soviet bridge builder. One day, Silin took me to the Yangtze to show me how the construction work was going. At

5,800 kilometres, the Yangtze is the longest river in China. Its basin takes up roughly one-fifth of China's territory, or 1.8 million square kilometres. The river begins in Tsinghai province. Its sources are on the slopes of a mountain range, and from here it begins its long journey, gathering the water of other rivers and becoming ever wider and deeper. Every year it pours more than a trillion cubic metres of water into the ocean. The Yangtze flows across the stony and wooded Sikang-Tibet plateau, cuts through the granary of China—Szechuan province—and, passing through the provinces of Hubei and Hunan, forms a delta, the land around which is famed for its fertility.

I was impatient to see this great river, especially since my hotel was not far from its bank.

"Like a sea, the Yangtze overflowed..." the ancient Chinese poet Zhang Ruoxu (660-720) wrote.

*Generations leave this world,
But the river flows on
While the moon sits alone in the dark bosom
of the sky.
Time is eternal.¹*

I boarded the launch which carried people to the other bank in order to get a closer look at the river. Beneath us there was a strong current, and the water was yellow, clay-coloured. The river is full of loess, with which it fertilises the fields which have stretched out across the vast expanse of its delta. The current is so strong that it carries the ferries and launches downriver. It is difficult to imagine China without the

¹ See: N. Fedorenko, *Zemlya i legendy Kitaya* (China and Her Legends), Moscow, 1961, pp. 133-134.

Yangtze, which seems to personify the Chinese people and their mighty strength.

The rivers of China are the country's benefactors, but at the same time they are a threat and a curse, for when they flood they cause enormous losses and sometimes claim hundreds of human lives. For centuries the Chinese felt themselves helpless before the might and self-will of their rivers. They treated them as though they were living beings, and prayed for them not to burst their banks and destroy settlements and crops, thus condemning people to starvation and death.

The Yangtze, the Huanghe, the Xijiang, the Huaihe and other great rivers of China not only link the provinces of China with each other, but also separate them from each other. Building bridges across rivers like these is a complicated and difficult matter, particularly where the Yangtze is concerned. However skilful the ancient Chinese craftsmen were whose praises are sung in legends, poems and folk tales, they never even dreamed of erecting a bridge across the Yangtze. One folk song even ran:

*Man cannot subdue the Yellow River
Or build a bridge across the Yangtze.¹*

We went up onto the bridge. I still have a photograph of Silin and myself standing beside one of the girders of the bridge across that enormous, turbulent river. Next to us there is a large and complex installation. The massive piers of the bridge stretched out from the left and right banks to the middle of the river. In the grey and foggy atmosphere of that winter's day the bridge was alight with the blue flashes of innumerable

¹ Ibid., p. 164.

pieces of electric welding equipment. From the height of the bridge the boats and junks which were carrying cargoes for the project and had gathered close together on the river all seemed very small. High above me I could see the jibs of the cranes. The bridge had become an enormous school for thousands of boys and girls of this liberated nation. At that time, January 1957, just two of the bridge's spans were not yet completed.

Silin enthusiastically and warmly explained how Soviet engineers building the Wuhan bridge had suggested using a new method of erecting bridge supports which did not require the use of cofferdams. Western specialists considered this project unfeasible, and said it would take at least four to five years to build the bridge.

The method proposed by the Soviet engineers allowed the bridge to be completed in a very short period—a little over two years—and at considerably less cost. All in all, the Chinese saved 34 million yuan.

In the autumn of 1957, Pen Lin, the foreman of the site authority, wrote in this regard: "In laying the foundations of the Wuhan bridge, we implemented the proposals of Comrade Silin, a Soviet specialist, that the foundations be laid deep underwater not by using cofferdams, but by sinking a well, using large-diameter pipes... It is with a feeling of immense gratitude that we convey our thanks to the Soviet Union and the Soviet specialists for their sincere help."¹

The bridge which had been built was the largest not only in China, but in the East as a whole. It consisted of two tiers and was opened to traffic on October 15, 1957. The upper tier was used by cars, trolleybuses and pedestrians, and the lower tier—by trains.

¹ *Druzhba*, 1957, No. 9.

The days are short in the winter, and dusk fell quickly. Electrical lighting was switched on, and we could see the contours of the finished part of the bridge outlined by the bright light of electric lamps: they made me think of the wings of a gigantic fictional bird, covering the mighty flow of the turbulent yellow water.

In the Freedom Park in Wuhan there towers a monument to the volunteer Soviet pilots who, in those difficult days for China, came to the help of the Chinese people in their struggle against the Japanese invaders. Chinese people had remembered those who gave their lives for China's freedom. I walked up to the memorial. On the pediment of the obelisk were inscribed the names of those Soviet heroes. Flowers lay at the foot of the monument.

The historian Pen Min wrote: "At the same time as the American capitalists were supplying Japan with fuel and scrap metal, thus helping the Japanese imperialists to bomb the Chinese people, Soviet heroes in the skies above our Motherland were shedding their own precious blood for the Chinese people."¹

Memorials to Soviet fighters have also been erected on the central squares of Mukden (Shenyang), Harbin, Port Arthur (Lushun), Talien, Anshan and other cities. When I visited these cities I saw people go up to the graves, obelisks and memorials to lay wreaths and plant flowers. On Soviet holidays employees of the Soviet embassy in the PRC also used to come to these places to lay wreaths, but then (until 1983) they were forbidden from visiting these and other cities, as well as from laying wreaths at the graves

¹ Pen Min, *Istoria kitaisko-sovetskoi druzhby* (The History of Sino-Soviet Friendship), Moscow, 1959, p. 212.

of Soviet fighters who gave their lives for the cause of the Chinese people, its freedom and independence.

The following day I left Wuhan, the city of three cities. After bridges had been built across the Yangtze and the Han, one of its tributaries, the three cities of Wuchang, Hankow and Hannyang merged into the single conglomeration of Wuhan.

Through the window of the train I could see the lights of the city and the garlands of light around the Wuhan bridge. As I looked, I remembered the old Chinese legend about bridge builders. Even the legendary heroes of China, who had been created by people's imaginations, had not been able to do what ordinary Soviet and Chinese people had done. The cooperation of two great peoples had bridled nature and its spontaneous forces.

Problems of Development

Even during my time in the PRC opinions gradually began to be expressed which understated the role of the Soviet Union in the defeat of Germany and Japan, and reduced the importance for the PRC of the Soviet Union's experience of building socialism. Such opinions appeared in secret documents, at restricted meetings of active Party members, and in speeches of individual leaders of the CPC. They were not expressed directly, but in an indirect form, for example, by references to the inacceptability of "tritely studying foreign experience". The question was, in fact, one of refusing to use the USSR's experience of building socialism.

Somehow we learned in the spring of 1956 that the Peking Diplomatic Institute intended to call a meeting to be attended by Party activists.

Bo Ibo, an alternate member of the Politburo and chairman of the State Planning Commission of the PRC, was to make a speech at the meeting. Cautiously, we enquired whether we would be allowed to attend. Li Enchu, the acting director of the Institute, conferred with the speaker, and we were permitted to attend the meeting.

Bo Ibo was extremely accessible. We were introduced. He was well informed about the work of the Institute and our lectures (his son studied at the Institute). In our short discussion we exchanged opinions on current international events.

In his address, Bo Ibo made harsh attacks on the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, specifically those concerning the assessment of Stalin's activity, and on the various forms of revolutionary struggle in capitalist countries. He also spoke against the Congress's directions to expand the struggle to implement the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence.

When I told the staff at the Soviet embassy about what I had heard, they were at first doubtful and wondered whether I had understood Bo Ibo's words correctly. There was, however, no doubt. My interpreter could not make such a serious mistake. Moreover, during his speech, Bo Ibo had referred directly to me. "A Soviet adviser is sitting here," he said, "and it will be unpleasant for him to hear this, but I must say it. Let him know what people in China think about these problems."

In the summer of 1956 Yang Xiufeng, the Minister of Higher Education, invited the main advisers of Peking's educational institutions to his offices. He spoke floridly for a long time on the importance attached in China to the experience of Soviet universities and their achieve-

ments in training scientific, technical and cultural personnel. He stressed, however, that China had formed its own traditional system of education, and that, above all, it was necessary to rely on it, excluding foreign methods. It was clear that by "foreign methods" the minister meant the methods and forms of education used in Soviet universities. He reported that the oral examination system, even in the social sciences where the ability to formulate an idea, discuss it and logically develop one's thoughts and proof is of great importance, would be revoked. The ministry had decided to return to the old, pre-revolutionary examination system, which was based on written answers to questions. The system of awarding marks on a scale of 1 to 5 was also revoked, being replaced by the old system of giving marks as a percentage.

From 1956-1957, the period of "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom" campaign, the tendency to reject Soviet experience began to be felt more and more. Materials giving Chinese readers information about Soviet people were printed less and less often, and fewer Soviet films were shown. Chinese officials explained this by "new demands on counter-propaganda" in connection with "the movement to improve the organisation of work".

In August 1960 the leadership of the CPC issued an instruction to remove from sale all Soviet publications which had come out since 1957, and to stop the retail sale of Soviet newspapers and magazines.

This line towards making a break with "foreign experience" was finally completed when the PRC severed its friendly relations with most countries of the socialist community and rejected all foreign cultural heritage.

In the flood of letters we received questions

began to appear more and more often with a definite concealed meaning. These questions belittled the importance of Soviet achievements in the building of socialism, and contained doubts as to the correctness of specific foreign policy actions of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

I was shown a secondary school textbook entitled *A Brief History of Modern China*. It was released in Peking in 1954. The maps in the book showed the regions returned to Russia under the treaties of Aigun (1858), Peking (1860) and Chuguchak (1861) as being "occupied by imperialists". As we know, these lands were seized from Russia under the Nerchinsk Agreement in 1689, which Russia signed while being threatened by Ch'ing troops. Modern Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Nepal and a number of regions of India and other neighbouring countries were also shown as territories "taken from China by imperialists". The book gave the impression that all this was the reflection of a definite line in Chinese politics.

The problems of the Russian-Chinese borders also came up in the questions passed on to me. I was asked how fair the current demarcation was, how it had arisen, and whether borders which were established and agreements which were concluded in the last century could be considered fair and equal respectively.

I had to analyse the agreements which determined the existing border between the USSR and the PRC.

The very first agreement determining the Russian-Chinese border in the Far East was that concluded at Nerchinsk in 1689. Let us take a look at the conditions in which it was concluded.

At the beginning of the 17th century there were neither Chinese nor Manchurians living in

the region of the Amur, the Maritime Territory or the northern part of what is today North-East China (Manchuria). These regions were settled by local tribes such as the Nivkhi, Dauri, Evenks, Orochi and others. The population was very small. From time to time armed detachments of Manchurians also appeared, who collected tributes from the local population, which retained its independence.

The Russians began to penetrate the Amur region at the beginning and particularly in the mid-17th century. This was primarily a fugitive peasant and Cossack colonisation. At that time the Cossacks consisted of those peasants who had fled the yoke of serfdom to free lands. It was only later that representatives of the tsar appeared in the region. The Cossacks built a number of fortified stockaded villages and towns on the Amur and its tributaries, while the Russians colonised not only the left bank, but also the right bank of the Amur and the Argun, i.e. present-day Northern Manchuria. Russian explorers also penetrated the coastal regions and the lower reaches of the Amur. It was they who first introduced agricultural crops to the area.

The Manchurians conquered the Chinese Empire in the 1640s and overthrew the Ming dynasty. The Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty was established, which, having consolidated its hold in China, set about expanding its domains in the south and the north. Numerous clashes began between Russian and Manchurian-Chinese detachments in the Amur region, first on the south bank, and then on the north bank of the river. The struggle, which lasted many years, centred around the town of Albazin, which the Russians had built in the region.

In 1689 negotiations took place in Nerchinsk between F.A. Golovin, the Russian ambassador,

and representatives of the Ch'ing dynasty. The small detachment which accompanied Golovin to the talks was faced by a Manchurian-Chinese army which vastly outnumbered it. Under these conditions, Golovin signed an agreement by which Russia ceded the Amur region—territory which had already been developed by migrant Russian peasants—to China. Thus, the Nerchinsk Agreement provided for the Ch'ing Empire to occupy the Amur region.

Since imperial times Chinese historiography, and later PRC diplomacy, have qualified the Nerchinsk Agreement—a document which gave the Chinese monarchy vast stretches of land which had never belonged to it—as the only equal agreement between China and Russia. In actual fact, this agreement, which was signed by the representative of the Russian government while he was being threatened by vastly superior Manchurian-Chinese troops, was not at all equal and was thrust on Russia by force, the Ch'ing Empire taking the role of the aggressor. As before, China failed to develop the occupied territories in the economic respect, and they remained sparsely populated. By the time the territories were returned to Russia in 1858, i.e. 170 years later, no more than a few thousand Chinese were living on the left bank of the Amur. We should bear in mind that during the Nerchinsk negotiations Golovin obtained a verbal, but official, undertaking from the Chinese not to erect buildings and fortifications on the lands they were about to acquire. The Chinese government itself refused to develop the territory, and agreed that its sovereignty over it would be limited.

The present border is based on the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860). Under the Aigun Treaty, Russia acquired the left bank of the Amur,

while the right bank was retained by the Ch'ing Empire. In other words, Russia, regained only a part of what the Ch'ing dynasty has seized from it under the Nerchinsk Agreement.

Under the Peking Treaty of 1860, the coastal region between the right bank of the lower reaches of the Amur, the Ussuri, Lake Khanka and the Pacific passed to Russia. The Nerchinsk Agreement had recognised that this region would not be demarcated until a later date. The Aigun Treaty determined the region's status as being that of a temporary joint possession of Russia and China until a demarcation took place. It was under the Peking Treaty that this demarcation was carried out.

From the 17th century to the middle of the 19th century the Ch'ing Empire followed a policy of invading and capturing lands in the Far East. In the face of the threat of a Chinese invasion, many peoples preferred to join Russia, particularly the peoples of Central Asia.

Chinese historiography asserts that China has some sort of historical right to part of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. These allegations are based on the fact that the domains of the Ch'ing monarchy once extended to the regions of lakes Zaisan, Balkhash and Issyk-Kul, present-day Kokand and even further.

It was necessary for me to show my Chinese audience the real state of affairs. In the above-mentioned period the Ch'ing authorities periodically collected tributes in the regions I have been discussing. These operations, which were carried out by Ch'ing troops, were predatory raids on the lands of others. These aggressive acts on the part of the Ch'ing military, which have been remembered through the centuries, could not give rise to any Chinese rights to the territory of the peoples of Central Asia.

Moreover, those territories of the PRC which today border on Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan were included in the Ch'ing Empire as a result of its aggression and predatory acts. Thus, Dzhungaria was taken in the middle of the 18th century, the elimination of the Dzhungarian khanate being accompanied by terrible atrocities: more than a million people were exterminated—the greater part of the region's population. In these conditions the Kirghiz people and some Kazakh tribes voluntarily joined Russia.

The western regions of China—present-day Sinkiang—also passed to the Ch'ing Empire as a result of aggression. In the second half of the 19th century this region was the scene of numerous uprisings of the local peoples, who protested against Manchurian domination and the oppression and robbery that accompanied it. One such uprising, which occurred in Kashgaria under the leadership of Yakub-bek, became widely known. It was put down by the Ch'ing government not without an assistance from Russian tsarism. In 1881 the Petersburg Agreement was concluded between the Russian and Ch'ing governments, and it is on this document that the present-day border is based from the point where the borders of the USSR, the Mongolian People's Republic and the PRC meet as far as the Pamirs.

The Soviet government rejected all unfair and unequal agreements concluded by the tsarist government and the Provisional Government. Closing the discussion on peace at the 2nd All-Russia Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1917, Lenin said, with regard to these old treaties, that in these documents "There are various clauses... The predatory governments ... not only made agreements between themselves on plunder, but among them they also included economic

agreements and various other clauses on good-neighbourly relations... We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these."¹ Lenin was thus opposed to the indiscriminate rejection of all the agreements concluded by the tsarist government.

An address of the Council of People's Commissars to the Chinese people which was published on July 25, 1919 said that the Soviet government rejected the seizure of foreign lands. The address also listed the Russian-Chinese agreements that the Soviet government proposed to abrogate: the 1896 Treaty, the 1901 Protocol, and all Russia's agreements with Japan from 1907 to 1916 which concerned China.² These agreements mainly concerned the positions and privileges of the tsarist government in Manchuria, the northern part of which constituted a sphere of Russian influence. Apart from that, the matter was also one of the Boxer indemnity. The declaration also contained a rejection of all rights of extraterritoriality resulting from the regime of capitulations. The address, however, did not name a single border agreement.

On December 16, 1949 Mao Tse-tung said in Moscow: "After the October Socialist Revolution the Soviet government... was the first to abrogate the unequal agreements with China which had existed while the tsar was in power."³

Later, in 1964, the government of the PRC raised doubts about Soviet ownership of more

¹ V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 255.

² See: *Soviet Foreign Policy Documents*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 221-223.

³ *Pravda*, July 17, 1949.

than 1 million square kilometres of territory. It called the existing border agreements unequal, and insisted on the so-called "disputed areas" on the territory of the USSR along the border being recognised. These claims were naturally rejected by the Soviet side.

* * *

One day I was informed that the deputy head of the propaganda department of the CPC had delivered a report to propaganda workers in which he had declared that the rate at which socialism was being built in the USSR was not to China's liking. He had come to the following conclusion: China was not going to follow the example of the Soviet Union. It would build socialism and industrialise the country by making a great leap forward. China, he said, had every opportunity to fulfill the main provisions of the plan to develop agriculture between 1956 and 1967 not in 12 years, but in something between 5 and 8. It is not possible to act slowly. Chairman Mao gave theoretical proof that balanced development does not constitute a regularity of socialism. Patterned development and an equilibrium—these are temporary phenomena. The absence of an equilibrium is permanent condition, thanks to which advancement takes place. Later, speaking at the Supreme State Conference on January 28, 1958, Mao called for a technological revolution to be carried out. Our nation is like an atom, he said. You only have to break the nucleus of our nation to release the energy... We will overtake Britain in 15 years.

The task was set of changing the face of the country in the space of three years by carrying out "major construction work" on the land. This work mainly took the form of irrigation

channels which were dug by the peasants. Without an economic or technological base, and without a sufficient number of trained specialists, the Chinese leaders considered it possible unprecedentedly to speed up the rates of construction by relying only on the enormous number of working hands and the enthusiasm of the people. The "willpower" alone was to serve as a lever with which to raise the level of production on massive scales in the shortest time possible so as to go over to "a communist mode of production". These adventurous aims of Mao's were based on libertarian deductions.

The plan for socialist transformations in the country had originally been calculated to last for a fairly long time—more than 15 years. In 1955, however, the Chinese had already begun talking about the need "to complete transformation ahead of time".

Many aspects of the overall plan began to be implemented more quickly, at rates which did not correspond to the changes in the productive forces. On the whole, the individual domestic industry was completely organised along cooperative lines at accelerated rates in 1956.

Thousands of primitive blast furnaces and steel furnaces were built, and every establishment from institutions of higher education to ministries and communes was involved in the smelting of metal. At the time, Bo Ibo declared: "The mass movement to develop the metallurgical industry through the efforts of the people has completely destroyed the mystical opinions about industry. It is possible to smelt high-quality steel and pig iron without engineers or specialists."¹

¹ In: *Sudba kultury v KNR 1949-1974* (The Fate of Culture in the PRC 1949-1974), Moscow, 1978, p. 98.

In 1958 I received a letter from some employees of the Diplomatic Institute. Talking about their lives, they wrote: "We are still earnestly studying international relations, but we are smelting steel at the same time." We know how this venture ended. Millions of tons of ore, coal and fuel were used to no purpose, and production fell into disarray. More than 15 million tons of steel and pig iron was smelted in this primitive fashion, and none of it was ever any good.

The primitive furnaces had to be closed down. The pig iron blocks were thrown onto waste land to rust, only a few of them being sent for resmelting. The "Great Leap" caused enormous losses in the country's agriculture, too, because the peasant masses had been torn away from food production for a senseless exercise in steel smelting. This, of course, had its effect on the harvest.

**"Let Flowers of Many Kinds
Blossom, Diverse Schools
of Thought Contend"**

At the end of 1956 and in the spring of 1957 we were witnesses to a campaign conducted under this slogan. My own observations, conversations with Chinese intellectuals, and a knowledge of the available literature provide reasons for pointing out certain specific characteristics of this political course. Like many others, this campaign was one of the constituent parts of a "special" line in the field of culture. Those who initiated such campaigns believed that calls for a "spasmodic" awakening of the intelligentsia's activity should not only facilitate an improvement in science and culture, but should also

bring to light the opponents of the existing régime and further their subsequent defeat.

The "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom" course was also designed to show the world the "democratism" as an example of a "new approach" to culture, and to surpass the Soviet Union in this respect. At a meeting of leading figures in science and culture in May 1956, Lu Dingyi, the head of the propaganda department of the CPC Central Committee, declared that "it is essential not only to consolidate people's power, develop the economy and education, and strengthen state defence, but also to ensure the rapid development of literature, art and science... Everyone, so long as he is not a counter-revolutionary, is free, irrespective of whether he espouses materialism or idealism".

The bourgeoisie, which possessed political rights, continued to exist in China, while the relatively small size of the proletariat and the predominance of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in the population prepared extremely favourable ground for bourgeois idealistic conceptions to arise and flourish.

At first this course concerned only literary and artistic activity, education and science, which led to a certain enlivenment in literature and art, the way for which was paved by the development of the socialist culture emerging in the country. More literature was published, old writers who wrote in the national "gohua" style took up their pens once more, the theatrical repertoire was expanded, modern music was to be heard, and the previously forbidden subjects of human relations, love and so on were revived. Steps began to be taken to improve the living conditions of people working in education, science and culture, and the number of unemployed intellectuals began to decrease. At the

same time, however, confusion quickly began to make itself felt because of the calls to "let flowers of many kinds blossom" in the field of ideology and to "let diverse schools of thought contend" in the field of philosophy and other social sciences.

The "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom" course, which was originally declared to be a policy aimed at helping literature and art to flourish, began to spread to all spheres of ideology and politics. This was hastened by a new campaign, announced in February 1957, to "order the style of work". This campaign was to cover not only members of the Party, as was the case with a similar campaign in 1942, but also all strata of the population, including the bourgeoisie.

At the All-China Conference of the CPC on Propaganda Work, Mao Tse-tung declared that the Party's Central Committee believed: "We must not 'roll up', we can only 'unroll'... 'unroll' means giving people the opportunity freely to express themselves... not to be afraid of making wrong judgements, not to be afraid of anything poisonous... there is no need to be afraid of 'unrolling', there is no need to be afraid of criticism, and there is no need to be afraid of 'poisonous grasses.'"¹.

Students were also drawn into the campaign. The organisers of the campaign indicated that participation in the "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom" course was meant to develop in students an ability to distinguish between mistaken and correct theories. It was to these ends that the authorities even permitted courses

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *On the Correct Solution to the Contradictions Amongst the People. Speech at the All-China Conference of the CPC on Questions of Propaganda Work.* Peking, 1958, pp. 272-273, 276.

in idealist philosophy to be offered, provided the appropriate teachers were available and the full text of the lectures was provided.

Classes were discontinued at educational establishments, including the Diplomatic Institute, Peking University and the Polytechnic Institute. Neither were other establishments working, and students and professors, employees and actors, scientists and workers all held mass meetings.

Speeches criticising any leading state and Party workers (with the exception of Mao Tse-tung), ministries, government departments, the political and social system, ideology and culture were not only permitted, they were even encouraged. The walls of the Institute were plastered with "*dazibao*" and leaflets criticising Party officials and statesmen, the political system, and so on. In some places anti-Soviet slogans were to be seen. Yang Xiufeng, the minister of higher education, once paid a visit to the Diplomatic Institute. When he came out of the building and headed for his car, he did not recognise it, because all the windows, the doors and the roof were covered with leaflets which called him a counter-revolutionary, a bureaucrat and an idler, and which criticised the examinations system and the curricula at the Institute.

We once paid a visit to Peking University. A platform with a microphone had been erected on a lawn in the centre of the large courtyard. Every student, professor or teacher could make any speech he liked from this platform, advance any theory, or criticise anyone except Chairman Mao.

As the Chinese explained to me, speeches delivered by some students were full of curiosities. Thus, one of the speakers declared that,

having studied world history from start to finish, he had come to the conclusion that there were, indeed, only three outstanding theoreticians in the world: Confucius, Marx and ... himself.

There were also much more serious "curiosities". Several professors, for example, made speeches from openly bourgeois and revisionist positions, alleging that Marxism-Leninism was inapplicable to China, that Marx was outdated, and that a new, "refined" and "renovated" theory was needed. The foundations of socialism and the role of the working class in socialist construction and the class struggle were subjected to criticism, while the need was stressed for a special path for China. Territorial claims on the USSR were also made from this platform.

On June 14, 1956 the newspaper *Nanfang ribao* carried an article entitled "The Correct Attitude to Research in the Natural Sciences". The article itself dealt with far more than just the natural sciences. The author tried to raise doubts about the correctness of using the experience of the Soviet Union, and about the value of Soviet scientific books and textbooks. He essentially reduced the flair of students for thinking independently to an ability to treat everything Soviet particularly critically. One of the spring issues of the newspaper *Guangmin ribao* in 1957 carried notices containing openly anti-Soviet attacks, while materials also appeared which asserted that the Soviet government was continuing the aggressive policy of tsarist Russia against China. Articles such as these neither received the relevant political evaluation, nor were they rebuffed.

The leaders of Party organisations encouraged and even provoked non-Party members and "suspicious elements" into making speeches. At the end of May I met Li Enchu, the deputy

director of the Institute and secretary of the Party Committee. He looked worried.

When I asked what had happened, he replied: "There was a meeting of the Party City Committee today. They aren't very satisfied with how the campaign is going in our Institute. About ten people who we believe adhere to right-wing deviationist positions did not speak, just remained silent."

Most of the employees and teachers at the Institute took part in the long meetings which ended way past midnight every day. Lectures were cancelled, as were the regular weekly meetings of the board which discussed the problems of organising work at the Institute, the curricula, and so on. Everyone wrote a long autobiography about his life and activity.

I was later told that Professor Wang held out longer than any of the others. No matter how much they called on him to take part in the discussion, he preferred to remain silent. In the end, when the campaign had drawn most intellectuals and students into the discussion, it became impossible not to speak. In his speech, which was of an openly pro-Western nature, he criticised the people's democratic revolution, the role of the Party, and the domestic and foreign policy of the government of the PRC. The professor called on the Peking leaders to alter their foreign policy orientation, and to take a course towards rapprochement with the USA and other Western powers.

At the time it was too early for such a step to be taken, and the leaders of the PRC spoke of "great and inviolable friendship with the USSR" and "fraternity with the Soviet people", etc. Soon afterwards, however, the Chinese government deliberately aggravated the situation in the Taiwan Strait without consulting the

USSR or other socialist countries. The Chinese wanted to give the impression that they wanted to liberate the Jinmen and Mazu islands, which were under Taiwanese control. In response the Americans sent the ships of their 7th Fleet to the Strait, and a serious military conflict became imminent. Newspapers wrote about Chinese plans to liberate Taiwan, and the Americans, referring to their 1954 mutual defence agreement with the Chiang Kai-shekists, threatened military intervention.

In September 1958 the Soviet Union gave the Americans a firm warning that it would fulfil its obligations to China under its agreement on friendship and mutual assistance with that country. This cooled the Americans' bellicosity somewhat, and forced them to reject an escalation of the conflict. Understandably, in conditions such as these, pro-American declarations were considered out of place.

Professor Wang and a number of other teachers were later classified as "rightists", and were sent from Peking to a rural commune to undergo re-education.

We Soviet specialists were troubled by the wide range of anti-socialist speeches. The recent events in Hungary were still fresh in everyone's memory, where similar anti-socialist speeches backed up by external imperialist forces had led to a counter-revolutionary revolt which had placed the socialist achievements of the Hungarian people under threat.

In May 1957 a meeting took place between a group of Soviet specialists and Chou En-lai. I myself had to meet the Chinese premier on several previous occasions. In 1957 he was nearly 60, yet had a thin, young-looking face and walked quickly and energetically. The son of a landowner, he had studied in Europe and

had a good knowledge of French and English.

We had first made the acquaintance of each other at a reception. Chou En-lai and his retinue had been circulating around all the small tables greeting their guests. I was introduced by Zhang Wentian, and the premier asked me in English what my impressions were of the work of the Diplomatic Institute and the possible training periods for young diplomats and teachers of international relations.

I replied that those who attended my lectures came from a hard-working, diligent people, but that they did not have an adequate cultural background or enough knowledge of universal history and literature. I also pointed out that we did not have the relevant textbooks, and so on.

"Well, you write us a textbook then," Chou had said.

"I'll try," I replied.

I kept my promise, and in 1958 Renmin ribao Publishers put out my book *A Modern History of International Relations (1918-1945)*, which was later used as a textbook in Vietnam and other countries adjacent to China. My lectures on the history of international relations from 1918 to 1956 were also published for Party, state and military activists.

A few days later the deputy minister of foreign affairs gave a lunch in honour of the advisers at the Peking Diplomatic Institute. I was told that this had been done on the orders of Chou En-lai. At table our hosts openly expressed their own thoughts and ideas concerning the international situation.

I subsequently met Chou En-lai many times at various banquets and receptions. The premier was always willing to dance and joke. He was often to be seen at performances of the Chinese

opera, and at concerts given by foreign artists. And he always took an interest in how things were going at the Diplomatic Institute.

The meeting between Chou and the Soviet specialists began with a photographic session. When this was over Chou made a long speech in which he spoke highly of the work performed by the Soviet specialists, stressing that, without the help of the Soviet people, China could not develop at the rate it was and would not be able to master the advanced experience of science, technology and culture so quickly. "Without Soviet help," he said, "we would have needed two to three times as long to reach the level which we have now achieved."

When we expressed our concern at the "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom" campaign which was under way, Chou declared: "What happened in Hungary is impossible here. After the war counter-revolutionary personnel were retained in Hungary, and so were their social underpinnings—the landowners, the bourgeoisie, and the capitalists, and we shot 900,000 exploiters. Here in China actions by counter-revolutionaries are ruled out."

Chou also spoke on the idea of holding the campaign in the first place: "We shall know," he said, "who thinks what. That is useful."

Right-wingers in the democratic parties in the government made use of the situation which took shape in the hope that their actions would be supported by most unbalanced, petty-bourgeois students. They also hoped to win over some intellectuals who were dissatisfied with government's policies.

The rise in the number of utterances by right-wingers came at the end of May and the beginning of June 1957, critical speeches being widely published in the press. Newspapers, in particular

Wenhui Bao and *Guangmin ribao*, carried articles with attacks on Party committees at institutions of higher education, and demanded that the Party renounce its guidance of educational establishments. Disturbances were also incited at Peking University, and the student "*dazibao*" criticised the domestic and foreign policy of the CPC, socialist culture and Marxism. There was also unrest in Tientsin, Nanking, and Shanghai, as well as amongst the peasantry.

On June 2, 1957 *Guangmin ribao* carried material criticising Mao Tse-tung himself! On June 8 *Renmin ribao* published an article calling for a struggle with the right-wingers. On June 19 Mao Tse-tung's speech "On the Correct Solution to the Contradictions Amongst the People", which he delivered at the February conference of the CPC, was published with additions setting out which "flowers" were to be given the chance to "blossom", and which were to be considered "poisonous grasses", and therefore had no right to "bloom".

There then began a savage "weeding out" of all "poisonous grasses". The main target of the new campaign were not genuinely bourgeois, right-wing elements, but Party and non-Party members who worked in science and culture. In all, around 300,000 "right-wingers" came to light in all spheres of public life. Some time later as I was told, the "right-wingers" were sorted into groups according to how "dangerous" they were! Some—the "most malicious"—were repressed (imprisoned, exiled, etc.), others were sent to "people's communes" in the countryside to be re-educated, and still others were sacked from their jobs, demoted, and so on.

The last time I saw Chou En-lai was in Moscow in 1964, at a reception given in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in honour of the anniver-

sary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. That day Chou was extremely sombre.

The conditions he had brought with him from Peking for Party ties to be restored between the CPC and the CPSU had been rejected by the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Chinese had advanced categorical demands, and had tried to interfere in the internal affairs of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

The American ambassador to Moscow, who was standing next to the Chinese leader, proposed a toast to the development of peaceful relations amongst all countries and peoples. The Soviet statesmen raised their glasses, but Chou En-lai demonstratively turned away and placed his glass on the small table next to him.

The years passed, and the Reagan Administration, which took office in 1981, announced its decision to remove China from its list of "unfriendly communist countries" and include it in the category of "friendly developing states". This step is not only allowing China to acquire military equipment and technology in the USA which cannot be exported to "unfriendly countries" because of special restrictions, but is also giving it access to preferential credit. In China it is expected that the acquisition of advanced American technology will help implement the "four modernisations" programme and overcome difficulties caused by the shortage of hard currency. American politicians think that by giving arms to the People's Republic of China they will get the opportunity of influencing Peking's policies and using them to further their own global strategy, which is aimed at achieving military superiority over the socialist countries, and domination over the world,

A Contribution to Friendship

At the end of June 1957 I was due to leave for the USSR together with several Soviet specialists. In this connection the board of the Institute decided to hold several meetings to sum up the results of the work which had been done in the two years since the Institute had been founded and the Soviet specialists had arrived.

At the closing meeting, which was held on June 6, 1957, Li Enchu made a report together with heads of department. In this report he summed up some of the results of the work of the chief adviser and his colleagues.

He pointed out the great importance of the meetings on the premises of the board of directors in which the chief adviser had taken part, where administrative, organisational, ideological and educational problems had all been discussed, as had questions of the Institute's social life. He emphasised that the minutes of the meetings had remained, and that the recommendations which had not yet been carried out would subsequently be implemented.

Li Enchu also pointed out that the chief adviser "has actively helped us, particularly in the history of international relations department, at Peking University, at the People's University, at the International Research Institute, and at the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society".

In order to enrich his lectures with new research material, the chief adviser had systematically familiarised himself with Chinese and Japanese materials, the archives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the daily press and periodicals. He had also given a great deal of all-round help in the organisation of scientific work, the study process, and political and educational work. "A firm revolutionary friendship based

on proletarian internationalism has been established between ourselves and the Soviet specialists who arrived in 1955," Li Enchu said. "We are very satisfied with the work of Kutakov and all the specialists who came with him." This point of view was also held by He, another deputy director.

Summing up the results, Li Enchu said that the specialists had behaved correctly. They had proposed taking these or those measures, while leaving it to their Chinese colleagues to decide how and when; they had never insisted or demanded that their advice be followed. It was in this that genuine internationalism made itself felt.

My colleagues and I were awarded the Sino-Soviet Friendship medal on behalf of Chou En-lai, the premier of the State Council of the PRC. The certificate which accompanied the medals said: "As a token of gratitude for your selfless and enthusiastic help for the cause of socialist construction in our country." I was then handed an official letter of farewell signed by the directors of the Institute. In particular, this letter said: "You came to us when our Institute had only just been founded. We had no experience of organising such an institute, but thanks to your all-round help the work of our Institute as regards administration and the organisation of studies, research and political and ideological education has acquired a firm base. This cannot be separated from your diligent work. You are one of the founders of our Institute." The letter also referred to my work outside the Institute, which included reading lectures and reports, publishing articles in magazines, and conducting "enthusiastic propaganda of the great Sino-Soviet friendship". In conclusion the letter contained the following pledge: "In re-

sponse to the help you have given our Institute, we must continue to work better, and to further strengthen Sino-Soviet friendship." I was handed many friendly letters by other instructors, employees and professors at the Institute, one of which said: "Remember this world for ever, remember your comrades, friends and students in China."

The farewell supper was organised in the Summer Palace. The food was both refined and appetising, and as a sign of great respect, no less than 25 different dishes were brought to the table during the course of the supper. We were also introduced to the chef, an old but energetic and cheerful man who had worked at the Palace since the times of Empress Tz'u-hsi.

We were escorted to the station by all the directors, all the members of the Party Committee, and all the teachers and postgraduates. At the station loudspeakers broadcast the songs "Moscow-Peking" and "The East Has Reddened, Mao Tse-tung Is Born".

However, the plans and hopes of the teachers and directors for the further development of the Institute and an increase in the general level of education were wrecked. In 1958 the whole country began to suffer as a result of Mao Tse-tung's libertarian idea of catching up with and overtaking the advanced capitalist countries in terms of production in the space of just a few years. This was the "Great Leap Forward".

The country had not yet recovered from this shock when the Cultural Revolution was started in 1966. As the Chinese themselves now admit, the Cultural Revolution caused a great deal of harm to the development of the country's economy, science and technology. As far as the development of science and education was con-

cerned, China was thrown backwards by 10 to 20 years. Educational premises were occupied by the outrageous Hungweipings (Red Guards), libraries and museums were ransacked, and historical memorials and many works of art were destroyed. Buildings were occupied for use by revolutionary committees, as headquarters for the Hungweipings, and as military units. According to official Chinese statistics, 17.6 million square metres of floor space were illegally occupied. In August 1978 the State Council and the CPC Central Committee adopted a decision according to which all unofficially occupied buildings which were essential for the education system were to be returned within a year. As a result, however, from 1979-80, Party, state and military bodies returned just 2.8 million square metres of floor space out of the 17.6 million which were illegally occupied.

As colleagues who returned from China later than myself explained to me, the Diplomatic Institute practically ceased working during the Cultural Revolution. The new director, who was appointed in 1959, had been repressed, as had many of the professors and teachers. Many people on the staff of the Chinese Foreign Ministry who had attended courses at the Institute had also been subjected to persecution. As I have said earlier in this book, all China's ambassadors were recalled during this period, with the exception of Huang Hua, Chou En-lai's assistant. As U Thant told me, Huang Hua had asserted in a conversation in 1971 that the Peking government believed it would succeed in having its rights in the UN restored in 1972. Basing itself on this assumption, the Institute had once again begun training diplomatic personnel in 1970, while the Foreign Languages Institute, which prepared translators to work in interna-

tional organisations, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Hsinhua Agency and other foreign policy institutions, had also resumed their work. The director of the Diplomatic Institute had been in disgrace for almost six years, and had been in re-education camps, and so on. After the defeat of the "Gang of Four" he once again headed the Institute, and began to restore what was left of it.

On the basis of the scrappy evidence published in the Chinese press it is possible to imagine the decline in which education found itself in China as a result of the Cultural Revolution. According to evidence published in the *Christian Science Monitor* on November 4, 1980, nine people out of every 10,000 in China were studying at that time. For comparison, this figure was five times higher in India, and twenty times higher in the USSR. China holds 113th place amongst the 141 countries of the world in terms of development, and even according to the most restrained estimates there are around 150 million totally illiterate people in the PRC. At least a further 300 million can be included in the uneducated category.

In China, a considerable part of the illiterate group is formed by young people. The authorities cite the Cultural Revolution as the reason for this, saying that the number of illiterate young people has grown in the last ten years as a direct result of it. Per head of population, China spends 200 times less on education than Japan.

Even the Chinese leaders themselves talk about this. Speaking in January 1980, Deng Xiaoping, deputy premier of the State Council of the PRC, declared: "There are less than one million pupils at our schools, and the number of people studying at our universities is even more insignificant... The Indians have spent more on

education than we have, and a country such as Egypt spends many times more on education per head of population than we do."

The Chinatowns of San Francisco and New York

While I was at Berkeley in 1967 I met the famous American sinologist, Professor Chalmers Johnson, a young and energetic scientist who had written a number of interesting books on Japan and China. One of these books dealt with the activity of the group led by Richard Sorge, a Soviet intelligence agent in Japan before and during the Second World War.

While we were talking in Johnson's office, the telephone rang. He picked up the receiver, listened, and then replied:

"Yes, of course I will."

Then, looking at me, he said:

"I have a Soviet scientist and diplomat sitting in my office. Maybe it's worth asking him to take part in our programme? The Soviets don't come to San Francisco every day."

He turned to me and said:

"I was talking with the leading correspondent of our television service. I think it would be interesting for you to take part in our weekly encounter. It's a round-table discussion in which the city's leading correspondents and specialists on international affairs take part. I am going to comment on the events in China and East Asia. We have several Chinese scientists at the university," he laughed. "There's the mathematics professor Chen Shengshen, the physics professor Shen Yuanxiang, the dean of the mechanical engineering department Tian Zhanglin, and 17 others. They can't, however, comment objectively on the events in China. Some of

them hold an openly pro-Taiwanese position and consequently give too sombre an evaluation of events on the mainland. Others have sympathies for Peking, but refuse to express their opinion in public. A third group recognises neither the Taiwanese nor the Peking regime. They are in favour of a free Taiwan independent of China. So, I am the one who has to speak...

"It will be interesting for you to see how we do this," he continued, "and you can express your own opinion. That will be interesting for our viewers. You will be the first Soviet scientist to appear on our television screens."

We quickly covered the distance from Berkeley to San Francisco—some 40 kilometres or so. Of these 40 kilometres, about 18 were along the top of the dam separating the bay from the city. On the way, the professor drove me through Chinatown—several districts which are populated mainly by Chinese. In the words of the professor, there were around 60,000 Chinese in San Francisco, while there were approximately 200,000 in the USA as a whole. San Francisco and the West coast of the United States, which faces the Pacific and Asia, are the main focus for ethnic Chinese. A new immigration law passed in the USA in 1965 allowed the Chinese rapidly to increase the size of their colony, and it is difficult to say exactly how large the Chinese population now is.

I want to point out that in 1970 the Chinese ethnic minority already consisted of 435,000 people. The rapprochement between the USA and China which began in 1972 considerably increased the flow of people emigrating from the PRC to the USA. According to United Press International, there were more than 860,000 Chinese in the USA in 1973, while Walter Mondale, the Vice-President of the USA, referred

to the presence in America of more than two million American citizens of Chinese origin during his visit to Peking in August 1979.

According to official figures, by 1980 the Chinese colony in the area of San Francisco Bay consisted of more than 120,000 people, around 80,000 of whom lived in San Francisco itself. However, the Chinese newspaper *East-West*, which is published in San Francisco, believes that this figure is considerably higher, because a considerable number of the 10-15 thousand tourists who visit the USA each month from the PRC use illegal channels to settle in the local Chinatowns with relatives or near relations.

At the same time as growing in number, the Chinese community increased its influence on the formation of American-Chinese relations. Questions of an America-Chinese rapprochement were widely aired by all the Californian mass media, including the radio and television. This represented maximal efforts on the part of the media to convince the various strata of the population of the need for relations with the PRC to be developed. The Chinese lobby (which was pro-Kuomintang until the beginning of the 1970s) used its business ties to step up American-Chinese contacts, thus allowing Peking's influence to penetrate the West coast of the USA.

In San Francisco, Chinatown differs sharply from the rest of the city. When you drive into it, you are immediately struck by the many shops with the inevitable figures of buddhas, dragons, ritual animals, heroes of Chinese legends and classical plays, lacquered crockery and boxes, Chinese silk with embroidered birds, animals and dragons, and Chinese lanterns hanging down from the cornices of the shops, restaurants and eating houses like concertinas. The restaurants and eating houses entice customers

with long advertising posters written from top to bottom in large red Chinese characters, and the bright neon advertisements of travel companies encourage people to visit Taiwan and the PRC. Tourists from various countries huddle in groups around the windows of the shops, while in the eating houses the expert cooks prepare various Chinese dishes in front of their customers. Through the windows of the restaurants it is possible to see people deftly handling chopsticks to partake of Chinese national cuisine, although Europeans and Americans prefer the forks and knives.

While he was talking about the Chinese community, the professor pointed out that the newspaper *East-West*—the mouthpiece of the local Chinese—came out every day in San Francisco. The most important reports were published in two languages—English and Chinese. The newspaper took a pro-Taiwanese stance, as, incidentally, did most of the ethnic Chinese. Because of historical factors, the Chinese community has extremely close economic and political ties with Taiwan, and only a very small part of the community supports Peking. After Nixon and Ford made their visits to Peking, however (in 1972 and 1974 respectively), the situation gradually began to change, and the pro-Peking elements grew stronger.

Alongside the pro-Taiwanese and the pro-Peking trends, the professor noted, a movement was also rapidly developing amongst American Chinese for greater participation in the life of the American society. Those who support this trend link their future with neither China nor Taiwan. A movement is also growing in the USA of people who favour independence for Taiwan and are hostile to the present regimes of both the PRC and Taiwan itself.

In reply to my question, the professor remarked:

"We get Chinese newspapers and magazines the day after they come out in Peking. The mail is brought by KLM airlines via Hong Kong. We also have a different source of information—Chinese radio. There is good reception all along the coast, and Peking broadcasts to the USA for 12 to 14 hours a day. That's why a review of events in China is an obligatory part of our weekly on-screen meetings."

Half an hour later we were in the studio. Those taking part in the programme were already assembled.

The host of the programme came over to me and said:

"First we'll give a review of events in different countries, and then the other participants will be interested to hear your opinion on various problems."

A miniature microphone was attached to my shirt front, and, since the programme was in colour, my face was powdered. I have to admit, I was anxious: it is not easy to answer questions straight off in a foreign language without any preparation. You might not catch the hidden meaning in a question, or you might not set out your own opinion sufficiently clearly. Unscrupulous journalists always seize on this.

One after the other the commentators gave their short pieces of information on subjects such as the war in Vietnam, events in France and Italy, and the situation in China. I tried to keep up with the speakers, and carefully listened to what my colleagues were saying. Then the host introduced me to the viewers, and I began to be asked questions. Most of them concerned Soviet-Chinese relations and the Cultural Revolution in China.

My comment that the so-called Cultural Revolution had nothing to do with culture pleased my colleagues. I spoke about the essence of the cultural revolution in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and the 1930s. Answering a question about Soviet-Chinese relations, I set out the principled line of the USSR in detail, explaining the readiness of the Soviet government to normalise relations with China and develop friendly ties.

Professor Chalmers accompanied me again the following day, and suggested we have a look at some shops dealing in Chinese literature.

"There are plenty of them in the city," he said.

We dropped into one of them. On the counters there were fresh newspapers and magazines from Peking and books in both Chinese and English. The well-illustrated magazine *China Reconstruction* was on sale, as were *People's China* and other magazines. Apart from that the shop was selling a small red book containing the sayings of Mao Tse-tung in English with a foreword by Lin Biao, and albums containing reproductions of works by Chinese artists and photographs of historical monuments. There were quite a lot of people in the shop, and we could see that the reports in the newspapers about the Cultural Revolution and the Hungweipings making havoc of Party committees and government institutions were causing great interest amongst young people. They wanted to know what the Cultural Revolution was and why young people were playing such a large part in it. Like their counterparts in many other regions of the USA, the young people of California marched in the front ranks of various anti-government demonstrations many times in those years: they marched against the war in Vietnam, in favour of a ban on atom-

ic weapons, against the American invasion of Cambodia in 1970, and so on.

There is also a Chinatown in New York. It is a forsaken district in the lower part of Manhattan—Downtown. This is also where to find Wall Street, which is short and gloomy and lined with massive buildings belonging to banks and corporations.

It takes a while to find Chinatown, but as soon as you cross into it you are struck by the Chinese signs, the paper lanterns, the garland-decorated streets, the roots and vegetables which are on sale in the shops and yet are unknown to Americans, and the unusual but very tasty food in the Chinese restaurants which have spread their tentacles all over the city. When I was in New York there were over a thousand Chinese restaurants of all sizes in the city.

The restaurant business enjoyed great popularity amongst the Chinese who had links with Taiwan, both big businessmen and ordinary residents of Chinatown alike. Even Chinese diplomats were not fastidious about it. Unsure of the stability of their position, the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek at the UN and attached to the US Administration kept restaurants as islets of hope. One of the best Chinese restaurants in New York, which was on Lexington Avenue, belonged to Ambassador Liu, the Taiwanese representative at the UN. When it was Liu's turn to be chairman of the Security Council, the traditional lunch which every chairman gave in honour of the UN Secretary-General and the members of the Security Council (to which the upper echelon of the Secretariat, which was responsible for the Council's work, was also invited) was the most original and appetising. There is no need to say that it was held in the Gold Dragon on Lexington Avenue.

The menu for the lunch included an innumerable number of the most refined Chinese dishes.

After the PRC was admitted to the UN in 1971 and the change came about in American-Chinese relations, a Chinese boom began in New York. Chinese began to appear in great numbers not only in Chinatown, but also in other famous and large districts of the city, such as Queens (Jamaica). The representation of the PRC at the UN based itself in the centre of the city, on the fashionable Park Avenue, Chinese began to be seen in the offices of banks and corporations, and the flow of immigrants from the PRC increased, while the Chinese propaganda machine began to operate to full capacity. I once asked Doak Barnett, a famous American sinologist:

"How many firms and enterprises belong to people of Chinese origin?"

The answer was impressive:

"Thirteen thousand firms and enterprises with an annual income of \$1.2 thousand million," he said. "Before the 1970s the Chinese were involved mainly in the servicing sphere and light industry, but since then the upper strata of the bourgeoisie has rapidly emerged amongst them. These people work in finance and promising industries such as instrument making, electronics, and heavy machine building. This allows Peking to make broader use of the opportunities of the Chinese community to solve the economic and scientific-technical problems of the PRC at the same time as developing inter-state scientific-technical ties."

American businessmen of Chinese origin had done a lot to develop trade and economic ties with China even before diplomatic relations were established. Until 1977 this activity was mainly carried out through the National Council for

Assisting American-Chinese Trade (NCAACT). Of the 400 or so American firms which were members of this Council, more than 100 belonged to people of Chinese nationality who held leading posts in it.¹ In 1977 the Chinese Trade Chamber was established in New York. At first it united around 80 companies belonging to people of Chinese origin, but by 1979 it was already bringing together over 100 companies.

In the middle of 1979 the United Chinese Trade Chamber was established in San Francisco, which consolidated the pro-Peking forces in America's Chinese trade and industrial circles. This Chamber had branches in all major American cities with a Chinese population, but most Chinese businessmen in the USA were oriented towards the markets of Taiwan, Hong Kong and South-East Asia in their foreign trade activity, a trend which did not change radically when diplomatic relations were established between Washington and Peking in 1979. This can be explained by the fact that traditions had been established, and that these economic ties were of a more developed and profitable nature.

While I was working in New York I had occasion to visit several major American universities (Columbia, Harvard, San Francisco) and colleges. In practically every one of these institutions I met scientists of Chinese origin. According to statistics provided by the National Scientific Council of the USA, in the middle of the 1970s 6.5 per cent of all people with university and college degrees in the country were immigrants from Asia, while 55.1 per cent of

¹ The organisation's board of directors, which was established in 1973, included such leading representatives of American business as David Rockefeller, T. Wilson, the head of Boeing Corporation, Alden W. Clausen, the president of the Bank of America, and others.

American teachers of Asian origin were Chinese. According to figures obtained from the national census, there were 48,000 specialists of Chinese origin with higher qualifications in the USA in 1970. The number of Chinese specialists with higher qualifications continues to grow from year to year.

The Chinese community in the USA, unlike that in any other country, has a unique potential, in quantitative and qualitative terms, in the form of highly-qualified scientists and engineers who have practical experience of work in the advanced areas of American science and technology.

As a result of the Cultural Revolution China was thrown backwards by 10 to 20 years in the field of scientific research, and in connection with this the Chinese leadership set the task of speeding up the development of science and technology, including in those areas which were directly linked to the satisfaction of China's military needs, by making use, in particular, of American scientific information and technology.

One of the ways of obtaining such information was officially to develop inter-state scientific and technical ties. Peking also tried to awaken a different, no less important source of information—American scientists of Chinese origin.

In the 1950s around 100 American scientists of Chinese origin returned to China and, as I have already said, became leading specialists in the Chinese nuclear missile industry. Peking's opportunities for using American scientists in its own interests grew immeasurably after diplomatic relations were normalised between the USA and the PRC and the relevant agreements on scientific and technical cooperation were concluded.

For the PRC the Chinese ethnic minority in

the USA is also an important source of foreign currency (in the form of financial donations, remittances to relatives in the PRC, and so on). According to American sinologists such as Chalmers Johnson, Robert Scalapino, Doak Barnett and others, in the 1950s the volume of remittances sent to relatives in the PRC by immigrants to the USA reached \$150 million a year. In the 1960s this figure was, on average, \$80 million a year. The persecution of people who had relatives abroad during the Cultural Revolution led to a fall in the volume of remittances to just \$20 million a year. In the 1970s the volume of remittances grew again, and Hong Kong specialists estimate that it reached \$150-200 million a year.

In 1978 Peking's total income from exploiting its links with foreign Chinese (including their capital investments in the Chinese economy) amounted to \$400 million. Peking then set itself the goal of increasing the volume of hard currency receipts from foreign Chinese to \$1,000 million a year in the near future.

Another important channel for getting foreign currency from Chinese emigrants living abroad, particularly in the USA, was the development of the tourist industry in the PRC. Using the traditional attachment of ethnic Chinese to their homeland and the interest in China of American businessmen and residents, Peking began a broad campaign to attract tourists to the country after Nixon's visit in 1972. In 1978, 530,000 foreign tourists visited China, including 400,000 ethnic Chinese. The developing tourist industry was evidently meant to cater mainly for ethnic Chinese, and it became the most promising source of foreign currency. In 1978 the PRC's receipts of foreign currency from sources other than trade grew by 40 per cent,

while those from tourist concerns grew by 83 per cent.

According to figures provided by the PRC State Statistics Authority, 5.7 million tourists visited China in 1980.

In recent years American firms which belong to people of Chinese origin and organise trips to the PRC for American Chinese have become particularly active in the USA.

The American Chinese

With the development of relations between the PRC and the USA, when the two gradually began to move towards meeting each other halfway, the situation amongst ethnic Chinese in the USA began to change. Closely following the official course of the US Administration, those amongst them who supported Peking and who had once been small in number, began to gather strength.

When diplomatic relations were established between the USA and China, and relations with Taiwan were severed in 1979, the conservative wing of the leadership of the Chinese community, which continued to control most ethnic Chinese, began sharply criticising the Carter Administration. These people believed that Carter had betrayed his ally. But, at the same time as American-Chinese cooperation continued to develop, the attitude of American Chinese towards the PRC altered. A considerable role in this change was played by the signing in 1979 of a trade agreement between the USA and the PRC and America's granting to China of the status of most-favoured nation. As a result of this the most reactionary, pro-Taiwanese section of the ruling clique of the local Chinese was forced to step down and make way for more liberal

figures who were in favour of developing relations with the PRC. Pro-Taiwanese organisations also began to change their stance, and new organisations appeared which proclaimed their goal as being to assist business, cultural, scientific, technical, sporting and other contacts between the PRC and the USA. These organisations not only met with support on the part of a number of representatives of business, university and cultural circles of the Western United States, but also received assistance from state and city authorities. The establishment of the Trade Association of American Chinese—the main purpose of which was to develop trade between the Western United States and the PRC—was also officially celebrated. This Association was set up alongside the Chinese Trade Chamber, which had been in existence since 1908 and maintained relations with Taiwan. In 1980 the directors of the Chinese Trade Chamber announced that they would not prevent its members from trading with the PRC. An active role in the development of American-Chinese ties in other directions belongs to the Association of Americans of Chinese Origin, which was founded in 1973. By 1980 this Association had set up 18 branches in various cities in the Western United States.

In 1980 the San Francisco branch of the American-Chinese Friendship Society had around 20,000 members. In order to popularise Peking's policy towards the United States, this Society holds numerous events, at which famous scientists and prominent politicians and public figures appear. The fact that Edmund Brown, the governor of California, regularly appeared before representatives of the local Chinese to explain the policy of the state's administration on certain questions is indicative of the influence of the Chinese community.

PEOPLE, EVENTS AND RECEPTIONS

Amongst the heads of state and government, the ministers, politicians, prominent scientists and writers, artists, cosmonauts, famous travellers and religious leaders who come to New York, you are hardly likely to find someone who would miss an opportunity to visit the headquarters of the United Nations.

As a rule, they meet the UN Secretary-General or one of his deputies, and lunches, dinners and receptions are given in their honour. Guests of honour meet the chairmen of the Security Council, the various committees and other bodies of the Organisation. Accordingly, I, as a deputy to the Secretary-General, often had to take part in meetings and discussions of this kind. Incidentally the presence of this or that deputy to the Secretary-General depended not only on the questions with which he dealt, but also on his nationality.

If such discussions involved the US Secretary of State, American Senators or the mayor of New York, they were usually attended by Ralph Bunche, the American deputy to the Secretary-General; if an African leader was taking part in a discussion it would also be attended by either Issoufou Djermakoye, the African deputy who dealt with the affairs of trust territories, or C. V. Narasimhan, the Indian Chief of Cabinet; and if a discussion involved representatives of

socialist countries or liberation movements, or if the questions to be raised concerned the activity of the Security Council, it was most often the Soviet deputy to the Secretary-General who was invited to take part.

The circle of people with whom the Secretary-General meets is extremely wide and diverse. Since I played some role or other in a number of meetings, I can remember U Thant and Kurt Waldheim¹ receiving Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Richard Nixon, the President of the USA, Dean Rusk and William Rogers, each of whom held the post of US Secretary of State at the time of the meeting, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Chilean President Salvador Allende, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Zairese President Sese Mobutu, Pope Paul VI, Pakistani President Ayub Khan, and other politicians.

U Thant also met the leaders of the Soviet state. He spoke positively about the peaceable foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

During every session of the UN General Assembly the Secretary-General would meet almost all the foreign ministers who had come to New York. This could be anything between 95 and 125 people. Apart from that, he would also meet the foreign ministers of countries which were not members of the UN. This is an inalienable element of the Secretary-General's activity.

Every year more than a million people visit the UN headquarters. Questions of whether the

¹ Former Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim was elected Secretary-General of the UN on December 22, 1971 for a five-year term.

representative of some organisation or country not a member of the UN was to be received often became the subject of a bitter political struggle. The American authorities, for example, have many times tried to prevent the reception of representatives of progressive forces, national liberation movements, and some socialist countries.

The Western powers opposed in every way possible the organisation of a meeting between U Thant and Otto Winzer, the Foreign Minister of the GDR. For example, the Americans declared that they would not issue a visa for the East German minister, while his West German counterpart travelled to the General Assembly session every year. A meeting only took place between Otto Winzer and Kurt Waldheim in Geneva in 1972.

Having thanked me for organising this meeting, Winzer emphasised that it was a breakthrough in the system of discrimination against the GDR practised by the Western powers, above all the USA.

The discriminatory cordon around the GDR was finally broken in 1973, when the country was admitted to membership of the UN and a number of specialised agencies. This was a historic event for the German Democratic Republic, and a recognition of its growing international influence and authority.

I have already talked about some of the many meetings and discussions with various politicians, diplomats, scientists, journalists, and religious and public figures which I remember from my time at the UN. I realise that human memory is not perfect, and, where possible, I have cross-checked my own impressions with documents, press reports and the testimonies of my colleagues.

It is as yet too early to make the content of some discussions public, for they are directly related to events which are going on before our very eyes, and the opinions expressed in them must remain confidential for the time being. In view of all these considerations, we are dealing with a rather small circle of prominent politicians and public figures who were directly involved in the main events described in this book.

For a number of years the representatives of the Western powers at the UN did not want to recognise the World Peace Council or admit its representatives to sessions of the General Assembly and other UN bodies.

It is a well-known fact that the World Peace Movement had already formed into an influential organisation in 1949. For many years, however, the forces of reaction tried to discredit the high ideals of these fighters for peace and to sow disbelief in their aims. All kinds of slander were directed against the World Peace Council, and it was declared a "pro-communist" organisation. But nothing could stop the peace supporters stepping up their actions.

A delegation of the World Peace Council consisting of members of the senates and parliaments of France, Belgium and India, as well as of a number of famous politicians, arrived in New York in the autumn of 1971. It was headed by Romesh Chandra, the general secretary of the Council and a prominent public figure in India. This tall Indian with striking dark eyes energetically showed that the Council had every right to speak in the name of the tens of millions of peace supporters on the current problems of the UN's activity.

After long negotiations, and with our help, the Committee of 24, which deals with the

problem of implementing the General Assembly resolution on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, was persuaded to hear the Council's declaration. After this, Chandra made a speech first to the Apartheid Committee and then to the Fourth Committee, which discusses questions of the fight with colonialism.

Milko Tarabanov, the chairman of the First (Political) Committee of the General Assembly, which deals with questions of disarmament and maintaining peace and security, resolutely supported the World Peace Council delegation. As chairman of the First Committee, he had the right to instruct that the documents and declarations of the Council be published, and it was with his agreement that the Council's declaration in support of the proposal to convene a World Conference on Disarmament was published as an official document. After prolonged negotiations and much hesitation, the UN Secretary-General agreed to receive the delegation from the World Peace Council.

The discussion which took place was interesting and rich in content.

Krishna Menon, who used to be a well-known figure in the UN and was a minister in a number of Indian governments, appealed to U Thant for support for the just aims and ideals of the peace supporters' movement. The participants in this movement—French, Italian and Belgian parliamentarians—persistently tried to get the UN to recognise the World Peace Council and give its representatives the opportunity to take part in its activity alongside many other non-governmental organisations which had long since acquired consultative status at the UN.

U Thant promised to help.

In January 1973 the Interparliamentary Union,

which unites parliamentarians from more than 80 countries, decided to hold a session on the problem of European security. Helsinki was chosen as the venue for this session, which opened in Finland's parliament. After a short introductory speech by the deputy chairman of the Union, the floor was given to President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen of Finland.

The President easily mounted the rostrum, from where he greeted the delegates, expressing his firm belief that the Interparliamentary Union would adopt decisions which would facilitate the convocation of an All-European Conference and its success. When the session had been officially opened President Kekkonen gave a breakfast in honour of the heads of delegations.

In a conversation with myself Kekkonen said:

"Finland is a neutral country. But on questions of war and peace Finland, naturally, is not neutral, but always in favour of peace and opposed to war."

As for Soviet-Finnish relations, the President stressed that these are mutually beneficial relations based on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded between the USSR and Finland in 1948. The example of the cooperation between the USSR and Finland, he said, countries with differing social systems, graphically demonstrated how fruitful cooperation can be when it is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

"Finland is a small country", Kekkonen continued, smiling, "but, as recent events and the visits by the heads of great powers show, they have been forced to learn something from the Finns and take the path along which we set out many years ago. It is quite understandable that Finland, which is itself interested in the

development of mutually beneficial cooperation in Europe, has taken on itself an active role in the preparations to convene an All-European Conference."

A Finnish parliamentary group created marvellous conditions for the Interparliamentary Union to hold its session, while the Finnish parliament itself and President Kekkonen made a considerable contribution to solving the main problem of convening and organising the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This was not only of European, but also of worldwide importance.

Several months later, in July 1973, the first stage of the CSCE took place in Helsinki.

In an interview with *Newsweek* magazine Kekkonen, pointing out the consistency of the USSR's peaceable foreign policy, exposed the slanderous conjectures of the Western press with regard to the nature and essence of the good-neighbourly, friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, and also with regard to the aims and nature of the CSCE.

The American journalist posed the following, provocative question:

"Some observers feel the U.S.S.R. views CSCE as a forum to ratify the current division of Europe into communist and non-Communist zones. Do you share that view?"

Kekkonen replied:

"I don't feel your description is accurate. I have every reason to believe that both the U.S.S.R. and the other leading powers responsible for Europe's security are equally interested in maintaining peace and a balance in Europe."

The correspondent, however, did not give up, and, referring to Soviet-Finnish relations, asked:

"Is this a model the U.S.S.R. would like to see applied elsewhere in Europe? That is, is

the ultimate goal of CSCE the 'Finlandization' of Europe?"

He got an abrupt and convincing answer:

"You know what I think of the term Finlandization in the insulting way it quite often appears to be used in the Western press. If Finlandization means how things really are, that a small European country which lost the war has maintained its independence and dignity, succeeded in getting back on its feet without anyone's help, created good and friendly relations with a neighboring great power with another social system and developed its own policy of neutrality, then I regard it as an expression of flattery."¹

In August 1975 a conference took place in Helsinki between the heads of state and government of European countries, the USA and Canada, which produced the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

You are hardly likely to meet a person in the USA who does not know the names of Martin Luther King, Coretta Scott King and Andrew Young. Some people were or still are openly hostile and detestful to these leaders of the Negro movement for civil rights, while others regard them with love and sympathy. The watershed here is not only racial, but also socio-political.

On April 4, 1968 a meeting of the UN Security Council was called at the request of Jordan. On the agenda was the question of the situation in the Middle East. At the meeting the Jordanian government drew the Security Council's attention to violations of the armistice in the region and acts of aggression on the part of the Israeli

¹ *Newsweek*, September 3, 1973.

military. It also demanded that measures be taken to halt these acts.

At half past three in the afternoon, just before the meeting was to begin, U Thant entered the hall. He was followed by Ralph Bunche, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs. U Thant sat on the right of the Council chairman, who himself was seated at the centre of the horseshoe-shaped table. I sat on his left.

As soon as the meeting began Ralph Bunche, who was sitting behind U Thant, began squinting at some telegrams and notes (he was short-sighted). A little while later, when I turned to look at him, he put the pieces of paper down, closed his eyes and seemed to doze off. His age and the numerous illnesses he had suffered were taking their toll. He was sitting in the second row and was therefore spared the importunate attention of the press and the television.

Security Council meetings, particularly those which dealt with important and urgent problems, were usually shown on the television. This meant that the wives of representatives of Security Council member countries and of leading officials in the UN Secretariat could check on the television where their husbands were being delayed. Ralph Bunche's wife Ruth once saw that he had completely dozed off, and telephoned his secretary, who then went up to the sleeping Bunche, shook him awake, and whispered: "Ruth called and asked me to wake you up. If you're very tired, you'd better go to your office."

Meanwhile, the meeting was being dragged out. Most members of the Security Council had condemned Israel's actions, but they could not agree on whether to take measures or not.

Turning to my assistant, who was seated be-

hind me, I noted that one of Bunche's secretaries had literally run into the hall and said something to him. An expression of dismay and helplessness had appeared on Bunche's face, and at first he had not been able to say anything. Evidently, he had not been able to control himself, either, for I had heard him mutter:

"It's terrible, it's unbelievable!"

Soon after that, the break was announced, and I went up to Bunche. He exclaimed:

"Martin Luther King has been assassinated! We mustn't forgive this crime!"

The assassination of this black leader in Memphis, Tennessee, was neither an accident nor an act of vengeance on the part of some unbalanced racist.

Reactionaries and racists alike hated King. He was imprisoned 24 times in 12 years, and attempts were repeatedly made on his life.

Death followed closely behind him, and he himself was fully aware of this. As Coretta Scott King, his wife, friend and companion-in-arms wrote in her book *My Life With Martin Luther King*: "He saw the danger clearly. His knowledge of history made him realize that most men who had taken a strong moral position had to pay the price for their convictions. He even used the word 'crucified' metaphorically, saying sometimes in his speeches, 'I may be crucified for my beliefs, and if I am, you can say, "He died to make men free."'"¹

The shot which rang out that day in Memphis provoked a wave of black uprisings and demonstrations which swept 153 American cities. In order to suppress this unrest the Administration

¹ Coretta Scott King, *My Life With Martin Luther King*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1969, p. 303.

called out more than 100,000 soldiers and policemen. Twenty-seven thousand people were arrested, 3,500 were injured, and 43 died.

Millions of people in the USA and other countries all over the world were stunned by the news of King's death.

It was painful for me, too, to learn of King's assassination. I could not imagine him dead. In 1968 he was just 39 years old. When I had met him a few months earlier, he had been a young, energetic and charming man.

At the beginning of September 1967 I was in Chicago, where I had been invited to take part in a television programme entitled "Your Right To Say It". The programme I was to take part in was devoted to the role of the Soviet Union in the UN. The programme is prepared by Northwestern University (Chicago) and transmitted live by WDN TV to viewers in Chicago, the state of Illinois and neighbouring regions. A video recording of the programme is sent all over the United States, and, according to WDN figures, is watched by an average of up to 10 million people. The heads of two major Chicago newspapers—the *Chicago Daily News* (B. March) and *Chicago American* (L. Vent) — participated in this round-table discussion, which was chaired by the dean of the department of journalism at Northwestern University.

I was faced with answering the questions of the others taking part in the programme straight off, without any advance preparation. This would mean that any corrections or elaborations on my part would be impossible (and what is more, the conversation was to be conducted without an interpreter!).

One evening before the programme was to go out, the organisers invited me to supper. During the friendly conversation I inquired which

problems would most interest my respected questioners-to-be.

The host of the programme unceremoniously said:

"No rehearsals."

When I had returned to my hotel I began to wonder somewhat worriedly just what questions I could expect to be asked. Then I suddenly had the idea of looking at what was at the centre of attention of the local press.

Looking through the newspapers, I got an idea of the circle of questions they placed at the centre of attention. Of international problems most attention was devoted to the war in Vietnam, the situation in the Middle East, the role of the UN in international affairs, the Cultural Revolution in China, and Soviet-Chinese relations. As I looked through the newspapers I came across a report that Doctor Martin Luther King would make a speech at "a national meeting of new political forces".

My preliminary acquaintance with the press justified itself. Most of the questions which I was asked during the round-table discussion concerned the problems which were at the centre of attention of the Chicago press.

When the conversation had finished, Mr. March smiled and, in front of the camera, said to me: "My wife told me: 'The Russians are good chess-players. I have no doubt that this Russian ambassador will work out in advance what questions you will ask him, and will prepare accordingly.'"

Then, laughing, he concluded: "My wife was right — that's just what happened."

I shall not talk about the questions I was asked or the answers I gave. It would take up too much space.

I did, however, get reactions to my appearance

on the television that very same evening. In the hotel lobby, where I was sitting with one of the programme's directors, I noticed a thick-set man with a large head in a group of people opposite me. His face seemed familiar, and he had short, curly hair and a small moustache above his fat, typically Negro lips. The snow-white shirt and the tightly knotted tie he was wearing served to emphasise his tough face and his bright eyes. At last, I remembered who I was looking at. Ralph Bunche had shown me his photograph once when we had met in his office on the 38th floor of the UN skyscraper. I also knew the man's face from photographs in the newspapers. It was Martin Luther King.

We were introduced. Smiling, King said that he had seen me on television and that he was trying to understand my stance.

"It's good," he said, "that you started by referring to the fact that you are in Lincoln's homeland."

In reply, I noted:

"I was following your example... After all, your famous 'I Have A Dream' speech also began with a reference to Lincoln... As for Vietnam, I read the speech you made in Los Angeles in January 1967 and your April sermon in the Riverside Church in New York. In many ways I agree with your appraisals of the nature of the war in Vietnam. The assertion of the Washington Administration that the USA is fighting Communists from North Vietnam is quite justly repudiated. The South Vietnam National Liberation Front was formed in 1960, many years after the dictatorship was established of the American protege Ngo Dinh Diem (in the autumn of 1954). The USA sends its soldiers 10 thousand miles from home, and this is called 'a fight with communist aggression'.

"I remembered your words," I continued, "your vivid metaphore: 'If the soul of America is poisoned, when we cut it open we shall read the word Vietnam.'"

King was a modest man. He nodded, somewhat embarrassed, and then noted that he had repeated in a number of speeches that the American administration was wasting the nation's resources in Vietnam, and that the American people was losing the war against poverty. The "Great Society" proclaimed by President Johnson and the "war with poverty", he said, had been buried on the battlefields of Vietnam.

"The expansion of the war," King said, "reduces social programmes and forces poor people, both white and black alike, to bear a greater burden... We spend \$ 322,000 to kill one enemy fighter, whereas for every person who is considered 'poor' we spend just \$ 53 on the so-called war with poverty in America." "I have said many times," he emphasised, "that we must unite the fervour of the movement for civil rights with the movement for peace."

I replied that I held his opinions and approach to such an important international problem as the war in Vietnam in high esteem. This was directly connected with questions of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet people sincerely sought friendship and cooperation with the great American people.

"The American policy in Indochina," I pointed out, "in particular the aggression in Vietnam, lies in the way of an improvement in relations between our two countries. An end to the war in Vietnam is in the interests of both the American and the Soviet peoples, indeed, it is in the interests of all mankind. This corresponds to the main principle of politics, its rationality, and this, in turn, shows political wisdom."

King smiled and said:

"I don't claim to speak on problems which concern all mankind. That is the domain of my friend Ralph Bunche." Then, as if he had suddenly remembered, he added: "I would like to point out that I cannot agree with a number of things you said about American policy, but I don't have the time to get into a discussion with you. Moreover, I do not agree with Marxist philosophy or the Marxist interpretation of history. I said this clearly in my book *Stride Toward Freedom*. If you read it, you will understand just what a gap there is between my opinions and the philosophy which you supporters of Marx and Lenin profess."

In private I noted that he and I did have something in common in our attitude towards Marxism, in that we agreed on the main thing—the exposure of the roots of social conflict and the need to eliminate inequality amongst people. We also had the same approach to the problem of peace and the cessation of the war in Vietnam.

In the evenings CBS, NBC and ABC, the main television companies in the USA, broadcast bulletins of the latest news.

On April 4, 1968 every channel led with reports from Memphis companies of the assassination of Martin Luther King. These reports were accompanied by numerous newsreel clips of the life of this black leader.

We can not forget the pictures showing the march on Washington of supporters of the movement for civil rights in August 1963.

That summer, American towns were swept by a wave of mass meetings, demonstrations and "freedom marches", all of which demanded that civil rights legislation be passed. This movement gripped large sections of America's black population.

The movement, which also won support from progressive white Americans, demanded that the Administration take decisive steps to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination. In June 1963 John F. Kennedy, thinking about the forthcoming presidential election in 1964 and reckoning with the reaction of Asian and African countries to events in the USA, promised to fight to get laws passed which would guarantee "equal opportunities" for blacks.

Despite its indeterminate and inconsistent nature, the bill he submitted to Congress provoked embittered opposition on the part of right-wing Congressmen. This once again showed the blacks fighting for civil rights that even the programme of ensuring partial rights for Negroes which the Administration had drawn up could only be approved and become law as a result of a mass struggle and pressure from below.

At its congress the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People approved Martin Luther King's suggestion that tactics of "non-violent direct protest" be used, that the protest be "actively expressed", and that the fight be taken onto the streets so that "even the racists could not shoot at unarmed men, women and children in broad daylight".

In July 1963 the representatives of 150 black organisations which had gathered in New York agreed to coordinate their actions. They also set up a foundation and approved a plan to hold a mass march on Washington. This march took place on August 28, 1963. That day more than 250,000 blacks and white Americans gathered at the Lincoln Memorial. Amongst them there were people of various convictions and political views who had come to Washington from all parts of the country. The march's emblem were two enjoined hands—one black, the other white.

The motto of the march was 'Freedom and Jobs!'

It is not possible to watch film of this quarter-million meeting, this mass of dark heads listening to the speeches being made by the leaders of the march, without emotion. Martin Luther King was the last to speak.

Philip Randolph, one of the leaders of the march, gave King—"the spiritual leader of the nation"—the floor. A storm of applause and shouts rushed over the square as thousands of people chanted: "Martin Luther King!" over and over again. The hum of the crowd seemed ominous, and then the deep and sincere voice of King floated across the square and the enormous sea of people. This may well have been his most emotional and impressive speech, and it went down in the history of the struggle of all black people under the title: "I Have A Dream".

Powerful loudspeakers carried his words to the hundreds of thousands of people on that square in Washington, and millions more all round the USA listened in on the radio and the television. His words reflected the spiritual torment of the millions of hapless black citizens of America. He was an enchanting speaker:

"Fivescore years ago," King's voice boomed out, "a great American in whose symbolic shadow we stand today signed the Emancipation Proclamation... But one hundred years later, the Negro is still not free, one hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. So we've come here today to dramatize a shameful condition..."

The sigh of bitterness and indignation which went up from the crowd inspired King even more. He departed from his text and spoke from the bottom of his heart with great animation:

"When the architects of our republic wrote

the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence," he went on, "they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was the promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness...

"Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked 'insufficient funds'."

The enormous crowd listened to King, bewitched.

"I have a dream," he said, lifting his hands up to the sky, "that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed, 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal'. I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, sons of former slaves and the sons of former slaveowners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood. I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice. I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character...

"And if America is to be a great nation," he continued, "this must become true."¹

King, however, did not only call on people to dream. He firmly rejected passiveness, and ardently encouraged people to fight against racism.

¹ Martin Luther King, Jr., *A Documentary: Montgomery to Memphis*, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1968, p. 218.

In his *Letter From Birmingham Jail*, where he was imprisoned in April 1963 for refusing to halt his peaceful demonstrations, he wrote: "We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed." In the letter, which later became one of his main programme documents, he also explained his reasons for changing to tactics of "direct protest". "Birmingham," he wrote, "is probably the most thoroughly segregated city in the United States... We had no alternative except to prepare for direct action."

With great emotion, he made the following appeal in his "I Have A Dream" speech: "Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive." He then listed the Southern states where racist terror was raging particularly badly: "Go back to Mississippi. Go back to Alabama. Go back to South Carolina. Go back to Georgia. Go back to Louisiana. Go back to the slums and ghettos of our Northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the valley of despair."

The closing words of this speech met with the approval of hundreds of thousands of people: "Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi. From every mountainside, let freedom ring!"¹

When he had finished, silence reigned in the square. And then there came the thunder of applause and shouts as thousands upon thousands of people ecstatically greeted King's certainty of the final victory of the righteous cause.

The newsreel I was watching jumped forward a year to October 1964, when it was announced

¹ Ibid.

that Martin Luther King had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. He actually received the Prize in December the same year. Wearing ceremonial dress and a broad tie with black and white stripes, he accepted the congratulations of the King of Norway with a kind smile.

In the declaration he made when he was awarded the Prize, King stressed that the conferment of the award was not an honour for him personally. "I accept the Nobel Prize for Peace," he said, "at a moment when twenty-two million Negroes of the United States of America are engaged in a creative battle to end the long night of racial injustice. I accept this award on behalf of a civil rights movement which is moving with determination and a majestic scorn for risk and danger to establish a reign of freedom and a rule of justice."

King's home city of Atlanta awarded him freedom of the city, but in nearby Selma he was beaten up by a white racist in the lobby of a hotel which had not dared refuse him a room.

Racists everywhere were furious that King was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and television stations did not show how J. Edgar Hoover, the all-powerful director of the FBI, called a special press conference on November 18, 1964, soon after the announcement that King had been awarded the Prize. At this press conference he declared that King was "the most notorious liar in the country".

The Voting Rights Bill was passed in August 1965. But, as King wrote, 1965 did not justify the hopes placed in it. A larger number of Negroes registered as voters, and segregation was symbolically ended in a number of schools, but this law had not been implemented on a large scale anywhere. The law was being circumvented thanks to cunning ruses.

King's resolute speeches against the war in Vietnam and in favour of an amalgamation of the fight for civil rights with the fight for peace inflamed the hatred of the racists and the reactionaries even more.

On April 3, 1968 King left Atlanta in order to head the struggle of striking dustmen in Memphis. The newsreel was now showing a picture of King and his friends on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel just a few minutes before the fatal shot. According to Coretta Scott King, the events of these last few minutes developed as follows:

"That afternoon passed at the Lorraine Motel and soon it was time to get ready to go out to dinner. After Martin was dressed, he went out on the little balcony facing the street toward a decaying roominghouse two hundred feet away... Solomon Jones who was to drive the car that evening, called up. 'It's getting chilly, Dr. King. Better take an overcoat.'

"Martin said, 'O.K., I will.'

"It was almost time to go. Ralph Abernathy rushed into his room to put on some shaving lotion.

"At that moment came the shot. They told me it sounded like a firecracker."¹

In November 1978 the House of Representatives committee which was investigating the assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King established that both assassinations were the result of a conspiracy and were not the work of a lone assassin. While giving evidence, Robert Blakey, the committee's chief counsel, drew its attention to the fact that the supposed assassin of King, a criminal by the name of Ray had been released from jail in Missouri 11 months before the assassination. What was more import-

¹ See: Coretta Scott King, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

tant, though, was his report that when King had arrived in Memphis, the security which had originally been arranged for him had been withdrawn. When King had arrived in Memphis on April 3, the Memphis police department had provided him with a bodyguard of four men, but this had been withdrawn the following day just one hour before the fatal shot.

Shortly before he died, Martin Luther King addressed the following words to his parishioners: "Tell them not to mention that I have a Nobel Peace Prize, that isn't important... Yes, if you want to say that I was a drum major, say that I was a drum major for justice; say that I was a drum major for peace; I was a drum major for righteousness."¹

Millions of people regretted his untimely death. In Atlanta the funeral procession was several kilometres long. Two mules pulled the modest two-wheeled cart with King's coffin, which was followed by more than 150,000 people. The funeral ceremony was broadcast for almost six hours by television stations whose pictures were seen by 120 million Americans.

Three years after these events I unexpectedly had to return to the subject of King and his role in the black movement.

At the beginning of 1971 I was invited by the American Association for Assisting the UN to make a trip to a number of Southern states in my capacity as Under-Secretary-General on Political and Security Council Affairs. It was also suggested that I visit the city of Atlanta, which is the capital of Georgia. Reactionary and racist organisations are particularly active in this state, as they are in Alabama.

I have to admit that I hesitated as to whether

¹ Ibid., pp. 348, 349.

it was worth going there: I might run into some sort of provocation.

My friends from the Association for Assisting the UN, however, asked me to meet with active members of their Atlanta branch and talk to them about the UN. Many of them wanted to see a Soviet diplomat, although I was going there in my capacity as a leading official of the UN Secretariat, and not as a Soviet representative.

Atlanta is a large and beautiful city with the skyscrapers that are typical of America. Most of these skyscrapers, however, are used as offices by banks and various kinds of firms, as expensive hotels, shops, restaurants, cafes, and so on. Rich businessmen, lawyers, professors and prosperous doctors live in detached houses out in the suburbs. In front of their houses there are well-tended lawns and intricate little fences, a striking contrast to the homes of the poor people who also live in the suburbs, only in a different district. These people live in hovels which are built back-to-back, there are piles of rubbish in the streets, and the atmosphere is one of general neglect.

At the beginning of January it is warm in Atlanta, and the detached houses are covered in a green carpet of luxuriant plants.

We drove up to the home of Stanley Johns, the head of the local branch of the Association for Assisting the UN. There were dozens of cars in the yard. As soon as we arrived our host asked us to go and meet some guests without even getting changed.

"Almost a hundred people have been waiting for you for over an hour," Johns explained. "The pick of the city is gathered here."

In the large drawing room we were regarded with open curiosity. For many of the people present this was the first time they had met

Soviet people. One after the other the guests came up to us, introduced themselves, shook hands and asked us questions. Without even having had an opportunity to talk for five minutes, they would move away again because others were putting pressure on them from behind. The people we talked with were very different from one another: there were businessmen, professors, doctors, barristers and labour union officials. There was also a good mix of blacks and whites.

Stanley Johns said that former US Secretary of State Dean Rusk had also promised to come in order to see me. He and I already knew each other from our meetings in U Thant's offices and at receptions in New York and other places.

When Nixon took office in 1969 Rusk was forced to look for a job and was taken on as a professor of economics at a university in the neighbouring state of South Carolina. When he took up this post, however, he immediately ran into great difficulties: the university's board of governors did not want to forgive him for the fact that his daughter had married a black. The former Secretary of State was thus able to experience at first hand the bitterness of the racist ways of his country. I did not meet Dean Rusk that evening: he telephoned to say that he could not come because his wife was ill.

These improvised interviews continued for almost two hours. Most people treated us benevolently and took an interest not so much in the work of the UN and my activity as an Under-Secretary-General of the Organisation, but in the life of the Soviet people and the policy of the Soviet state.

At last, our host took me by the arm and led me into another room, leaving the others in the drawing room. There were just a few people in the second room.

I was introduced to a short, strikingly beautiful black woman whose dark-claret-coloured dress served to emphasise her charm.

"Coretta King," she introduced herself, offering me her hand.

Photographs of Coretta King far from fully reflect her attractiveness and charm. As became clear from our conversation, she had come to the reception especially to meet me.

Remembering her husband, she said that Martin had always talked about his readiness to give his life for the cause in which he believed. He believed, she said, that by devoting himself entirely to the service of others, he would inspire them to fight for the realisation of the aims their movement set itself. If a person does not have anything in his heart for which it would be worth dying, Martin would say to his children, it is not worth him living.

Coretta King talked softly, with dignity and confidence. Her manners and style of speech always made a great impression and provoked involuntary sympathy and respect.

She pointed out in our conversation that, despite the difficulties and the severe blow that had been dealt to the black movement—the assassination of her husband—the fighters for equal rights for blacks would not lay down their arms.

"The Negro people," she stressed, "has seen its strength and opportunities. My husband did not give his life for nothing. The Administration and Congress now realise they cannot but take the wishes of the twenty-four-million-strong Negro people into account. The years of struggle and non-violent direct protest have brought definite changes in the position of the black population.

"When Martin and I returned to Atlanta more than 10 years ago," she continued, "we couldn't even dream of attending a reception like this.

Of course, that's far from the main index of the progress that has been made. The awakening of the Negro people, its growing political activity, and the striving of blacks to come together are undoubtedly making many political leaders reckon with us in the USA. They realise that it is difficult to make a political career, to be a governor, a mayor, a Congressman or even President of the USA without the support of the blacks or regardless of their votes. It is difficult for us now that Martin is dead. We don't have a generally-recognised and well-known leader. Martin, for example, could condemn the war in Vietnam and racial discrimination, he could call on people to take part in mass campaigns of disobedience, and so on. Unfortunately, today's leaders cannot allow themselves to do these things. They realise that declarations like this will give the authorities an excuse for repressions. We aren't sure that these repressions won't break the spirit of a certain number of participants in the fight for civil rights."

We were approached by a young black. He had a vigorous face and lively, inquisitive eyes. Once again I had the feeling that I knew the person I was looking at.

"Andrew Young," he introduced himself.

"An assistant and friend of Martin's," Coretta King added.

Andrew Young, a youthful preacher, joined the movement headed by Martin Luther King in 1961 and quickly became one of its leaders.

Describing the situation which had taken shape in the black movement after King's assassination, Young said that, in order to give it a correct evaluation, it was necessary to have a good understanding of the ideas contained in Lenin's work *"Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder*.

"Our movement," he stressed, "is susceptible to many diseases and difficulties typical of a young, developing organism."

During our conversation Young gave an interesting analysis not only of the state of the black movement in the USA, but also of the alignment of the main forces in the country and the position of the two leading bourgeois political parties. Analysing the stances and the prospects of the Democrats and the Republicans in the forthcoming 1972 presidential election campaign, he emphasised that, like most other national minorities in the USA, blacks traditionally supported the Democrats.

"We," he said, "are going to fight to make absolutely certain that the Democratic platform reflects our demands that the rights of the black population be guaranteed in education (the elimination of segregation, labour (the elimination of the existing inequality of wage rates, unemployment, and the current gap in the number of black and white unemployed), and black representation in the US Congress and the legislative assemblies of each of the states. We also demand that racial discrimination be eliminated from the country's public life. If these demands are not satisfied, blacks will not support Presidential or Congressional candidates from either the Democrats or, moreover, the Republicans."

The leaders of the Democratic Party were forced to take this into account, and a number of promises reflecting the demands of America's black people were included in the Democrats' electoral platform that year.

During the primaries and at the Democratic Party Congress, which decided who would stand as the Party's candidate for President, black votes played an important role in the victory of Senator George McGovern.

Despite his inconsistency and his many digressions during the election campaign, McGovern advanced the most radical programme of domestic reforms (including that on the black question) and a number of demands in the field of foreign policy which were popular with the voters (an immediate end to the war in Vietnam, the withdrawal of all American troops from Indochina, and so on). This liberal programme scared the bosses of his own party, the reactionary leaders of the trade unions and, most importantly of all, the big monopolies. That November he was defeated in the fight for the presidential chair.

In the 1976 presidential elections the black population believed the far-reaching promises of Jimmy Carter, the Democratic candidate, that he would carry out a number of reforms to improve their position. Of all the blacks who voted in the 1976 elections, 92 per cent gave preference to Carter. Once in office, the new President decided to cash the pre-election promissory notes he had handed the black population mainly by taking symbolic action: some black figures were given posts in the state apparatus. One of these was Andrew Young, whose appointment as US representative to the UN was regarded by political observers as a step designed to strengthen the President's relations with the black population of the country.

Things went a lot worse, however, with the implementation of those of Carter's promises which touched on the interests of large sections of the black population. After a meeting with the President in December 1978 a delegation of black leaders headed by Vernon Jordan, the chairman of the National Urban League, expressed its "deep disappointment" with Carter's plans to fight inflation. Neither was the black population any less disappointed with other aspects

of the Administration's economic policy. Blacks were bearing an ever greater burden as a result of the rise in unemployment, the arms race, cut-backs in social programmes, the rise in prices, the drop in real wages, and so on. The Carter Administration even renounced its most insignificant concessions to the blacks.

Andrew Young played a definite role in American foreign policy in Africa, but his open declaration to the effect that there were hundreds and, possibly, thousands of political prisoners in the USA provoked fierce indignation in the country's ruling circles. A declaration such as this would probably not have caused such a stormy reaction had it not come at the height of the Administration's campaign "in defence of human rights", which Carter had placed at the centre of his political and ideological attack on socialist and developing countries.

Young was forgiven for taking this liberty and was merely reprimanded: the Administration evidently wanted to avoid a major political scandal, and was thus making allowances for the fact that Young, as the influential *Washington Post* put it, was a creation of the turbulent events of the 1960s, a person who intended to smash the foundations of traditional diplomacy.

He was not, however, forgiven when he struck the "most sensitive nerve" of Washington's policy—the Palestine problem—by meeting the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. To please Tel Aviv, the USA denies the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination, right up to the creation of a sovereign state Israel and the Israeli lobby in the USA kicked up a terrible stir when Young, possibly unintentionally, revealed the two-faced game of American diplomacy in the Middle East:

while proclaiming an official policy of "impartiality", the USA in fact follows a pro-Israeli line. Andrew Young was shown the door. He was leaving, the *Washington Post* wrote at the time, exactly as he had arrived two and a half years ago: against a background of stormy and noisy arguments caused by his personality.

In an extensive interview on the occasion of his retirement, Young declared that he did not agree with the official course of the Administration on a wide circle of important international problems. He also declared that he did not agree with the Administration's policy concerning Vietnam (he favoured establishing diplomatic relations with the SRV) and Cuba (he had said that the USA should remove restrictions on trade with the island), or with the plans to increase military expenditure and develop the MX mobile missile system. He did, in fact, agree with everyone who asserted that it was the USA which bore prime responsibility for the flight of almost a million refugees from South-East Asia.

In an interview with the Swedish newspaper *Göteborgs-Posten* on March 14, 1980, Young noted that only fragments remained of the foreign policy course which had been so widely pushed by Carter during the 1976 elections. I remembered the striking, contradictory figure of Andrew Young well. His friends believe he will find the right path in life fighting for the interests of his people, fighting to win for blacks genuine civil freedoms, political and economic rights, and rights to social progress and prosperity.

Before we left Atlanta we asked our kind hosts to take us to the grave of Martin Luther King. He was buried in the suburbs of the city, in an old cemetery where black slaves used to be laid to rest.

The small area of vacant land was fenced in by

a low wooden palisade, and a small notice said: "The grave and memorial park of Martin Luther King". An eternal flame burned beside his modest grave, next to which there lay withered flowers. There were also a few recently planted trees.

My companions explained that a national collection was under way, and when enough money had been gathered, a memorial would be erected and the park would be laid out. As yet, however, there were insufficient funds.

Several years later a modest memorial was erected consisting of several light-coloured rectangular slabs and a granite block, in the centre of which had been carved:

MARTIN LUTHER KING, Jr.
1929-1968

Free at Last, Free at Last
Thank God Almighty
I'm Free at Last¹

Martin Luther King won freedom only after his own death.

On the tenth anniversary of King's death a meeting and demonstration took place in Memphis in memory of the great leader. At this meeting Jerry Wurf, the president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, declared:

"The purpose of the march is never to let us forget what King meant, not just to Memphis, but for the struggle for freedom throughout this nation. I think in 10 years some of that pain is a little dull, but the sharpness and the contribution of King is very much alive."

Together with her friends, Coretta King laid a floral wreath at her husband's grave, and then

¹ Coretta Scott King, op cit., p. 334.

declared that blacks still had much to do to fully achieve his dream.

The black demonstrations in the south of the USA in the spring of 1980, which were the culmination of the despair caused by racial discrimination, unemployment and harsh oppression, serve as a clear illustration to these words. In May 1980 the American authorities took harsh reprisals against blacks in Miami, Florida. Andrew Young quite justly declared at the time that it was necessary to try not only the police officers who murdered McDaffey, a black, (their acquittal was the drop which caused the patience of the black population to break), but also "the whole system" of racism and oppression of the national minorities in the USA.

In April 1964 I had occasion to visit Japan as a member of a delegation of the USSR-Japan Society. The delegation split into three groups which then travelled to different parts of the country. I was offered the chance to visit Shikoku and then Hiroshima. Thousands of books have been written about Hiroshima.

It was almost twenty years since the atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima, but in the centre of the city the shell of the bank had been preserved, above which the bomb exploded. On the steps of the building the scorched shadow can be seen of a man caught in the blast. The museum of the atomic bombing, however, is even more shocking than this: it contains plaster casts of people torn to pieces by the explosion and gold watches with melted hands stopped at 8:16, the time of the blast. These are laconic figures which tell of the almost instantaneous death of over 70,000 people and of the many thousands suffering from radiation sickness even today.

In the centre of the city square there is a memorial to the victims of the atomic bombing. The memorial is decorated with garlands of paper cranes—symbols of life and happiness. I went up to the memorial with a large wreath of flowers, around which was fastened a ribbon with the inscription: "In memory of the victims of Hiroshima. From the USSR-Japan Society."

Before me a man of medium height with an easy step had also laid a wreath at the memorial. When he walked away I read on the ribbon: "From Richard Nixon". Nixon looked at my wreath with interest. Since the inscription was in Japanese he did not realise who I was, and asked me in English:

"Who are you and where do you come from?"

When he heard my reply, he said:

"You see, we come from totally different poles, but we honour the memory of the victims of Hiroshima... I've been in your country, and I hope to visit Moscow again."

In reply I noted:

"My country always gives a warm welcome to guests if they come with good intentions."

Nixon pretended that he did not understand my allusion to his visit to Moscow in 1960 when, as Vice-President of the USA, he displayed anything but kind feelings for the USSR.

In 1964, however, Nixon was a different man. In the 1960 presidential elections the voters of America had given preference to his rival, John F. Kennedy. Nixon had then stood as a candidate for Governor of California in 1962, but had again suffered defeat. This forced him to revise his previous political views, which had fallen entirely within the framework of the dogmas and ideas of the Cold War. Many political observers believed that Nixon's song was already sung. After two such failures it was hard to reckon on a

political career. Nixon, however, had not lost faith in his lucky star.

In 1967 his name once again appeared on the pages of American newspapers as a possible Republican candidate for President. His main rival at the Republican Party Congress in Miami in August 1968 was Nelson Rockefeller, the Governor of New York State and one of the richest people in America. The Republican Party Congress voted in favour of Nixon.

Disgraced by the policy of President Johnson with regard to Vietnam, the leaders of the Democratic Party were unable to find a candidate who would break with the ruinous line of the Johnson Administration by clearly and categorically declaring that the Vietnam war, which was so unpopular with the American people, was the Administration's most flagrant mistake, and that, as President, he would immediately put an end to it.

Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who was put forward as the Democratic candidate, was too closely linked with Johnson and did not have enough political courage to declare publicly that he would give the American people a new policy. Robert Kennedy, who did offer such a programme, was assassinated.

During the Democratic Party Congress in Chicago the police took harsh reprisals against young people and radical elements who tried to get the Congress clearly and unambiguously to give a promise to end the Vietnam war immediately. These reprisals showed the electorate that, should the Democrats remain in office, there could be no hope for a resolute change in domestic and foreign policy, a fact which the Republicans made use of.

Nixon declared that, if he was elected, he would "bring our boys home" and end the war in Viet-

nam. He also promised to make a move from the era of confrontation and struggle with the socialist countries to a path of searching for mutual understanding and cooperation.

This brought Nixon victory, and in early January 1969 he paid a visit to the headquarters of the UN. U Thant organised a reception in honour of the new President in a small conference hall.

Nixon walked energetically into the hall. A smart, thin man with a suntanned face (he had just returned from Florida, where he had been resting after the election campaign), the President radiated confidence, health and a fine mood. He was accompanied by future Secretary of State William Rogers and Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security.

U Thant began to introduce the guests. With the skill which is usual in many American politicians, Nixon conducted himself confidently and said something nice to everyone.

Coming up to me, U Thant said:

"This is Mr. Kutakov, my assistant on political and Security Council affairs. He is a diplomat, a scientist and a specialist on problems of the Far East, and has published a number of books on Japanese foreign policy and diplomacy."

Nixon offered me his hand and, it seemed, recognised me.

"Japan," he said, "is a very interesting country, isn't it? Could I get hold of your books?"

Ambassador Csatorday, the Hungarian representative at the UN, was standing next to me. Nixon was very true to himself.

"I've been in Budapest," he said. "It's a very beautiful city. I hope to visit your beautiful country once more."

Csatorday, naturally, replied:

"Mr. President, we will be pleased to welcome you in Budapest."

Nixon exchanged a few words with each of the guests he was introduced to. Evidently, he wanted to create a good impression with everyone.

Having made the round of all the guests, Nixon then made a short speech in which he said that it had been very pleasant for him to meet members of the Security Council and leading officials of the UN Secretariat. The Republicans, he said, attached great importance to the UN and were going to promote its activity. He had been pleased to meet with his old friend U Thant, whose acquaintance he had made more than ten years previously when he had been Vice-President and U Thant had been a young diplomat accompanying him on a trip to Burma. They had both been young then, Nixon said, and even the stones which had been thrown at them had seemed light. Since then, he went on, they had both grown older, and their responsibility for the future of the world and the peoples had grown, too. He hoped, he said, that his friendship with U Thant would continue in the interests of peace and security.

However, Nixon's hopes that U Thant would alter his principled stance on the Vietnam question, on finding a settlement to the Middle East conflict, and on American policy towards the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa were not fulfilled.

In September 1969 Nixon addressed the 24th session of the UN General Assembly. His speech contained a number of interesting moments showing that he and his entourage, above all Kissinger, were beginning thoroughly to revise many foreign policy dogmas and take a more realistic approach to the correlation of forces which had taken shape in the world. The main theme of Nixon's speech, however, was his striving to involve the UN in a solution to the problem of the

Vietnam war which would be in the interests of American imperialism.

There was nothing new in this: similar attempts had been made many times by the Johnson Administration.

Nixon's speech did not make an impression on the delegates, because his attempt to win UN support for foisting conditions favourable for the USA on Vietnam was all too obvious.

That evening, a reception was given on behalf of the US President in the Waldorf Astoria, the most famous and fashionable hotel in New York, for the delegations attending the 24th session of the General Assembly. This reception was organised in an extremely pompous manner. The guests were met by US Secretary of State Walter Rogers and the Chief of Protocol.

When the guests had all gathered there was a fanfare of music, an orchestra began to play, and the doorman announced:

"The President of the United States of America."

Nixon, his wife and Rogers mounted a specially prepared platform decorated all over with the American flag. As always, Nixon looked cheerful and smart.

The Chief of Protocol introduced each of the guests as they approached. Nixon said a few banal words to everyone.

My turn came round.

Nixon looked at me and said:

"I remember you. You're the specialist on Japan. You write books about it." Then he added in Russian: "I am very pleased to meet you."

"Mr. President," I remarked, "you are making great progress in your study of the Russian language."

"Unfortunately," he replied, speaking in English again, "I have very little time for that."

I have too many obligations and things to attend to."

It is clear that Nixon was taking a serious approach to relations with the Soviet Union and preparing for change in American foreign policy. John G. Stoessinger, an American professor who worked in the political department of the UN Secretariat, published a book entitled *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America*, in which he used historical examples to show the need for a change in American policy towards the USSR and China. Several months later he showed me a letter from Henry Kissinger which said that the President had asked that the author of the book be informed that he shared his opinions concerning American policy towards the USSR and China.

Washington could not but take into account such facts as the steady rise in the economic might and defence capability of the USSR and the continuous process of change in the correlation of forces in the international arena in favour of socialism and to the detriment of imperialism. The supporters of a more sober policy in the USA realised the great danger and the fatal consequences that a thermonuclear conflict between the world's two mightiest states would have. Far-sighted politicians, influential business circles and large sections of the public all began to realise more and more clearly that what was needed was the peaceful coexistence of two social systems, and cooperation between the USSR and the USA.

For a long time Soviet-American relations experienced difficulties, and considerable efforts were required on the part of the Soviet Union to create a basis for their positive development. In its policy the Soviet Union consistently combines a firm rebuff to the aggressive intrigues of

imperialism with a constructive approach to international problems. A great deal of advance work which required courage, patience and restraint led to the top-level meetings in Moscow and Washington between 1972 and 1974.

These meetings and the Soviet-American treaties and agreements resulting from them (on the basic principles of mutual relations between the USSR and the USA; the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems; on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms; on the prevention of nuclear war; and a number of treaties and agreements concerning the development of relations in the economic, scientific and cultural spheres) were important steps towards reducing the threat of a nuclear war breaking out, towards solving disputes around the negotiating table, and towards an overall improvement in the international situation.

After Nixon had been officially introduced the guests, as is usual, divided into small groups to share their impressions and the latest political news.

I exchanged a few words with Kissinger, who asked:

"What did you think of the President's speech? We had to do a lot of work on it."

"There are some new ideas," I replied, "but as far as Vietnam is concerned, I didn't notice anything positive."

"Everything in its own time," Kissinger laughed.

On instructions from the UN Secretary-General I often had to represent the Organisation when important international agreements were being signed in Washington. President Nixon also attended these official ceremonies.

Until 1973 he seemed not to have changed—he

was as confident, smart, easy to get on with and outwardly benevolent as ever. He also took an interest in UN affairs.

His activity in the field of foreign policy—particularly, his turning point in relations with the USSR—resulted in a number of important agreements being concluded, won him popularity with ordinary Americans, and ensured his great success in the 1972 presidential elections.

All this political capital, however, was soon squandered: Nixon's desire to remain in office at any price led to the Watergate scandal, which involved the misuse of power in order to conceal the criminal actions of his assistants during the 1972 elections. Struggling for power and influence, other groups within the American ruling classes forced Nixon to resign as President in August 1974.

In the autumn of 1966 N. T. Fedorenko, the Soviet representative on the UN, and I were invited to a reception. The lunch was being given by David Rockefeller, the chairman of the board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, to mark the opening of the bank's new offices. In the USA and, indeed, in the entire capitalist world the name Rockefeller is surrounded with a certain halo: the Rockefeller family owns the third most important bank in America and Standard Oil Co. (the largest in the world), has major investments in Latin America and the Middle East, and also owns many other firms and corporations. The family's wealth is measured in tens of thousands of millions of dollars. In 1966 David's brother Nelson was governor of New York State, one of the largest and richest in the country, and people said he had aspirations to the Presidential chair. Before becoming gov-

ernor of New York State he had been deputy to the Secretary of State on Latin American questions. In 1968 he had great chances to be the Republican candidate for President: it was only in the last stage of the selection process—at the Party Congress in August—that he was overtaken by Richard Nixon. Later, in 1974, he became Vice-President of the USA. David's other brother, Winthrop, was governor of the state of Arkansas. David Rockefeller, who actively engaged in international affairs, enjoyed no less influence than his brother Nelson, and the borderline between his political interests and the interests of the Chase Manhattan Bank was not very clear. "What is good for the Chase Manhattan Bank is good for America," is the motto of the Rockefellers.

David Rockefeller was a member of the National Committee on USA-China Relations, which was established in the middle of the 1960s, and halfway through the 1970s he was one of the initiators of the Trilateral Commission, which comprised representatives of business, community and scientific circles in the USA, Western Europe and Japan. In particular, the USA was represented in the Trilateral Commission by future President Carter, future Secretary of State Kissinger, and future assistant to President Carter for national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Commission drew up important recommendations for the governments of the leading capitalist countries.

Let us, however, return to the reception. Three men stood at the entrance to the large hall on the ground floor of the sixty-storey skyscraper greeting the guests. They were dressed almost identically in simple dark grey suits. The one standing in the middle, a short man, probably only stood out because of his bright-

red tie. Guests approached and shook hands with all three.¹

I could not work out which of them was the host and like all the other guests shook hands with each of them and introduced myself.

As is often the case at buffet lunches, large tables with hors d'oeuvres and hot dishes stood to the right of the entrance. Each of the guests went up to the table, where chefs dressed in white coats and hats served the various dishes according to the choice of each person. Small groups of guests milled around the tables and, together with Chief¹ Adebo, the Nigerian ambassador (an acquaintance of mine), I also went up to be served. The man in the red tie was standing quite close to us, and from the conversation I understood that he was David Rockefeller. He was not like his elder brother Nelson, whom I had met on an earlier occasion. David smiled politely with his thin lips at each of the people with whom he talked, but his pale, slightly puffy face hardly changed. His small, deep-set dark eyes looked coldly at the person he was talking with; it was the ambassador of an African country, and the latter's words were of little interest to the banker.

Having taken our plates of food in both hands, we sat down at the nearest table where we were joined by David Rockefeller. A general conversation started in which Rockefeller displayed great interest in the Cultural Revolution which had begun in China. My assertion, however, that this Cultural Revolution had nothing in common with culture and pursued the purely political, mercenary interests of the Maoists also aroused his interest, and he began to argue

¹ A title used in Nigeria to denote high-ranking representatives of various tribes.

with me and Ambassador Fedorenko, who had by now joined us. Rockefeller declared that the Cultural Revolution would bring with it the revival of Chinese politics, which he said, had been fettered by the bounds of totalitarianism and would awaken social forces and help China become a modern country.

During the subsequent conversation Rockefeller, speaking about the activity of the Committee on USA-China Relations, asserted that there was a great future for China and that, should the conditions in the country change, it would become an enormous market for the USA and other Western countries. China would become an open country for the entire Western world.

I hardly have to list the catastrophic consequences which the Cultural Revolution brought the Chinese people. Suffice it to say that the development of China was delayed for many years.

Rockefeller did not hide his love of power, and his words were weighty, as befitted a representative of such a family and the position of head of one of the largest banks in the USA.

I met David Rockefeller on later occasions, too: at receptions which he gave, sometimes in honour of the heads of diplomatic missions, sometimes in honour of the leadership of the UN Secretariat, and sometimes for completely different reasons. Rockefeller's office and his reception halls were on the top floors of the new skyscraper, the opening of which I attended. The corridors and reception area were hung with paintings by artists of various periods and trends. In 1970 David Rockefeller organised a large exhibition of paintings from Picasso's cubist period. This exhibition included Picasso's paint-

ings sent by the USSR from the Hermitage collection at Rockefeller's request.

I also met Rockefeller at meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private organisation involving many prominent politicians and public figures, such as Secretaries of State Rusk, Rogers and Kissinger, assistants to the President for national security M. Bundy and E. Rostow, and major scientists. This is the "nerve centre" of the monopolies, and is where the most important doctrines of American foreign policy are worked out.

David Rockefeller was often to be seen in photographs with heads of state and government. In March 1981 a *Wall Street Journal* correspondent asked him:

"You've been criticized for having access to various heads of state that often seems better than that of U.S. government officials. Do you feel it's inappropriate for a businessman to become too involved in politics?"

"I don't see anything that is inappropriate about meeting with heads of state," Rockefeller replied. "And most of them, I think, feel an exchange of views with a businessman who travels a lot and knows a lot can be productive. It gives them a different perspective than they may get merely from talking to diplomats or government officials."

The correspondent then began persistently asking Rockefeller about his attitude towards China, taking into account the fact that the Chinese repudiation in 1980-1981 of the economic obligations they had earlier assumed had provoked serious discontent in business circles in the USA, Japan and other Western countries.

"Chase," said the correspondent, "has been active in cultivating relations with China, yet

in general it seems U.S. business's euphoria about the Chinese market has waned. Do you have any projection on when the People's Republic will become an active trading market for the U.S.?"

"I have to admit," Rockefeller replied, "I never felt this was going to be an enormously profitable operation for us in the near future, and I do think the euphoria which developed a couple of years ago was probably unrealistic. The slower rate at which things are progressing now is in the interest of China as well as the trading partners of China. I still feel, however, with the cultural heritage of China and a population of one billion people, it has to be an important factor in the world. I should think that within a reasonable period of time, whether it's five years or 10 years, we'll be doing a lot more than we are now."

As a result of opposition on the part of the Western powers neither the German Democratic Republic nor the People's Republic of China were members of the United Nations at the beginning of the 1970s. The Federal Republic of Germany was not a member, either. The Soviet Union took the position that both German states should be simultaneously admitted to the Organisation. As though preparing for its entry into the UN, the FRG stepped up its activity in a number of specialised international organisations. The first West German observer at the UN was Sigismund von Braun, the brother of Wernher von Braun, the famous American nuclear missile specialist. He was followed by Walter Gehlhoff, who was close to the West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt. The two actively developed contacts with representatives

of various countries at the UN, while Walter Scheel, the West German foreign minister, did not miss a chance to visit New York, attending every session of the UN General Assembly. Here he met the heads of government and the foreign ministers of other countries who usually came to the opening of General Assembly sessions, as well as to take part in the general political discussion. Scheel also came to the 26th session of the General Assembly, at which one of the main questions was that of restoring the rights of the PRC in the UN.

As is usual in diplomatic practice, Walter Gehlhoff organised a lunch in honour of his minister. He gave the lunch in the residence of the West German representative, a small, old detached house sandwiched between two tall buildings on 57th Street, one of the central streets of New York. Invitations were sent to the representatives of a number of Western and Latin American countries which enjoyed most influence in UN circles (Great Britain, France, the USA, Belgium, Argentina, Brazil, *et al*). Scheel was, naturally, at the centre of attention. His light grey eyes sparkled animatedly as he scattered jokes and told amusing stories. When, as usually happens at diplomatic meetings, the general flow of the conversation around the table had divided into little streams, I began talking with the minister, whom I was sitting directly opposite. The narrow table permitted us to talk easily without raising our voices and thus attracting the attention of the others.

First we threw each other a few jokes, and then the conversation changed to political problems.

"Herr Minister," I said, "from time to time you show up in New York and remember our Organisation. When are the foreign ministers

of the two German states going to come to the General Assembly on a regular basis as members of the Organisation?"

"We are in no hurry to join the Organisation," Scheel replied. "First of all we need to solve our inter-German problems."

"Do you mean relations with the other German state?" I enquired.

"Yes," Scheel answered rigidly, "relations with East Germany. When we sort out all disputes with East Germany we shall apply for admission to the UN. I do not doubt," he smiled, "that East Germany will do the same thing."

"Isn't it strange," Gehlhoff broke into the conversation, "that there are two governments in one country? Albert Norden, one of the leaders of the East German government, was born in the same town as me and went to the same little school as I did. And now ... it's as though we're in different states, although we speak one language and have one culture, art and religion."

"You do, indeed, live in different states," I remarked. "Norden lives in the socialist German Democratic Republic, and you live in capitalist West Germany. It is hardly right to link questions of the participation of the two German states in international life with the problem of the unification of Germany. You know perfectly well that there was such a possibility in the first years after the end of the war, but neither West German politicians nor the Western powers wanted to make use of that possibility."

"It is hardly worth continuing this argument, gentlemen," French Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet interrupted. "It's an old story... We won't solve it now, but we'll spoil this beautiful lunch. It's better we enjoy the skill

of the German chef than partake of German or Russian eloquence."

Scheel nodded.

"I agree with the French ambassador," he said. "This is a beautiful lunch, but I would like to point out just one thing: the UN Charter contains certain discriminatory clauses with regard to Germany.¹ We Germans must take this into account. But these are future problems. This is not the place for political discussions. When we, in due course, join the Organisation, I promise to say all this from the rostrum of the General Assembly."

The French ambassador said that he hoped to derive satisfaction from this future speech, but that for the present he preferred to drink the Mosel wine in a toast to the future contribution of East and West Germany to the work of the Organisation.

In 1973 the GDR and the FRG became members of the UN at the 28th session of the General Assembly. This was an important diplomatic success for the socialist German state and a recognition of its growing role in international affairs.

Twice a year the leaders of specialised UN agencies meet with the Secretary-General to discuss questions of general interest and work out a coordinated policy. These meetings bear the title of the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC).

Attendance at the meetings is restricted (only the leaders of the specialised agencies and two

¹ The UN Charter (Article 107) provides for the possibility of armed repression by the forces of UN member countries of any revival of German fascism.

or three deputies to the Secretary-General are present) and important political problems are discussed. These have included problems such as that of the UN's attitude to China (before the rights of the PRC were restored) and its relations with the GDR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, both of which were subjected to discrimination in international organisations for many years.

Questions had also been discussed in the ACC of providing assistance to the victims of the American aggression in Vietnam, of the natural disasters in Nicaragua in 1972, and of the civil war in East Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1970 and 1971.

The first meeting is usually held in the spring, in the headquarters of one of the specialised agencies; the second is held at the UN headquarters in New York, as a rule in October, while the General Assembly is in session. This gives the leaders of the specialised bodies the opportunity to attend meetings of the Assembly, to make applications to individual committees, and to report on how individual recommendations of the General Assembly are being put into effect. Thus, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which, strictly speaking, is not a UN specialised institution but is, nonetheless, part of the "UN family", annually submits its report to the General Assembly for approval. It also submits reports on the implementation of General Assembly recommendations, in particular on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as reports on the implementation of the recommendations of a conference of states not possessing nuclear weapons, etc.

Great importance is attached to these meetings by the governments of the countries where they are held. This is understandable if we remember

that amongst those taking part in the meetings there are the heads of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as is well known, this bank has at its disposal multi-million sums which it can invest in the economy of foreign states under the guise of aid), the International Monetary Fund—an organisation called on to regulate currency relations between capitalist countries (and whose importance is especially great now, in the current period of confusion in the balance-of-payments system of the West and of intensifying contradictions between the main capitalist countries with regard to the question of the currency system as applied to European currencies in relation to the dollar, which has lost its former stability as a result of the crisis it endured), the World Health Organisation (which also has considerable financial and human resources to render assistance should an epidemic break out or some other natural disaster occur), the Food and Agriculture Organisation (which has considerable stocks of food-stuffs at its disposal), and other organisations.

As far as the economic and financial aid received by states was concerned, a lot depended on the stance taken by the leader of each of the above-mentioned organisations.

In April 1969 a meeting of the ACC was convened at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organisation in Rome. After the ACC had begun its work we received an invitation for an audience with Pope Paul VI. This, however, was not unexpected: in October 1966 the Pope had flown to New York specially to speak at the session of the General Assembly. This had been in spite of his old age, and it was also a break with papal tradition. In this way Pope Paul VI showed he was fully aware of the

importance of international organisations such as the UN and its specialised agencies.

Pope Paul VI and his entourage had realised that the old norms and the incorrigible traditions which ran right through the political and ideological doctrine of Catholicism had proved to be inadequate for the new era which had dawned and had come into clear conflict with its demands. There had arisen the problem of bringing about a transformation of all forms of the Church's activity.

A combination of social, economic, political and ideological processes and phenomena of the time had set the Church's leaders the task of maintaining their positions in the new historical conditions, of ensuring the Church's influence over the masses and stemming the tide away from religion, and of consolidating their status in the complex and contradictory life of modern society.

The Pope's meeting with the participants in the ACC session was one of the episodes in the struggle of the Church's hierarchy to join in modern life and go further towards satisfying the demands of the peoples of the developing countries.

It is probably not possible to find more chaotic and disorganised traffic than one finds on the streets of Rome. The mass of vehicles and the city's narrow old streets make traffic organisation an insoluble problem.

Our audience with Pope Paul VI had been set for 11 a.m. on April 18, 1969. The ACC meeting ended at 10:30, and it seemed we would be at least half an hour late. However, a motor-cycle escort with loud, ear-splitting sirens ensured we arrived at the Vatican precisely at 11.

The Vatican is a unique kind of state headed by the Pope. It has its own security service, its

own laws, its own citizenship, special prices, and so on.

At the entrance to the Vatican the tall papal guards recruited in Switzerland and dressed in bright striped uniforms saluted us. To this day their uniforms are made according to patterns drawn by Michelangelo.

Our meeting with the Pope took place in a small, modestly furnished room, in the centre of which there stood a platform with a microphone. Along the sides of the room there were two small tables for the people attending the Pope.

The Pope's face looked tanned, and his lively and intelligent eyes sparkled as he mounted the platform with an easy and energetic step. U Thant was given the floor and made a speech in which he talked about the main problems facing the session of the ACC, after which the Pope spoke. In a fairly long speech, which he made in French, Paul VI supported what U Thant had said and declared that the Vatican would make every effort to ensure that the United Nations' programme for a second decade of development was successfully put into effect, that it would facilitate an improvement in the material standard of living of the peoples, and that it would lead to the elimination of poverty and destitution in the world.

In the middle of the 1960s a definite trend was noticed in UN activity gradually to transfer main emphasis from the basic, i.e. political, problems to socio-economic and scientific-technical questions, which, although important in themselves, were of a subordinate, auxiliary nature from the point of view of the UN's principal task of maintaining peace and security. This trend noticeably grew stronger at the end of the 1960s. In 1969 and 1970 the UN spent 85 per cent of its budget on socio-economic activity, while

less than 15 per cent went on the implementation of political measures. The idea that it would be expedient further to increase the proportion of UN expenditure which went on socio-economic needs also crept into the Pope's remarks.

Next there was a conversation between the Pope and U Thant, in which three of the UN Secretary-General's deputies also took part. This meant that the group was of a somewhat peculiar composition, since of the people with whom Pope Paul VI was talking, only the Frenchman Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, was a Catholic. The rest of us were either atheist or semi-atheist (U Thant told me that he believed only in the philosophical side of Buddhism and that he was not a religious person).

The Pope, of course, was well informed of this fact, and the conversation was therefore of an especially businesslike, purposeful nature. Paul VI wanted to show that the problems troubling the peoples of the world and finding reflection, to some extent or other, in the activity of the UN and its institutions, were not unknown to "Christ's vicar on earth" and that he was ready, as far as he was able, to promote that part of UN activity which involved maintaining peace in the world and giving help to suffering nations. It was clear that the Pope had a good knowledge of the activity of the UN, of its structure, and of the possibilities of its specialised bodies.

At the end of the meeting the Pope presented each of us with an expertly crafted silver medal bearing a bas-relief of his image.

THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE

The Silver Jubilee of the UN

October 1970 saw the 25th anniversary of the formation of the UN, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, US President Richard Nixon, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Mauritanian President and chairman of the Organisation of African Unity Moktar Ould Daddah, and many others (in all, the heads of 70 delegations) spoke at the jubilee ceremonies and in the political discussion.

In a speech summing up some of the results of the UN's activity, Andrei Gromyko listed all the constructive decisions, which the Organisation had adopted in its 25 years.

"These," he said, "include the well-known General Assembly resolutions on curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament;¹ the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the decisions concerning the recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of colonial peoples for their freedom and concerning the provision of moral and material support to them in that struggle; the United Nations Declaration on

¹ On the Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests (1959-1960); On General and Complete Disarmament (1959) *et al.*

the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and on the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty; the General Assembly resolution on the strict observance of the prohibition of the use of force in relations between States; the Security Council resolution on the political settlement of the Middle East conflict and the Security Council decisions on measures to be taken in regard to the racist regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonialists. The list of useful decisions adopted by various United Nations organs could be continued... A comparison of all the areas in which the United Nations has achieved success during this quarter of a century, with the areas in which it has failed, leads to the conclusion that on the whole the balance of its activities has been positive."¹

October 24, the day the UN Charter came into force, is celebrated every year as United Nations Day. It is traditional for the UN Secretary-General and the chairman of the General Assembly to make a ceremonial speech on this day in the UN headquarters to the delegations of all member countries.

In 1970 the jubilee events were planned long in advance of October 24, but, quite unexpectedly, the heads of state and government, the ministers, the heads of the delegations, U Thant and some of his deputies received an invitation in Richard Nixon's name to attend a lunch at the White House on that day in honour of the 25th session of the General Assembly.

¹ Official Record of the General Assembly. Twenty-fifth Session. Plenary meetings. Volume II: Verbatim Records of Meetings 15 September-17 December 1970. 1877th meeting-21 October 1970. United Nations. New York, 1974, p. 11.

U Thant appealed to Secretary of State William Rogers not to spoil the US's own reception that day, and not to place the heads of the delegations in a difficult position.

Rogers replied that he was not in charge of White House protocol. Of no help either was the appeal by Charles Yost, the permanent representative of the USA, to Henry Kissinger, special assistant to President Nixon. Yost was given to understand that the President himself had indicated which date to choose.

Most of the heads of delegations and government leaders decided not to annoy the master of the White House. The only people to refuse to travel to Washington were Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah, and six or seven foreign ministers.¹

The choice of October 24 for the dinner in the White House, the same day as the UN Secretary-General was to give a ceremonial reception, was seen by many diplomats as a direct demonstration of dissatisfaction on the part of the American administration with U Thant and the United Nations as a whole. A shrewd and clever diplomat, U Thant at once realised this and did not even attempt to change the date of the UN reception and the jubilee concert. All events took place on October 24, as had been planned.

As always, U Thant was calm and collected and smiled politely at his guests. But he was clearly disappointed. It had been brought to his attention via unofficial channels that the British Conservative government of Edward Heath had also spoken in favour of his retiring

¹ By this time Andrei Gromyko and the foreign ministers of other socialist countries had already left New York.

when his term of office expired at the end of 1971.

The opposition of two great powers with the right to exercise a veto in the elections of the Secretary-General in the Security Council threatened U Thant with defeat, a fact which he understood perfectly.

On January 18, 1971, at a press conference dealing with the results of the 25th session of the General Assembly, U Thant made a declaration which was unexpected for everyone: a UN Secretary-General, he said, should serve just one term. He was subsequently forced to agree to a second term, because the great powers could not reach agreement in time on a suitable candidate. This meant that he had given them a whole year to find someone to replace him. He himself did not intend to remain as UN Secretary-General after November 1971 under any circumstances. In taking this stance, U Thant referred to the circumstances of a personal nature and the state of his health.

After U Thant had made this declaration in January 1971 representatives of many countries began to make pilgrimages to him, and ministers and ambassadors alike insisted that he alter his decision.

In June 1971 the Organisation of African Unity adopted a decision supporting U Thant's candidacy for the post of Secretary-General. A similar decision was adopted by the Arab League, and many other developing countries spoke in favour of U Thant remaining at his post for one more term. U Thant took heart at these developments.

In a private conversation I once asked U Thant if his declaration had also been his final word on the subject.

He replied:

"I would like to discuss this problem once again at a later stage."

It was clear that he was not excluding the possibility of re-examining his position. He then began to think about whether to try and remain for one more term, or, at least, for two to three years.

This did not go unnoticed, and the bourgeois press of the USA, Great Britain, Holland and other imperialist powers unleashed a campaign against him. He was accused of starting the war in the Middle East by withdrawing UN forces from the Arab-Israeli border in 1967, and he was criticised for "non-objectivity" in his attitude to the war in Vietnam, etc.

To counter U Thant, the candidacy was widely propagandised of the Finnish representative at the UN, Max Jacobson, who had been proposed by the Scandinavian countries.

In October 1971 a stomach ulcer from which U Thant suffered grew worse. This gave the American press grounds to allege that he was incurably ill, that he was in no state to conduct affairs, and that he should therefore be replaced.

This time the British, who had a reputation for being experienced and skilled diplomats, decided not to conceal their temper. As U Thant told me, he was telephoned in hospital by Joseph Bradshaw Godber, British Minister of State from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who said: "We wish you a most speedy recovery. It would, however, not be decent of us to ask you, a sick man, to agree to be re-elected for a new term and carry this heavy burden."

Telling me about this, U Thant smiled sadly and said that after such a declaration on the part of the British any talk that he could once again work as Secretary-General was unrealistic.

The position taken by China differed very lit-

tle from that of the USA and Great Britain. The Chinese did not want to support U Thant. While in hospital he received Qiao Guanhua, deputy foreign minister of the PRC and head of the Chinese delegation at the General Assembly session, and Huang Hua, the permanent representative of the PRC at the UN. The two Chinese did not offer their opinion on the elections of the Secretary-General, but neither did they ask U Thant to remain in his post. Instead they limited themselves to asking him to visit the PRC without specifying in which capacity they would like to see him: that of Secretary-General, or simply as a private individual. They simply said: "in any capacity".

This deliberate vagueness on the part of the Chinese finally convinced U Thant that he should not alter the stance he had already announced. It was better to leave the post while most countries were encouraging him to stay than it was to be rejected in the Security Council as a result of a veto.

The Elections for a New UN Secretary-General

On December 17, 1971, the hall where the Security Council meets was unusually empty. There were no journalists or photographers to be seen, and the television cameras being prepared to cover the day's events. The number of UN Secretariat employees present had also been reduced to a minimum. This was a closed meeting of the Security Council, on the agenda of which was the election of a new UN Secretary-General.

Before the meeting was opened one of U Thant's assistants handed me an envelope. It was a letter from U Thant in which he asked me to bring

to the attention of the Security Council the fact that he categorically refused to have his candidacy put to vote in the Council, even for an incomplete term.

The list of candidates who had long since been proposed and discussed by governments, regional groups and organisations included Jacobson (Finland), Jarring (Sweden), Waldheim (Austria), Guerrero (Chile), Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (Iran), Amerasinghe (Sri Lanka), Makonnen (Ethiopia) and others. In order to be elected a candidate needed nine votes without any of the permanent members of the Council voting against him.

In the first two rounds of voting no single candidate won a qualified majority. The second round resulted in former Austrian foreign minister Kurt Waldheim receiving the largest number of votes (11), while Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, the Argentinian representative (who had been unexpectedly proposed by the Western countries), received 10 votes and Max Jacobson—9. However, each of these was voted against by one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

The General Assembly was to close on December 22. This meant that the situation was as follows: if the Council could not reach agreement on a new Secretary-General, the question would have to be set aside for a year, until the next session of the General Assembly. U Thant, however, as I have said, had refused to remain in his post, even for a limited period. The delegations were extremely anxious and drew the attention of the Security Council members to the need to adopt a positive decision on someone's candidacy.

At this point Kurt Waldheim stepped up his activity. The tall figure of the Austrian could be constantly seen in the UN lobby. The Ameri-

can newspapers published photographs of Waldheim talking with the representatives of Japan, Italy, Belgium and the USSR.

On December 21 the meeting of the Security Council opened in a tense atmosphere. At the suggestion of the French representative the list of candidates included all those who had received more than 5 votes in the preceding rounds.

The ballot box was opened. De Rozas had received 12 votes, but his candidacy did not go through because one of the permanent members of the Council had voted against him. Waldheim had received 11 votes, two of the permanent members of the Council (according to correspondents, the USA and the PRC) having abstained from voting.¹

The following day the General Assembly approved Kurt Waldheim's election as UN Secretary-General for a five-year term (until December 22, 1976).

Kurt Waldheim was born in 1918 and was educated at the University of Vienna and the Consular Academy of Vienna. Immediately after the war he began working in the Austrian foreign ministry, where he headed the personnel department. He was also general director of the department for political affairs, and held a number of diplomatic posts in Paris and Ottawa. From 1965 to 1968 he was Austria's permanent representative at the UN. While Minister of Foreign Affairs he helped bring about the development of Soviet-Austrian relations. In April 1971 he stood as a candidate in the presidential elections for the bourgeois People's Party, but was defeated.

In July 1972 the Soviet government invited Waldheim to visit the Soviet Union, where he was received by Aleksei Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko. In his conversations with the Soviet

¹ *The New York Times*, December 22, 1971.

leaders the UN Secretary-General showed a realistic understanding of the international situation and gave a high appraisal of the Soviet government's measures aimed at lessening international tension and strengthening universal security. In 1976 he was re-elected to the post of UN Secretary-General.

The Soviet Peace Programme and the UN

The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union once again approved the main aims of Soviet foreign policy, which is directed at ensuring, together with other socialist countries, favourable international conditions.

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU the main directions of the struggle for peace, international cooperation, freedom and the independence of peoples were formulated in the Soviet Peace Programme. The CPSU saw and sees its tasks as being: to deliver mankind from the threat of thermonuclear war; to liquidate seats of war in South-East Asia and the Middle East; immediately to repulse any acts of aggression and international arbitrariness; to promote detente and establish in international relations the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial and equal cooperation; to conclude agreements on the prohibition of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons; and to step up the fight to curb the arms race, convene a world conference on disarmament, and cut back military expenditure, above all, that of the major states. The Soviet Union strives to see the full implementation of UN decisions on the elimination of the remaining colonial regimes, and it is ready to cooperate with other countries to solve such problems as preserving



Andrei Gromyko and UN Secretary —
General Kurt Waldheim talking in Moscow (July 1972)



Aleksei Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council
of Ministers, U Thant, UN Secretary-General,
and Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
of the USSR, during U Thant's visit to Moscow
in June 1970



At the session of the Interparliamentary Union in Helsinki. The floor is taken by President Urho Kekkonen of Finland (January 1973)



UN Secretary-General U Thant and Syrian representative George Tomeh during the discussion of the question on Southern Rhodesia (November 1970)



A vote in the UN Security Council





Jeanne Cissé, a public and political figure of the Republic of Guinea who holds the International Lenin Prize "For the Promotion of Peace among Nations", at a Security Council meeting



Addis Ababa, February 1972. Colin Crowe, the representative of the United Kingdom, votes against the resolution on Southern Rhodesia



At the Security Council session in Panama
(March 1973)

the environment and carrying out research into and conquering outer space and the World Ocean.

The implementation of the Peace Programme brought tangible results. A lessening of the danger of a military confrontation between two different social systems became possible thanks to active Soviet foreign policy and the joint efforts of many states making use of, in particular, the opportunities of the UN.

The agreements concluded between the USSR and the USA between 1972 and 1974 were of particular importance in creating an atmosphere of detente. Above all, this is true of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, whereby the USSR and the USA undertook to make every effort to exclude the risk of a military conflict between them, as well as between any other countries.

Peaceful coexistence became the law of the times. Meetings between Soviet leaders and those of the USA, France, the FRG, India and other countries were a major contribution to the cause of developing bilateral relations between states with different social systems, and also exerted enormous influence on the development of international relations in the whole world.

The wave of national liberation movements grew stronger, too, and the patriots of South Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos won historic victories. The collapse of the colonial empire of Portugal, the proclamation of the independence of Guinea-Bissau, and the elimination of colonial rule over Angola and Mozambique were all important steps along the path of implementing the task of granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, which was proclaimed by the United Nations as early as 1960.

The UN cannot stand to one side of the main road of the development of world politics. The

main international problems have found, and continue to find reflection in the work of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the numerous committees and conferences organised by or taking place under the aegis of the UN.

The stance taken by the UN and the decisions it adopts exert considerable influence on the course of international events and world public opinion.

The wind of great historical change in the world has also resulted in irreversible processes in the United Nations. In 1984 the flags of 158 states flew outside the UN skyscraper in New York. However, not only has the numerical composition of the UN altered: radical qualitative changes have also taken place. After the many states which became independent in the 1950s and 1960s joined the Organisation it was no longer the imperialist powers and their allies in aggressive military blocs that formed the majority, but peaceable states—socialist countries and developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This fact considerably strengthened the UN and made it more representative and viable.

This change in the composition of the UN created more favourable conditions for the Organisation to be used by the forces of peace and social progress.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries regard the UN as an arena of active political struggle against aggression, and are trying to turn it into an effective instrument for maintaining universal peace and strengthening the security of the peoples.

On March 14, 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, talked with UN Secretary-General Peres de Cuellar. Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised that the main thing now was to work for an end

to the arms race, especially the race in nuclear arms, and not to permit it to spread to outer space. The UN, he said, can and must make its contribution to accomplishing this task. He reasserted that the Soviet Union, being a staunch opponent of resolving international disputes by force, had always attached great importance to the UN as an effective instrument of peace and that it was prepared to take new steps so that the just and democratic principles on which the UN was founded 40 years ago might become firmly established in the practice of international relations.¹

The 39th session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to declare 1985 United Nations Year. At its meeting on March 28, 1985 the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee considered and approved a plan of measures for marking this year in the USSR. The overall direction of these measures consists in making ever greater efforts to lessen international tension and curb the arms race.

Soviet diplomacy is waging a resolute and consistent struggle in the UN for a lasting peace and disarmament, in defence of the freedom and independence of the peoples standing up for their sovereign rights, for the development of international cooperation on an equal basis, and against the imperialist policy of interfering in the affairs of other peoples.

At the beginning of the 1980s the international situation was seriously aggravated through the fault of imperialist and hegemonistic circles.

Proceeding from the seriousness of the situation, the 26th Congress of the CPSU drew up a set of measures aimed at strengthening peace, restraining the arms race, and bringing about

¹ *Pravda*, March 15, 1985.

a political settlement of conflicts. The world public gave these proposals a high appraisal, calling them the Peace Programme for the 1980s. The CPSU and the Soviet government are now working urgently and purposefully to implement this Programme, advancing new initiatives to improve the situation in the world and lessen the danger of nuclear war.

On June 23, 1981 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted an appeal "To the Parliamentarians and Peoples of the World", which called for everything to be done to prevent a new world war.

In the summer of 1982 the Soviet Union declared that it was unilaterally accepting the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Soviet government called on all nuclear powers to follow its example and assume similar obligations, a step which would considerably further the growth of mutual trust and a normalisation of the international situation.

In January 1983 the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation adopted a Political Declaration, which set out a concrete programme for curbing the arms race and strengthening peace and international security. A central place in this programme is occupied by a suggestion to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The signing of an international document such as this would create a firm basis for maintaining and consolidating peace on the planet. This is of particular importance for Europe, where the concentration of nuclear weapons has reached an especially dangerous level. The USA is also deploying nuclear weapons at its bases in Asia and the Pacific Ocean. In June 1983 the USSR Supreme Soviet noted: "One of

the most urgent tasks of the present time is to put an end to the growth of nuclear weapons. The accomplishment of this task would be a major contribution towards lessening the danger threatening the peoples of the world."¹

Proceeding from this, the USSR Supreme Soviet instructed the Soviet government to approach the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the People's Republic of China with a proposal that all nuclear powers simultaneously freeze all their nuclear weapons in both the quantitative and qualitative respect. Alternatively, such a freeze could initially come into effect with regard to the USSR and the USA on a date to be agreed, and later with regard to the other nuclear powers.

A freeze on all the components making up nuclear arsenals would sharply raise the level of trust in relations between states possessing nuclear weapons, and would also allow a resolute step to be made towards an improvement in the general atmosphere in the world.

In accordance with the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Soviet government approached the governments of the USA, Great Britain, France and China in June 1983 with a proposal that all nuclear powers freeze their nuclear weapons quantitatively and qualitatively. The proposal stressed that, in taking such a major initiative, the Soviet Union far from considered a freeze an end in itself, but regarded it as an effective first step along the path towards reducing and eventually totally liquidating nuclear weapons, thereby completely eliminating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

However, the aggressive forces of imperialism are continuing on their course towards a con-

¹ *Pravda*, June 17, 1983.

frontation with the socialist world and towards using force to suppress the striving of the peoples for national and social liberation. They are also trying to dictate their will to other states and to run their natural and labour resources.

For many years I had occasion to observe Chinese policy in the international arena, as well as to acquaint myself with the life of the Chinese people, its striving to build a better society and its hopes for a better future.

Soviet people have always felt respect and friendship for the Chinese people. The aspiration of the Soviet government to develop links with the PRC on a good-neighbourly basis was once again proclaimed from the highest tribune of Soviet Communists--the 26th Congress of the CPSU. An improvement in relations between the USSR and the PRC would meet the fundamental, long-term interests of the peoples of the two countries, as well as the interests of peace and security.

I have not lost faith that the USSR will have a good neighbour and friend in the Chinese people, and I believe that the border between our countries will become a border of peace and friendship.

On the pages of this book I have dealt with a number of major international conflicts which threatened universal peace. As a result of the activity of imperialist forces some of these conflicts (the Middle East, Namibia, etc.) have retained their explosive character. What is more, new seats of war have formed, the arms race is continuing at greatly increased speeds, and the overall international situation has grown worse. We, Soviet people, however, are optimists. The worsening of the international situation and the increasing threat of war are encouraging hundreds of millions to join the fight for peace.

They counter the dangerous plans of imperialist reaction with resolute actions aimed at saving mankind from the threat of a thermonuclear conflict, at bringing about disarmament, and at solving all international disputes around the negotiating table.

Peace is being protected by impressive forces which have at their disposal everything they need to defend their freedom and their right to independent development and creative labour.

People want peace, not war; they want calm, not war fever; and they want prosperity, not an exhausting arms race. Such are the hopes, the dreams and the desires of the overwhelming majority of humanity. This makes us confident that, in the end, we will once again manage to turn the development of events around and work towards consolidating peace, restricting the arms race, and developing international cooperation. An appeal flew around the planet which, quite justly, came to be called the Peace Code. I am talking about the fixed standards of conduct proposed by the Soviet Union to govern relations between the nuclear powers. These standards of conduct are based on the irrefutable fact that it is today of key importance for peace and the security of the peoples that the nuclear arms race be curbed and that the vital interests of all mankind require this, as does the responsibility of state leaders before current and future generations.

The Peace Code and the standards it contains are a logical development of the peaceable foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the nuclear age. If I may put it this way, it is a direct descendant of Lenin's Decree on Peace and the peace programmes adopted at recent congresses of the CPSU; it is, in fact, the flesh and blood of the policy of peaceful coexistence proclaimed by Lenin. At

the same time, this Code, this collection of standards has absorbed the main, most important demands, wishes and suggestions of the planet's peace-loving forces, which are fighting against the nuclear arms race and nuclear death. This once again bears convincing witness to the fact that the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union coincides with the fundamental interests of mankind and meets people's innermost hopes and conceptions of peace and international security.

LEAVING NEW YORK

In April 1973 I returned to the Soviet Union. This time my wife and I chose to travel by sea. The Italian liner on which we sailed took eight days to reach Genoa. The difference in time between New York and Moscow is eight hours. If you make the journey from New York by plane you feel ready to drop by the time you reach Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow after a sleepless night and 12 to 13 hours in the air. It also takes you several days to adapt to the new shift between day and night. When you travel by sea, however, the clocks are advanced one hour every day and, almost without noticing it, you become accustomed to European time.

The chaotic days of preparation for departure and numerous farewell receptions were over. After my return from Panama every day had been taken up by one protocol event or another: dinner with the Secretary-General, lunch on behalf of my colleagues, the other Under-Secretary-Generals, or dinner with Security Council members—the representatives of the USSR, Japan, India, Czechoslovakia, etc. There had been many toasts and kind wishes, while at one of the last meetings of the Security Council the chairman—Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Antonio Tack—had made a statement in which he gave a high appraisal of my activity. At the suggestion of Ambassador Sen of India this statement

was adopted as a Security Council decision. I would also like to note that my country also appreciated my activity at the UN: I was awarded two orders and medals.

I gave a reciprocal farewell reception on board the liner. A lot of people attended, including leading employees of the UN Secretariat, ambassadors representing members of the Security Council, and my friends and colleagues.

The beautiful liner drew away from the wharf and we went up on deck to have one more look at the enormous city where we had spent eight long years. Manhattan looked ruffled by its enclosure of skyscrapers. Behind the gigantic Pan American building there stood the forty-storey skyscraper of the UN headquarters, a comparatively small construction by New York standards. In this complex of concrete, steel, glass and marble I had spent many more than a thousand days and nights. The "between season" periods of relative calm had been replaced with marathon debates and bitter collisions lasting several days and nights in the Security Council during international conflicts. And yet, every time I approached the entrance to this palace, in front of which the wind from the East River fans the many-coloured flags of the UN member states atop their tall flagstaffs, I was anxious about the forthcoming debates and consultations both around the conference table and during meetings in the lobby. There you always had to be ready urgently to repulse some allegation, and you had to have a sense of instant reaction and stoic self-restraint. You must be prepared against unexpected attacks from political opponents or against importunate questioning by omnivorous journalists who tirelessly kept their watch practically every day. The fact that this international enclave is situated in the centre of gigantic New

York also tells appreciably on the lives and day-to-day activity of the employees of missions and the UN Secretariat, beginning with the conditions under which they live and ending with their carrying out their duty. Throughout the forty years the UN has been in existence the American Senate has not found the time to ratify the agreement on the legal status of the Organisation on American territory. The American authorities sometimes interpret the status and rights of international officials and diplomats at the UN in their own way. However many times, even in my memory, did the Soviet representation at the UN come under fire, however many times were the employees of the Soviet, Cuban, Yugoslavian and other missions victims of attacks, and however many times did hired demonstrators rant and rave outside the headquarters of individual missions? During all this the police displayed Olympic composure: the organisers of the attacks and outrages, who are so well known to everyone, remained "unidentified" and unpunished.

The great city disappeared over the horizon and our liner sailed swiftly out into the open sea. I went to enjoy the boundless expanse of water and breathe the sea air saturated with iodine and salt. Dulcet Italian music was flowing over the deck, and I became absorbed in thought, I remembered the war, in which I took part, and our hopes that it would be the last. The millions of victims and the horrendous destruction it had brought had led mankind to the idea of finding an alternative to war as a means of solving conflicts and achieving national security. The need to prevent a new war was set out in the UN Charter, while the new thing in the idea of creating the United Nations consisted in the fact that it was to be based neither

on force, arms or the predominance of the economic might of a few over the poverty of many, nor on prejudices and intolerance, but on the striving of the peoples of the world for cooperation, mutual understanding and common sense, their striving to build and not destroy, and the need for security, peace and justice. The entire experience of the Second World War, which was a rigorous test of the resolve of Soviet people to repel what the fascists wanted to thrust on them by force, the liberation wars of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the process of decolonisation and many other instances where the imperialist powers have used force or the threat of it have proved beyond all doubt that the time has passed when "peace and security" could be thrust on nations. The great wisdom of the states which founded the United Nations and the immense pride of those who believe in internationalism consist in the fact that peace and security can only be achieved by joint efforts and for everyone alike.

Forty years have passed since United Nations was created. This is a comparatively short period for history, and the UN is a completely new phenomenon in the history of mankind. It embodies the ideals which many sceptics regard as premature, given the existence of such diverse socio-economic systems and state formations.

All the same, these ideals have encouraged 158 states to come together to build that which has not yet been built: a system of collective security and social justice. Those who believe in the UN believe that conflicts can be settled by peaceful means, that economic injustice can be overcome without violence, and that all people are entitled to human rights. We must realise that if we refuse to defend these ideals now that

the international situation has been aggravated because of militarist circles in the West, the threat of a nuclear catastrophe will grow even more. Without the peoples' understanding and support the United Nations will fail in its cause of accomplishing the great aims of peace, justice and prosperity for all.

Sages of many countries and nations teach that man cannot exist if he has nothing pleasant to look forward to. The great Russian writer Lev Tolstoy said that life must and could be a ceaseless joy. If life does not grant you great joy it is merely because the path you are following leads in the wrong direction. After all, it is our attitude to what surrounds us that brings us joy or otherwise.

I devoted almost half my life as a diplomat, my best and most fruitful years, to serving the United Nations, and I do not regret it. I believe that human intellect will be victorious and will not permit the death of civilisation.

The United Nations must and will play its role in the salvation of mankind.

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